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DIMENSION:
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Volume 6 Fall 1968 Number 1

John M. Mulder, *Editor*

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DIMENSION

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EDITORIAL

NOTES ON THE DIMENSIONS AND RELEVANCE OF THEOLOGY

Contemporary theology is passing through a period of crisis, and the implications of this crisis are evident within the church, its seminaries, and the contemporary world. It is essentially a crisis of identity; there seems to be little or no direction to the fitful, erratic, faddish theological trends which have been characteristic of the present situation for the last decade. Increasingly, theologians find it difficult to say what theology is or what theologians should be doing. Confusion, uncertainty, and uneasiness have taken the fore; the church grapples for a hold; and individual Christians view the whole scene with a sense of dismay.

Theology's identity crisis was perhaps no more clearly evident than at the 1968 Gallahue Conference held here at Princeton Theological Seminary. The theme of the conference was "Quo Vadis?," i.e., where do we go from here. It was hoped that theologians assembled would illumine the problems and direction of theology in the wake of the abortive God-is-dead movement. However, one can recall Hugh T. Kerr's summation at the end of the conference: Not only could the participants not define the nature of contemporary theology's task but they were even unable to identify the problems with which theology must begin.

In December, 1968, 90 scholars and intellectuals gathered at Princeton University for a meeting sponsored by the International Association for Cultural Freedom and discussed the problems of a world confronted by massive technological, economic, political, and social change. The absence of theologians was perhaps only noticed by the theological community, but one can scarcely expect a constructive contribution to the solution of complex problems from men who are unsure about what they are doing or from a discipline which is undefined.

Furthermore, the present crisis confronting the curriculum in this seminary indicates the nature of theology's confusion. The abolition of comprehensive examinations for the Bachelor of Divinity degree and the anticipated dropping of required study of Biblical languages may provide the freedom for more constructive study of theology; however, it is also evidence of the uncertainty here about what professors should be teaching and what students should be learning. New courses proliferate, and one senses that theology is no longer worthy of study per se but only in relation to sociology or psychology or literature or the Bible or politics. In throwing off the shackles of parochial interests, theology has so extended its dimensions that it appears to be either everything or nothing, rarely anything in itself.

In the midst of all this, students cry that their theological education be relevant. Behind this demand is the concern that their studies involve too much theory and leave them unprepared for the application of theory to the problems of a church in a chaotic world. However, behind some of the calls for relevancy one also senses the assumption that theology is not relevant in a secular world and that even if its manifold identity crises were resolved, it would not make any difference. Thus the demand for relevancy is in part a rejection of theology and its claims in order to embrace the possibility of a theory of action. It is maintained that the study of such a theory is relevant because it will provide the answers to the overwhelming problems of contemporary society. Furthermore, behind much of the call for relevancy is an anti-intellectualism which demands that education provide answers rather than pose problems. The Socratic agony and worth of examining life is rejected. Knowledge must be integrated for the student; relevancy must be provided. Absent is the Kierkegaardian insight that there is no knowledge unless it is personal, that Pilate crucifies truth when he asks what it is. Similarly, it may be that the student precludes the relevancy of theological education when he demands that it must be provided and when he fails to realize that it is he who must make his education relevant. It is he who must use his mind to integrate knowledge, and no professor or institution can achieve this for him. Indeed, aside from the noxious paternalism which such a cry for relevancy implies, the truly relevant education is the absolutely irrelevant education in a world in which change increases and multiplies in intensity.

Today one rarely hears that the life of the mind is a worthy pursuit in itself and that the pursuit of knowledge is not to be subjected to the service of political ideology or social action. Just as dogmatic certainty about issues of doctrine has at times obscured the church's view of God's work in the world, so also abnegation of the critical resources of the mind for the purity of action in the world destroys the prophetic message of the church. While the truth sets us free, it does not liberate us to confine it in the service of our own social or even philosophical concerns. Perpetually, man's impulse is to escape from the freedom to which he has been called, and today students as well as professors must reclaim the freedom of the mind which is theirs. In Augustinian terms, we believe in order that we might understand, and the process of understanding involves continuous criticism of that which we proclaim in the name of God.

Only by exercising the freedom of the mind offered to us in Christ and by remaining critical can theological education become relevant. In refusing to reject our freedom, we can be free to be wrong. In the freedom of the exercise of the mind, theology can obtain a new life and determine its identity and task in a chaotic world. It seems obvious that this identity will not be resolved de novo, forged out of the vacuity of the present, but only through a return to the two sources of the church's identity—the Bible and the church's history. Only by studying what we believe is the revelation of God in his Word can we determine what words we must speak today. Only by studying what we were and did can we determine what we are and must be doing. Identity crises for theology and the church are not new, but they have never been resolved without recourse to a search for God's Word in the Bible's words or without an analysis of the church's past. Only by seeking to understand the past and God's activity and message then can we respond to his Word obediently and begin to speak intelligible, relevant words now. However, the task is ours alone. If we consign the integration of knowledge to the curriculum of an institution, rather than to the minds of its students and professors, if we demand that the relevance of theology be provided rather than determined by the critical exercise of the mind's freedom, theologians and the church they seek to serve will continue to flounder in the chaos of their own identity.

—John M. Mulder

SOME ASPECTS OF KARL BARTH'S DOCTRINE OF DEATH

BY RUSSEL L. STAPLES

I. INTRODUCTION

THE purpose of this paper is to investigate some aspects of Barth's doctrine of death as it appears in his mature work. No attempt is made to compare the doctrine set forth in his early work, *Die Auferstehung der Toten,* with that expounded in the *Church Dogmatics.*

This is a fairly broad investigation. It seems necessary at the outset to take a brief look at his anthropological method before coming to grips with his doctrine. Death as a theological concept has meaning, of course, only as it is related to a particular doctrine of man, and in Barth's system this in turn is based on the Christological Archetype. We shall thus move from the Archetype to the doctrine of man as soul and body in time and from thence to death. Next the discussion will proceed to a consideration of death in relation to both man's natural finitude, as willed and created by God, and sin. Inasmuch as Barth's doctrine of eternal life is related to the overcoming by Jesus of that death which is judgment, we will take a brief look at his doctrine of the atonement.

The paper is an exercise in analysis and no attempt is made to evaluate Barth's doctrine from the standpoint of any specific theological position or to set up a method for doing so. Rather, a number of criticisms from various standpoints are registered. It will be shown that Barth is consistent throughout in the application of his a priori constructs to the task of anthropology and man in death.

II. BARTH'S METHOD OF DOING THEOLOGY

Barth's fundamental epistemological proposition is theological

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KARL BARTH
1886-1968

I fear not death, but like a man
Tread virtue's path that I began.
If on me terror's gate shall ope
I shall dare all, yet live in hope.

—Tamino in Mozart's
Die Zauberflöte



‘I HAVE only a hazy feeling about the music played there where you now dwell. I once formulated my surmise about that as follows: whether the angels play only Bach in praising God I am not quite sure; I am sure, however, that *en famille* they play Mozart and that then also God the Lord is especially delighted to listen to them.’

—Barth in “A Letter of Thanks to Mozart”

‘Theology . . . is a peculiarly beautiful science. Indeed, we can confidently say that it is the most beautiful of all the sciences. To find the sciences distasteful is the mark of the philistine. It is an extreme form of Philistinism to find, or to be able to find, theology distasteful. The theologian who has no joy in his work is not a theologian at all. Sulky faces, morose thoughts and boring ways of speaking are intolerable in this science.’

—Barth in *Church Dogmatics*

‘The man who does not take it seriously that we are looking to that end [death], the man who does not realize what dying means, who is not terrified at it, who has perhaps not enough joy in life and so does not know the fear of the end, who has no trace of envy at the longevity of the patriarchs, who were not only one hundred but three hundred and four hundred and more years old, the man who, in other words, does not grasp the beauty of this life, cannot grasp the significance of “resurrection.” For this word is the answer to death’s terror, the terror that this life some day comes to an end, and that this end is the horizon of our existence. . . . Resurrection means not the continuation of this life, but life’s completion. To this man a “Yes” is spoken which the shadow of death cannot touch. In resurrection our life is involved, we men as we are and are situated. *We* rise again and no one else takes our place. . . . It is true that we cannot give ourselves, or persuade ourselves that we have, the hope that our life will be completed. It must be *believed,* in death’s despite. The man who does not know what death is does not know either what resurrection is. . . .’

—Barth in *Dogmatics in Outline*

and not philosophical and revolves about the concept that "God (and therefore also man as God's creature and image) can be known only through God."[1] Theological thought thus proceeds from reality to possibility; man's destiny is determined by God who always takes the initiative; i.e., God is the subject of every action. The eternal Being of God presents man with a history that determines all other history. Barth uses the term "theanthropology" to describe his system because it is a theology of God as the God of man and of man as the man of God.[2] In this system the Word of God is the source and criterion of theology. Faith must precede understanding.

Jesus Christ, as the "concrete universal" is the essential key to the understanding of God, the universe, and man. Whereas classical theology customarily commences with the constitution of man's being, existence, and nature, and proceeds from there to construct a doctrine of the human nature of Jesus Christ, in Barth's theology,[3] the the whole doctrine of anthropology is concentrated in Jesus Christ. Commencing with the human nature of Jesus Christ who is the revealing Word of God in respect to the nature of man as willed and created by God, Barth moves from the particular to the general in constructing his anthropology.[4] Because of his concern with man's original nature and because of the limitations of science and philosophy, Barth does not regard the methods of existentialism, phenomonology, and the exact sciences as being competent to produce a true knowledge of the whole man as willed and created by God. Thus it is that he turns to the human nature of Jesus Christ, the man without sin, for a knowledge of man: "In order to see man in his time correctly, we have investigated the being of the man Jesus in His time . . . in His resurrection from the dead. . . . Our anthropology can and must be based on Christology, but it cannot be deduced from it directly."[5]

Barth justifies his use of this method by pointing out that the correspondence between the being of man and the revelation of God in the life of Jesus Christ disqualifies the basic presupposition of natural theology (that man has an independent existence) and therefore also its method. Man is created and willed by God to have his being in fellowship with both God and his fellow man.[6] He is thus a being in relationship. This provides a further point of correspondence between man and Jesus, who Himself exists not in and for Himself but in relationship with God and man.[7]

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[1] *Antwort, Karl Barth zum siebzigsten Geburtstag am 10. Mai 1956.* Evangelischer Verlag. A.G. 1956. p. 285.

[2] Karl Barth, *The Humanity of God.* Richmond, 1960. p. 55.

[3] *Church Dogmatics* III/2, p. 344. (Hereafter abbreviated as *C.D.*)

[4] *C.D.* III/2, pp. 296ff.

[5] *C.D.* III/2, pp. 511f.

But there is also a warning as we have noted, for just as our human nature cannot be equated with that of Jesus Christ, or even with its own quintessential self, because it is impenetrably veiled beneath its sinfulness, so neither can anthropology be simply deduced from Christology. Therefore, Barth limits the field of his analogy of proportionality to the following four main aspects of the human nature of Jesus: man for God;[8] man for other men;[9] whole man;[10] the Lord of time.[11]

Our main concern in this study has to do with those items that relate to man's existence as an ordered unit of soul and body, within the limits of his allotted time; not excluding, however, God's gracious act of reconciliation which opens the way for man to become a partner of His own life and glory. One of the limitations that must be recognized at the outset is that the section of the *Church Dogmatics* which will deal with eschatology has not yet been published. In view of the many questions that Barth seems to leave unanswered in the last few pages of *C.D.*III/2 this is problematical. However, Barth has written so broadly on the matter in so many places that it is quite feasible to proceed in the light of the material that has been published.

III. THE CHRISTOLOGICAL ARCHETYPE (UR-BILD)

1. *Jesus as Soul and Body.*

Barth's fundamental declaration concerning the constitution of the human being of Christ is that He is not a union of two parts or two substances, but an ordered unity of soul and body. He is one whole man, embodied soul and besouled body.[1] The one is the other, and not merely besides it. This relationship endures during His death, resurrection and ascension.[2] Barth does not pay much attention to either the activity of the soul or the body as separate entities, but emphasizes their "wholeness."[3]

[6] *C.D.* III/2, pp. 19, 55.

[7] *C.D.* III/2, pp. 68, 71.

[8] *C.D.* III/2, pp. 55ff.

[9] *C.D.* III/2, pp. 203ff.

[10] *C.D.* III/2, pp. 325ff.

[11] *C.D.* III/2, pp. 437ff.

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[1] *C.D.* III/2, p. 327.

[2] *Loc.cit.*

[3] *C.D.* III/2, p. 330.

Although there is, in the relationship between the soul and body of this man, indeed an "above" and a "below," a "first" and a "second," there is complete peace between them. In this peace, soul and body, each in its place and in its own way shares in the worth of the whole. "His body is in His soul" is first, followed by "His soul is in His body."[4] The meaning of this is that the obedience and suffering of Jesus, that took place within (rather than outside) His body was primarily the action and passion of his soul and in a secondary manner therefore also the action and suffering of His body. Jesus was thus an embodied soul in such a manner that the action took place from above to below, moving from soul to body, and not vice versa.

The relationship of soul and body in this man transpires within the sphere of operation of the Holy Spirit which takes up His place within the ordered unity of Christ's embodied soul. The Holy Spirit thus has His being and comes to action in the closest connection with the flesh; so much so, that He could hardly be called Spirit in abstraction from the flesh.[5]

Barth summarizes the meaning of Jesus as exemplar for anthropology as follows: "These . . . show us what had to be shown, namely that with our knowledge of Jesus as a whole man we find ourselves at the centre of all Christian knowledge . . . for all theological knowledge of man as such we must begin with a picture of this man."[6]

2. *Jesus as Lord of Time.*

True to his "Christological principle," Barth holds that it is possible to deduce an understanding of the meaning of man's time, only from a consideration of the being of Jesus in His time.[7] That the Word became flesh indicates that the man Jesus was clothed upon with time; i.e., in a certain sense he, in common with all others of the human race, had an existence between the boundaries of birth and death.[8] The possibility of Jesus being under time arises from the concept that the triune God in whose being there is movement, order, and sequential order does not Himself have His being in a timeless eternity; rather, "He is supremely temporal."[9]

The most striking aspect of the history of Jesus in time is that it was not terminated by His death. His first history (of some thirty years' duration) was followed by an important second history, or "the fragments of a second history,"[10] of forty days between His resurrection and ascension. This second history is the key to the understanding of Jesus' first history, for it is only in the light of the resurrection, pentecost and ascension that the events of that first history may properly be understood. Barth therefore approaches the problem of man's being in time from this vantage point. "All other times are now controlled by this time, i.e., dominated, limited, and determined by their proximity to it."[11] Barth calls this time, at the heart of other times, the "time of God."[12]

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[4] *C.D.* III/2, p. 339.

[5] *C.D.* III/2, pp. 333f.

[6] *C.D.* III/2, pp. 341, 344.

[7] *C.D.* III/2, p. 439.

[8] *C.D.* III/2, p. 441.

[9] *C.D.* III/2, p. 437.

The time of Jesus, like all other time, has three dimensions: beginning, duration, and ending, but it is also different from other time because events that normally constitute barriers in time become gateways in His time.[13] Every other time begins and was therefore not yet; every other time has duration but finds its barriers in that very present; every other time has an ending and shall therefore at some point cease to exist. These limitations are not valid for the time of the man Jesus. While He had a beginning, yet there was no time when He was not; His life had a present but that does not mean that His present is limited to the years of His earthly sojourn; His time had an end but that does not imply that He is no longer.[14] Furthermore, the being of the man Jesus in time as a being in the present, past and future is enlarged upon by Barth under three headings.

i. *Jesus Is Present.* Barth's meaning is not that Jesus is made transcendentally present to the New Testament community by the Holy Spirit like a subjective vision which transposes the past into the present. Rather, Jesus is the "One who even after His earthly time is still an active Subject, doing new things, creating in history."[15] Thus the past becomes the present without ceasing to be the past.

ii. *Jesus Is Past.* "Jesus not only is; He has also been. . . . What is the yesterday of this today?"[16] Barth divides the history of the past into four discernible categories: (a) Jesus' life before the crucifixion includes everything written in the gospels. These are the events which constitute the power of the apostolic present. (b) Alongside of this New Testament past is the Old Testament past which includes the covenant between God and His people. (c) There is a history which precedes the past of Israel's history. Creation is a sign of God's covenant which points to the man Jesus as the object and purpose of God's creatorship.[17] (d) Jesus is in the eternal council of God before the creation and is thus before all times.

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[10] *C.D.* III/2, p. 441.

[11] *C.D.* III/2, p. 455.

[12] *C.D.* III/2, p. 462.

[13] *C.D.* III/2, p. 464.

[14] *Loc.cit.*

[15] *C.D.* III/2, p. 471.

[16] *C.D.* III/2, p. 474.

iii. *Jesus Christ Is Future.* The being of the man Jesus is also a being in the future; "it has also to be said . . . that He comes."[18]

It is important that a balance be maintained between the three dimensions. Jesus is no less—but also no more—the coming One than He is the present One or the One who was. He that comes is no other than He who is. Thus the resurrected One is already the coming One who limits His appearance to the circle of His contemporary witnesses. Because the resurrected One is already the coming One nothing can be expected in the future that has not already taken place in the Easter time of the past.[19] Barth concludes that "strictly speaking, there are no 'last things,' i.e., no abstract and autonomous last things apart from any alongside Him, the last One. Consequently there is no diffused hope, but only the one hope concentrated upon Him, and therefore full and perfect."[20]

IV. ANTHROPOLOGICAL DERIVATIONS (ABBILD)-I

1. *Man as Soul and Body.*

Having paid attention to the matters of soul and body in the Christological Archetype, we now proceed to analyze the meaning of these in Barth's theological anthropology. We will conduct the discussion under two headings. The first involves the external matters of body and soul, and the second is concerned with the internal aspects of constitution.

i. *The External Aspects of Soul and Body.* Barth commences this discussion with the negative statement, "Man owes it to God that he is man and not something else, and that he is and is not not."[1] The positive implication of this negative statement is that man exists, is constituted, and upheld by God.[2] "This God as such establishes him as soul and body, constituting the unity and order of his being, and maintaining him in this being in its unity and order."[3]

[17] C.D. III/2, p. 476.

[18] C.D. III/2, p. 485.

[19] C.D. III/2, p. 489.

[20] C.D. III/2, p. 490.

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[1] C.D. III/2, p. 344.

[2] C.D. III/2, p. 346.

[3] C.D. III/2, p. 347.

In the constitution of man we have to do with an unchangeable and salutary fact. Unchangeable, because his constitution derives from God and cannot therefore be destroyed or rendered worthless by man; salutary, because this constitution represents an inner relationship between God and man which cannot be broken. Man thus grounded, constituted, and maintained by God, is an "event" which is established on the basis of an act of God and not on the basis of a potency conceded by God to man.

Man is soul and body, in such a way that no abstraction is possible. That man is body means that he belongs to the material world and is thus physical, spatial, and temporal. That man is soul means that he is invisible as well as visible, heavenly as well as earthly. He cannot fall victim to his spatiality, visibility, and materiality even though he is bound to it. However, soul would not be soul if it were not bodily and body would not be body if it were not "besouled." The boundary imposed on man is not a prison but a significant and ordered economy. Finally, it must be remembered that "'soul' is a determination of earthly being."[4]

That man has spirit constitutes for Barth the possibility and reality of his life. "Man has spirit and is thereby man."[5] He may live, and he can live only because he has spirit. It follows axiomatically that man is not himself Spirit, merely the recipient of Spirit. The Spirit is immortal, the subject is mortal.[6] "The Spirit stands in a special and direct relationship to the soul . . . , but only in an indirect relationship to the body."[7]

ii. *The Inner Relationship of Soul and Body.* Barth deals with three aspects of the inner structure of man: the unity of soul and body, their particularity, and their material relationship.

(a) *The Unity of Soul and Body.* Man is twofold. He is the soul of his body. Despite the great contrast between the two, man is wholly and simultaneously soul and body. In the light of this fact, three distinctions are necessary. First, Barth rejects the dualistic conception (which may be called the traditional Christian view), in which soul and body are two interconnected but separate parts of human nature. ". . . We . . . deny that the doctrine of these two shadowy substances is the Christian understanding of man, although for many years it

[4] *C.D.* III/2, p. 351.

[5] *C.D.* III/2, p. 355.

[6] *C.D.* III/2, p. 364.

[7] *C.D.* III/2, p. 365.

has been self-evidently accepted as such."[8] Second, Barth rejects doctrines based on monistic materialism. "On this view, the real is only what is corporeal, spatial, physical and material."[9] Third, Barth rejects monistic spiritualism.[10] On this view the soul is the one and only substance of human reality. Therefore, Barth's expectation of the future does not arise from a postulated immortal soul; rather, it is grounded in the promise of the resurrection of the dead.

(b) *Soul and Body in Their Particularity.* Barth stresses the unity as well as the freedom in inter-relationship of the soul and the body: "The soul is itself the freedom of man, not only to sense and desire, but in thinking and willing to be able to stand at a distance from himself and to live his life as his own. The body on its side is man in so far as it enjoys this primacy of his soul as a corporeal being. . . . Its dignity, in its own way is not less than that of the soul. . . . That man is the soul of his *body* is the secondary fact which is no less indispensable to real man than the first, namely, that he is the *soul* of his body."[11]

(c) *Soul and Body in Their Material Relationship.* Working deductively from Christology, Barth maintains that the nature of man as soul and body is not merely an "accidental conjunction . . . but an intelligibly ordered association of these two moments."[12] This ordered relationship exists because there is rational "control" which stems from the soul and "service" which is rendered by the body. Only death can destroy the order that obtains in the inner relationship of soul and body. Yet even in this circumstance, according to Barth, there are limitations to the power of death and the possibility of continuation in an undefined state in the future: "And if there is deliverance from death, a death of death, then this order has the last word, even against death itself. Man is as he is in this order."[13]

V. ANTHROPOLOGICAL DERIVATIONS (ABBILD)-II

1. *Man in His Time.*

Barth does not analyze time in an abstract philosophical perspective. The necessary starting point is God because in the being of the triune God, there is relationship, a before and an after, order and sequence.

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[8] C.D. III/2, p. 380.

[9] C.D. III/2 p. 382.

[10] C.D. III/2 p. 390.

[11] C.D. III/2 p. 418.

[12] C.D. III/2 pp. 418-9.

[13] C.D. III/2, p. 428.

Being above time, God's eternity is contemporaneous with every present time and includes that which precedes and follows it. He is beyond time; thus we go to meet him because he is after our time. When there shall be no more time, because the created cosmos has fulfilled its purpose, God will still be there, watching over the totality of what was. God's eternity is the "Ur-form" of our relative time.

Deductively from this "Ur-form" of time, Barth gives a detailed analysis of the being of Jesus in time as the basis for an understanding of man in time. Barth says that man has no control over either the past or the future. Because the present is the never-stationary boundary between the past and the future and not a duration or a series of moments, it is the most obscure of the three dimensions of time and also beyond man's control.[1] But it is precisely in the present, at the precarious point of this uncertainty, that sinful man has his being in time.[2]

Barth's reconstruction of anthropological time, that is, time as created and given to man by God, begins at this point. The eternal God became temporal in the person of Jesus Christ in order that He, existing in proper temporal concurrence with both His own trinitarian being and that of sinful man, as the Lord of time might give unto us that which we had lost as a result of sin.[3] In and through the man Jesus, we can now have time in the measure that God as Creator willed that we should have it. Barth views time from an inner and an outer vantage point. The reality of time as inner encompasses the being of man as God's covenant partner. He calls this "given" or "created" time, which, with its three dimensions of past, present and future, constitutes man's "Lebensraum." "Allotted" or "outer time" is time considered in its limiting dimensions.

i. *Given time*. The first anthropological deduction is that the existence of the man Jesus in time "is our guarantee that time as the form of human existence is . . . willed and created by God . . . and is therefore real."[4] Human actuality cannot be abstracted from time or regarded as a timeless existence. ". . . The being of man in time [is] something necessary and essential, and not just incidental and fortuitous."[5] Even in eternity when time is no more man will be in his time.[6] Second, Barth stresses that man has his existence in the time that is given to him. He cannot control this time because he has no time to control; it is not his because he, who is not God, yet cannot exist without God; he must receive time from God. Just as man, who is the soul of his body, is dependent upon the Spirit for his being as besouled body, so also he is dependent upon God for his being in time. Time is therefore one aspect of man's creaturely limitation in his role as covenant partner with God. Third, the time willed and created by God for man provides the temporal "space" for the life of man. This time has specific limitations that are best clarified by comparison with eternal time. Eternity, or uncreated time, is not timeless. Indeed, man's time, which is created, is dependent upon it for its meaning. Each provides temporal "space" for God and man respectively, and consists of past, present and future. The difference between the inclusiveness of eternal time and the sequential character of created time involves the limiting factors of man's time. These limitations are as follows:

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[1] C.D. III/2, p. 514.

[2] C.D. III/2, p. 517.

[3] C.D. III/2, p. 520.

[4] *Loc.cit.*

[5] C.D. III/2, p. 524.

[6] C.D. III/2, p. 522.

> (a) *The Being of Man in Present Time.* Primarily, it is not we who are now but God who is now. "He is now primarily; and we secondarily."[7] Thus man now has a direct relationship to God's eternity. Furthermore, there is an urgency about this now that is destroyed by ungodly views of time that look for time beyond the only time we have.[8]
>
> (b) *The Being of Man in Past Time.* I have been, means that I am now in part what I was because I bear my past with me into my future. It also means that my past is irrecoverable. God, however, retains the time that is no more so that it is not lost. "Because it [the past]," says Barth, "is safe in the hands of God, we are freed from any positive or negative paralysis in relation to it."[9]
>
> (c) *The Being of Man in the Future.* The future holds no fears for us for we can count on the fact that the will and act of God are the meaning and ground of our future. Thus in God the future is as much a reality as the present. We would be resentful of the nearing terminus of our present only if we wanted to be like God and therefore eternal. In similar fashion our future would terrify us only if we were men without God and strangers to the covenant. But in God we may have our time—our whole time—and therefore also our time in the future tense without dissatisfaction or fear.[10] Barth

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[7] C.D. III/2, p. 529.

[8] C.D. III/2, p. 532.

[9] C.D. III/2, p. 539f.

[10] C.D. III/2, p. 546.

makes it clear that the future here is not God's eternity, but the future of our time as God gave it to man in creation.[11]

ii. *Allotted Time.* Considered from an external viewpoint, time as it is given to man is a limited time between the times. Human life requires duration for the fulfillment of its human and divine goals. Man in fact desires a dimension of duration that is somewhat broader than its present limits. However, Barth reasons, there is no place in a Christological anthropology for a spaciousness of time that sets aside the limits of beginning and ending. Life in an allotted span is appropriate to man in view of his difference from God. Unending time would be no solution to man's problem for the following reasons:

(a) Time as such cannot guarantee the realization of life's goals; at best it can only provide an opportunity for fulfillment.

(b) Assuming that human life is content to be creaturely, its striving for perfection would not be genuinely served if infinite time were placed at its disposal.[12]

(c) Man would actually be worse off rather than better in an unrestricted life. "He could only be perpetually *in via*, . . . always lack or seek satisfaction, unable to shake off its [life's] determination . . . or its divinity or humanity."[13] He would be driven to perpetual dissatisfaction.

(d) Man must come to the insight that it is positively good and salutary for him to live in allotted time. This is entirely possible when he realizes that God is all around him, that He is the One with whom man has to do "on the margin of life, at the frontiers of our time."[14]

(e) Positively, this means that God perpetually compels us to confrontation with Him, to a realization that the cause we serve is not ours but His.

(f) Finally, Barth demonstrates by deduction that a limited life span is consistent with the Christological Archetype of anthropology: "Was not the life of the man Jesus a limited life in a restricted time? Yet we saw that that life, with all its limitations, was the life of the eternal Son and Word of God. We saw that His restricted time as such was fulfilled time, filled by the coming of the kingdom of God. . . . We look at this man . . . when we adopt our understanding of the nature of man in respect of his temporality."[15] Barth then

[11] *C.D.* III/2, p. 551.

[12] *C.D.* III/2, p. 559.

[13] *C.D.* III/2, p. 562.

[14] *C.D.* III/2, p. 564.

[15] *C.D.* III/2, p. 571.

proceeds to submit the two boundaries of allotted time, beginning time and ending time, to careful analysis.

2. *Man in His Beginning Time.*

In theology attention is normally concentrated on man's ending time, but God is the source of both beginning and ending, and the former is just as real and important for the understanding of the latter. At the beginning, Barth outlines the three major theories regarding the origin of the soul but refrains from entering the "strange discussion" because it brings us no nearer to an understanding of the journey from the "non-being" from which we come to the "non-being" toward which we move.[16] We have already seen that he rejects the postulate of an immortal self-existing soul in favor of the wholistic concept of a "besouled body."[17] This position is consistent with his Christological anthropology.

A logical deduction of the radical position already taken (i.e., that it is good for man to be limited because it is the eternal gracious God who so wills and so limits) is that man derives from God. "We certainly come from non-being, but we do not come from nothing."[18] The pre-history before our history, the time of our non-being, is the time of the inner life of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, the time of His purpose and will, and the execution of that will towards heaven and earth and ourselves. Hence there is nothing to fear in the time of our non-being; it does not entail deficiency or shadow.[19]

3. *Man in His Ending Time—Death.*

Proceeding from our origin in "non-being" we move inescapably to the threatening abyss of negation. "We shall die. This, and nothing else, will be the end awaiting us. There thus arises again and with particular urgency the question of the relation of our existence to our non-existence, i.e., whether our non-existence in time may not mean our negation, or in what sense it has any other meaning."[20]

i. *Death in Negative Perspective.* According to the Scriptures, reasons Barth, death has a double aspect. Negatively it is seen as a strange and fearful reality which besets man along the path of life with its ominous forebodings (sickness, loneliness, captivity, etc.) and finally

[16] C.D. III/2, p. 574.

[17] *Supra.* p. 14.

[18] C.D. III/2, p. 576.

[19] C.D. III/2, p. 577.

[20] C.D. III/2, p. 588.

triumphs with his death. Man's primary concern is not merely that at death he returns to the realm of the "non-being," for as we have already seen, God is there. But, and here lies the problem, between our beginning and ending, between our going out from the presence of God and ultimate confrontation with Him at the end, is our sin and guilt, "guilt in relation to God and also to our divinely appointed fellows . . . always guilt."[21] Death and guilt are closely related, and Barth states the negative principle in this way: "Death, as it actually encounters us men, is the sign of God's judgment on us."[22] This means that death as the demonstration of God's judgment does not belong to the created by God, and therefore good, nature of man. Barth demonstrates from the Old Testament that death in this negative sense as judgment, is not natural, normal, and good, but that it is the result of sin and guilt. Death is the sign of God's judgment.[23]

But "sign" is not to be confused with "judgment." It is to be interpreted in the light of the remarkable events which accompanied Jesus' life. These events constitute preliminary signs of God's grace and salvation and indicate that God would not forever permit death to have its own way. Therefore, death as judgment is no longer a punishment meted out upon the child of God; Jesus' death saves man not from death, but from the judgment of death. This means that although sinful man is still threatened on the frontier of his being by death, this death is no longer negation, for in death we are confronted with God. Therefore, man no longer fears death itself, but much more God in death. God is both the punishing and the merciful One. This makes death the locus of anxiety as well as of release. The fire of His wrath becomes at once more fearful and more comforting as it is transposed into the fire of His love. Even in death the merciful God remains. Death is our frontier, but He is the frontier of death.

Negatively, death is strange, abnormal and fearful—a foreign intrusion into God's good creation. The inadequacy of this negative interpretation of death is revealed in the previous paragraphs where it is implied that death as a sign of judgment relates only to that death which is associated with guilt and not to the good nature of man. The question thus arises whether death, the second boundary, is not also like birth, the first boundary, appointed to man by God as part of His good creation and for his best good. That Barth gives a positive

[21] *C.D.* III/2, p. 596.

[22] *Loc.cit.*

[23] *C.D.* III/2, p. 597.

answer to this question has already been suggested in the section on the Christological Archetype.

ii. *Death in Positive Perspective.* Barth maintains that Jesus bore only that aspect of death that relates to sin, guilt, judgment, and negation. This implies that there is a natural death which is normal, good, and best for man. "This means," he states, "that it [death] also belongs to human nature, and is determined and ordered by God's good creation and to that extent right and good, that man's being in time should be finite and man himself mortal."[24] Therefore when man dies, it is not merely because of judgment; it is not an unnatural event, for death is natural; as part of God's good creation, it is normal, good and best for man. As a boundary, death belongs to the God-willed nature of man; thus it is neutral and in keeping with his entry into the world. It is good that man's life flows naturally from its genesis in "non-being" to its exit in "non-being." Barth says, "Man as such, therefore, has no beyond. Nor does he need one, for God is his beyond. Man's beyond is that God as his creator . . . was and is and will be his true Counterpart in life, and finally and exclusively and totally in death. Man as such, however, belongs to this world. He is thus finite and mortal. One day he will only have been, as once he was not."[25] To him it is promised—and this is his hope—"that even as this one who has been he will share the eternal life of God Himself."[26]

In accepting the end of human existence as natural and normal there arises a problem at the point of the crucifixion—the meaning of the substitutionary death of Jesus Christ. In Barth's view, Jesus was naturally subject to death; it was necessary for Him to be able to die.[27] Immortality would have disqualified Him for the task.[28] Finitude in time was an anthropological necessity of His person: "And if His dying—in virtue of what it was as His—is the sum total of the good which God has shown to the world, how can we dare to understand man's mortality as something intrinsically negative and evil?"[29] But the death on the cross did not take place out of biological necessity.[30] Christ took death upon Himself as God's judgment,[31] Jesus only bore death on man's behalf in the second sense. Man is saved from death as the judgment of God, but not from natural death. If we are not able to die naturally in the first sense, then what God has done for us in Jesus will have been done in vain.[32] Barth writes, "It is only as a boundary is set for us to which we can move, which we shall one day pass and beyond which we shall be no longer that we are in a position to throw ourselves conclusively . . . on Jesus Christ as our Deliverer from the wrathful judgment of the second death."[33]

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[24] *C.D.* III/2, p. 632.

[25] *C.D.* III/2, p. 632.

[26] *C.D.* III/2, p. 633.

[27] *C.D.* III/2, p. 630.

[28] *Loc. cit.*

[29] *Loc. cit.*

[30] *C.D.* III/2, p. 629.

[31] *C.D.* III/2, p. 628.

Following this theological argument deduced from Christological and soteriological bases, Barth supports his position exegetically. We will, he says, "have to be content with a narrower compass of demonstration"[34] inasmuch as the Bible generally describes the fact of the end of the sinful life as "judgment." There are, however, passages that view death as a neutral, "natural" event. He especially pays attention to outstanding figures such as Moses, Enoch and Elijah whose "boundary" experiences, precisely because God was so directly involved, can be called "natural."[35] Thus, Barth concludes his opus on anthropology as follows: "The New Testament Christian does not fear death. But he never hopes for it. He hopes for the One who has delivered him from death. . . . He is willing to die 'gladly' like Jacob. . . . He affirms Jesus Christ as his beyond. And it is for this reason that he understands his life here and now as one which is affirmed by his beyond."[36]

VI. JESUS VICTOR

We have seen that Barth is obviously at pains to establish that the limitation of life belongs to the natural and good creation of man and that it is the unnatural death of sinful man—eternal corruption, the second death—that is overcome in Jesus Christ. We have not, however, except in the most general terms, inquired into the relationship between sin and death or examined how Jesus acquires the victory over death.

1. *Some Aspects of the Atonement.*

Sin, and the sins of man, form an objective disruptive factor within creation. Sin is an impossible possibility, the nature of which cannot be known apart from the revelation of Jesus Christ. It is uncreated, yet has existential reality. It is the negation of the divine "Yes" and stands in opposition to the will of God. Sin is expressed in pride and grounded in man's rebellion against God. Its character is revealed in the hopeless destiny—"eternal death, the invincibly threatening force of dissolution"—to which every man moves as a sinner.[1]

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[32] *C.D.* III/2, p. 630.

[33] *Loc. cit.*

[34] *C.D.* III/2, p. 633.

[35] *C.D.* III/2, p. 638.

[36] *C.D.* III/2, p. 640.

In a crucial discussion on the relationship of sin to the atonement and to death, Barth emphasizes two aspects of sin.[2] First, sin is the disturbing element in creation which "blocks" the proper covenant relationship between God and man; second, sin is the source of man's destruction and eternal corruption.

In response to these two functions of sin, the atonement must overcome sin and restore covenant relationship between man and God on the one hand, and "block" the source of destruction on the other. This dual function of the atonement underlies Barth's interpretation of Christ's work of reconciliation.

Sin is overcome in a spectacular manner. Jesus Christ, in complete solidarity with man, takes upon Himself our sins and treads "the way of sinners to its bitter end in death, in destruction, in the limitless anguish of separation from God, by delivering up sinful man and sin in His own person to the non-being which is properly theirs."[3] But Jesus is not alone in His eternal death on the cross. In Him every covenant-breaker dies and perishes from the earth.[4] Sin, as an ontological reality is abolished by the complete eradication of sinful man who is its bearer. "He has made an end of us as sinners and therefore of sin itself. . . ."[5] Sin and "the present evil world" are negated, "killed and buried with Him."[6]

Barth makes clear that the abrogation of sin, in this negative aspect, is not forgiveness or a juridical absolution, but the fulfilment of rejection. He uses the strongest possible terms to describe God's incompatibility with, and destruction of, the sinner and his sin. "The wrath of God," Barth writes, "which is the fire of His love has taken him [man] away. . . . In the power of this event the existence of man as a sinner . . . is consumed. . . . God could not and would not use this man. He could not and would not tolerate him any longer. He could and would only do away with him."[7] This is God's judgment upon sinful man. Jesus suffers the punishment of eternal death which we deserve.

Sin is overcome in a grand conquest which completely changes the situation of man in the world. This is accomplished "without any co-operation on our part."[8] Man is involved in "an act which took place on earth, in time and space" by which his situation has been "objectively" and "decisively changed, whether he is aware of it or not."[9] In this view, sin is transposed into an ontological reality and overcome by the destruction and annihilation of its bearers. Ultimately, however, the basis for this is God's judgment on man.[10] There is something curious and puzzling about this. Barth emphasizes that this aspect of God's conquest of sin is ontological and not juridical, possibly to stress the objective character of the atonement; yet in the final analysis his view is logically dependent upon an appeal to God's juridical act of judgment on Jesus Christ in His death, and therefore also upon sinful man. This judgment of God must be seen in the light of the divine passion which makes any thought of a partial restoration impossible and demands nothing less than radical victory. The victorious fighting against sin "blocks" the source of our destruction and rescues us from eternal death. We do not have to suffer what we ought to suffer. "For the sake of this best," says Barth, "the worst had to happen to sinful man. . . ."[11]

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[1] *C.D.* IV/1, p. 253.

[2] *C.D.* IV/1, pp. 252-256.

[3] *C.D.* IV/1, p. 253.

[4] *Ibid.*, pp. 93,f.

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 253.

[6] *Ibid.*, p. 254.

[7] *Ibid.*, p. 94.

The major problem in Barth's theory thus far seems to arise from his dealing with sin as an ontological entity. The annihilation of sin becomes conditional upon the annihilation of its bearers. Even when allowance is made for the fact that he views this transaction as taking place in terms of a Kantian transcendental dialectic and therefore as a moment prior to and governing all relationships within its sphere, this remains a problematical concept. It is such a powerful, objective conception (tending toward universalism) that one wonders whether it leaves any room for a subjective relationship in atonement. Is there no way to overcome sin and guilt without destroying man? If sin can be overcome only by annihilation, what happens to forgiveness? Is there some necessity in God (and one more displeasing to man than that required in the satisfaction theory) which requires annihilation as the price of victory over sin?

But we have considered only the negative aspect of God's judgment. His positive judgment is a creative word. Just as all men died and were buried in their sins in the death of Jesus on the cross, so also in His resurrection all are made alive. This new man is "brought in

[8] *C.D.* IV/1, p. 230. [9] *Ibid.*, p. 245. [10] *Ibid.*, p. 93.
[11] *Ibid.*, p. 254.

with the resurrection of Jesus Christ, . . . with the same energy with which the old man of contradiction and opposition was done away in the death of Jesus Christ."[12] Man is created anew, separated completely from his sins. This is the meaning of Christ's resurrection for us. And in this we also see the full meaning of Barth's Christology; God is humiliated in Jesus Christ to bear man's judgment of eternal death; man is exalted to the right side of God in Jesus Christ. This exaltation is accomplished in the power and humiliation of the Godhead. In this re-creation of man we must deal with a "declaring righteous" which is at the same time a "making righteous."[13] God's positive dealing with sin in His creative word might be considered to be the reconstitution of the proper covenant relationship between God and man. God, says Barth, "has turned over a new leaf in the history of the covenant of God with man, making atonement, giving man a new peace with God, re-opening the blocked road of man to God."[14]

VI. DEATH AND ETERNAL LIFE

In the *Church Dogmatics*, Barth concludes his exposition on death with an original, moving, and perplexing account of eternal life as the content of the Christian hope. But it is clear that the position he takes has changed since he wrote the following in 1927: "Resurrection means a *new corporeality*. . . . There will be one redemption of all things, a redemption even of our body. . . . The Bible speaks of the corporeality of the resurrection and the new world. A change of predicate takes place. . . . The subject remains the same."[1]

His lectures at the University of Utrecht in February-March, 1935, and published in the little volume *Credo*, excerpts of which follow, highlight this radical change. It is not now clear that "the subject remains the same."

> And when it [the New Testament] speaks of eternal life it is of the new form that it speaks . . . the carrying out of the accomplished reconciliation. . . . It is the message of . . . the eternal kingdom. . . . Resurrection of the flesh means very simply that man will be in himself what he already is in Christ, new creation. . . . It is already a reality.
>
> . . . We shall again have to be on our guard against all those ab-

[12] C.D. IV/1, p. 95. [13] *Ibid.*, p. 95. [14] *Ibid.*, p. 254.

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[1] Karl Barth, *The Word of God and the Word of Man*. Boston, 1928, p. 93.

> stractions which our philosophic arrogance delights in. . . . Nor does eternity of our life mean that this life of ours is annihilated and its place taken by some other life in some other world, even if it be an eternal world. Finally, eternity of our life does not mean that our life becomes identical with the life of God."[2]

It is not easy to ascertain the shape of this "new form" and there is grave danger of claiming either too little or too much in our interpretation. Our method of procedure will be to endeavor to establish the negative aspect of his thought in this respect; i.e., what eternal life is not, and then move on to a positive interpretation, allowing Barth to speak for himself.

1. *Eternal Life in Negative Perspective.*

At the beginning it would seem important to establish the meaning of eternity. Eternity is not a dimension in time. Time is the temporal space created by God for man and the world in which he lives.[3] Eventually the created world as such will have fulfilled its purpose and will only have been.[4] When its life is over, its movement and development completed, it will not "need any continuance of temporal existence."[5] Time in the sense of earthly limited temporal duration will then be no more. Time, as it is now known to man, will remain only as it exists in the eternal presence of God. Not time but "eternity is the living God Himself; it is impossible to look on eternity as a uniform grey sea before, above, and after time. . . ."[6] It is in this light that the following statements are to be interpreted.

> . . . We must be careful not to form pagan conceptions of God and the eternal life that He lives and the eternal life that He promises to man. . . .[7]
>
> . . . It may well be that we are pursuing pagan dreams of a good time after death. . . .[8]
>
> . . . For he [man] would be eternal. But that is a dream, and a bad one at that.[9]
>
> . . . When I have had my last present, I shall have no more future but shall only be past and have been. . . .[10]
>
> There is no question of a continuation into an indefinite future

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[2] Karl Barth, *Credo*. New York, 1962, pp. 166-170.

[3] *C.D.* III/3, p. 87.

[4] *C.D.* III/3, p. 87.

[5] *C.D.* III/3, p. 88.

[6] *C.D.* II/1, p. 639.

[7] *C.D.* IV/1, p. 112.

[8] *C.D.* III/2, p. 625.

[9] *C.D.* III/2, p. 558.

[10] *C.D.* III/2, p. 574.

> of a somewhat altered life. The New Testament hope for the other side of death is very different from that.[11]
>
> He [man] does not hope for redemption from the mortality of his existence.[12]
>
> The Christian hope does not lead us away from this life; . . . It is the conquest of death, but not a flight into the Beyond.[13]

In contrast to his "redemption of the body" statement in *The Word of God and the Word of Man* Barth has the following to say regarding the Scriptural evidence for the continuation of life:

> The Old Testament knows nothing of a renewal of man in a time after his death, of a continuation of his life, of resurrection in this sense, and therefore of an eternal life granted to him.[14]
>
> . . . a better hereafter, and identifiable with the kingdom of God . . . The New Testament does not contain a single shred of evidence to support this view. Compared with what the New Testament calls hope, this Utopian version can only be described as a fabrication . . . it can do without Jesus.[15]

Many of Barth's statements in this connection are in the context of a protest against an other-worldliness which debilitates active, constructive participation in the Christian task at hand; e.g., Barth writes, "The thorough-going eschatology for which the interim between now and one day necessarily seems to be a time of emptiness, of lack of a progressive and barely concealed disillusionment, is not the eschatology of New Testament Christianity. And again it is only an unspiritual community that can tolerate such a view."[16]

Having seen that eternal life is not a continuation of a somewhat altered life, or resurrection of the body, or redemption from mortality, or a light into the beyond, we end this section with a question about the nature and meaning of Christian hope and the intimation of an answer from Barth:

> What is the meaning of the Christian hope in this life? A life after death? An event apart from death? A tiny soul which . . . is preserved somewhere, in order to live on immortally? That was how the heathen looked on the life after death. But that is not the Christian hope.[17]

[11] C.D. III/2, p. 624.

[12] C.D. III/2, p. 633.

[13] Karl Barth, *Dogmatics in Outline*. New York, 1959, p. 154.

[14] C.D. III/2, p. 618.

[15] C.D. III/2, p. 486.

[16] C.D. III/2, p. 468.

[17] *Dogmatics in Outline*, p. 154.

> Let us be clear that, when we say that, we are again speaking of the Second Coming of Jesus Christ. Christian Eschatology is different from all other expectations for the future, whether they be worldly or religious or religious-worldly, in that it is not primarily expectation of something, even if this something were called resurrection of the flesh and eternal life, but expectation of the Lord.[18]

2. *Eternal Life in Positive Perspective.*

It is not easy to be sure that one has interpreted Barth correctly in stating what eternal life is not; the converse is, however, an even more formidable task. The concepts of classical theology have very little application here, and even when accustomed terms are used they are invested with new meaning. What we said about eternity in the previous section is basic to an understanding of Barth's positive concept of eternal life. The cross of Christ marks the end of time and His resurrection the beginning of the last day; at the last trumpet there breaks forth "a present without a future."[19] Thus the child of God moves from a creation without a past to a present without a future. But he does not come from chaos nor does he return to chaos.

What is the meaning of this "present without a future?" It is variously interpreted in the statements that follow in terms of what might be called "eternal continuance before Him." In Barth's view, this is certainly not the same as nothingness (Italics in the quotations that follow are mine):

> Man as such therefore has no beyond. Nor does he need one, for God is *his* beyond.[20]
>
> Eternity is really beginning, really middle, and really end because it is really the living God.[21]
>
> . . . In this final parting he expects his Lord and with Him . . . exaltation to the *eternal light* of eternal life.[22]
>
> Even in death we are not lost to Him, and therefore we are not really lost. One day we shall cease to be, but even then *He will be for us*. Hence our future non-existence cannot be our complete negation.[23]
>
> This being of his in his time . . . will be revealed in all its merited shame but also in its unmerited glory, and may thus be eternal life from and *in* God.[24]

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[18] *Credo*, p. 166.

[19] *C.D. III/2*, p. 624.

[20] C.D. III/2, p. 632.

[21] C.D. II/1, p. 639.

[22] C.D. IV/3, 2, p. 928.

[23] C.D. III/2, pp. 610, 611.

[24] C.D. III/2, p. 633.

> What it looks forward to is the *eternalising* of this ending life . . . Our past and limited life, which did not begin before time and does not continue beyond it, our real but only life, will then fully, definitively and manifestly participate in that *kainotes zoes* Rom. 6:4. . . . It will then be eternal life with God and in fellowship with Him. . . . It can only be a matter of this past life in its limited time undergoing a transition and transformation and *participating in* the eternal life of God.[25]
>
> [Jesus] . . . whose will and resolve it is to give man a *share* in this time of His, in His eternity.[26]
>
> . . . a resurrection and continuation of life after death is definitely not its [the Christian hope's] positive content. This simply consists in the fact that those who have been in their own day are *as such before* God who is not a God of the dead, but of the living. . . .[27]
>
> Resurrection means not the continuation of this life, *but life's completion.*[28]
>
> Your death is put to death. You are in fact already dead. . . . In Jesus Christ I am no longer at the point at which I can die; *in Him our body is already in heaven.*[29]
>
> The Christian hope does not lead us away from this life; it is rather the *uncovering of truth* in which *God sees our life.* It is the conquest of death, but not a flight into the Beyond.[30]

No useful purpose is served by enquiring into the use of each figure employed or the meaning of terms. The task is endless and the material defies analysis, at least in terms that are meaningful to our existence this side of the grave. For instance, what is the meaning of "his" in "God is *his* beyond;" or how do we interpret life in terms of "eternal light"; or the meaning of "He will be *for* us" if we have already passed into "non-being"? Is "eternalising of this ending life" a contradiction in terms? In what sense can we "*share* in His eternity" and what can being "as *such* before God" possibly mean? Precisely because Barth's concept of eternal life has no possible correspondence with known reality does he employ figures and symbols. Therefore we refrain from employing a method of analysis that is not intended.[31] We conclude that the overall impression is closer to a true understanding of his thought.

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[25] C.D. III/2, p. 624.

[26] C.D. III/2, pp. 450f.

[27] C.D. III/2, p. 620.

[28] *Dogmatics in Outline*, p. 154.

[29] *Dogmatics in Outline*, p. 155.

[30] *Dogmatics in Outline*, p. 154.

[31] Cf. Barth's description of the sacraments as signs making visible the "bounds" between what can be said and understood—"and the incomprehensibility in which God is . . . Who He is." *Credo*, p. 9.

Eventually this world will have fulfilled its purpose; time will be no longer; man himself will not be there, but this does not imply his "nothingness." Man's destruction is precluded by its beginning in the good creation of God and finally excluded by the revelation of Jesus Christ and his victory over death. God has broken the power of the Nihil so that it is powerless to prevail over man; man cannot become "nothingness." What power, Barth asks, can reduce the creature to a state of nothingness instead of reality? "It can only be the power of God Himself."[32] But God will not do this; therefore, man continues eternally before Him. Man will be "eternally preserved, revealed in all his greatness and littleness."[33] "Everything will be present to Him," Barth says, "exactly as it was or is or will be, in all its reality. . . . He will not allow anything to perish. . . . He will not be alone in eternity, but with the creature. He will allow it to partake of His own eternal life. And in this way the creature will continue to be, in its limitation, even in its limited temporal duration."[34]

3. *The Parousia.*

The *parousia* of Christ, and in this connection Barth refers especially to 1 Cor. 15, signifies the end of the end time when the great revelation of the secret of Golgotha will take place. At this time the resurrection of the dead becomes a reality and the Son hands the kingdom over to the Father. This is a historical event, but the "event of a present without a future."[35] This is that ultimate event that marks the end of this present world, an event so absolute and so final that there is no longer mention of a new beginning or the renewal of life, or the continuation of life with a new mode of existence.

Just as Christ's "consummating manifestation"[36] in the *parousia* is the fulfilment of the history and purpose of the Church, so also it is "life's completion"[37] and the fulfilment of the Christian hope for the individual Christian. The resurrection of Jesus Christ, the parousia and the resurrection of the body are melded into one victorious triumph: the triumph of life over death in the person of Jesus Christ.[38] Barth concludes, "He Himself as the eternally living God is also the eternally living man."[39]

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[32] C.D. III/3, p. 89.

[33] *Loc. cit.*

[34] C.D. III/3, p. 90.

[35] C.D. III/2, p. 624.

[36] C.D. IV/3, 2, p. 929.

[37] *Dogmatics in Outline*, p. 154.

[38] C.D. IV/3, 1, p. 294.

[39] C.D. IV/1, p. 115.

VII. RESUME AND EVALUATION

Barth commences his theology with a series of a priori constructs and patterns his system into the form dictated by these models. In the case of anthropology he works consistently from "above to below" —from the God-man to human nature as willed and created by God. This enterprise is conducted in rather strenuous isolation from other sources of evidence or information. He ignores empirical investigations and in his exegetical interpretations at times gives the impression of bending the evidence of scripture into conformity with his model.

The priority of the soul in Barth's doctrine is a priority within the unity of body and soul so that man may not be thought of as comprised of two substances. As soul of his *body* man is a part of that which is outwardly visible and as *soul* of his body he belongs to that realm which transcends the purely physical. At death the soul ceases to be soul and the body ceases to be body. Barth is opposed to every idea of the thought of the natural continuity of life regardless of the vehicle of the argument, whether it be the immortality of the soul or the resurrection of the body.

Every form of dichotomy of body and soul is rejected; so intimately are the functions of the soul and body interconnected that no practical distinction can be made between the nature of either. This quite naturally earns the disapproval of those who maintain that soul and body are dichotomous and that death is the separation of the soul from the body. Advocates of this view hold that Barth's position does not do justice to the nature of man.

As body and soul, man is in time. Barth wishes to emphasize in his theology of time that man occupies a creaturely position in time as well as in space. Although this time has its origin in the eternal, it does not stretch into eternity. It is limited; it has a beginning and an ending. He advances arguments to show that eternal time would be meaningless to man and that the boundaries of time are natural and good. This position is ultimately grounded in Christology; Jesus' life could have ended differently. If He had not chosen to die the death which was judgment for sin, He would have died naturally. The finitude of Jesus' person demonstrates an anthropological necessity common to all men. Although Athanasius made substantially the same point regarding the nature of Jesus' person, there are those who take serious exception to this position. In this view death emerges as the natural or good end of man as willed and created by God. It is an index of finitude rather than the result of sin.

Barth's doctrine of salvation in Jesus Christ raises further problems. There can be no disputing the totality and objectivity of the victory, but a concept of grace emerges that is so overwhelming that it seems difficult to find any place open enough for a subjective response.

When he comes to the concerns of eschatology and life after death, there is in Barth's view no immortal, substantial soul to form the basis of a doctrine of the after-life. His position is extremely difficult if not impossible to define. Negatively, it is not eternal life in a temporal dimension; not a continuation into an indefinite future of a somewhat altered life; not resurrection in the sense of continuing life; not obliteration; not being made equal with God. At times his doctrine appears to be little more than a survival in the thought of God. Those who hold other views of the hereafter maintain that if this is better than an outright end of all things in death, then it is but very little better. It is clear that Barth wishes to deny that there will be an absolute end to all things, but what in man "lives eternally" in the presence of God is not clear.

Accepting Barth's position as some form of continuation, there remains the question of what meaning or value is attributed to death. Is it a promise or a threat? For Barth it is clearly a promise. Even there we will be in relation with God even though this will be in some undefined mode of "being eternally in his presence." Death is not invested with the life-determining, reciprocal force that it receives in Heidegger nor with the threat of eternal damnation as in some classical theologies.

The question as to whether this doctrine does justice to the Christian hope as expressed in the scriptures is formulated by Součck as follows: "The reader will inevitably ask the question, whether the soberness of Biblical faith, rejecting all illusions about the imaginary higher elements of man, and accepting the earthliness and finiteness of his being, is not here too finely polished. Is not the Christian hope too much narrowed down, until it becomes a quite unimaginable moment of meeting with God, or an elevation of the mere finite, past, and not-to-be-continued existence of man into the light of God's grace, God's forgiveness, and God's purpose?"[1] In a similar vein, there are those who hold the opinion that Barth's position cannot be made to conform to the confessional statements of the church. One is H. Vogel, whose argument is made more impressive by the fact that he is in agreement with Barth on the relationship between Christology and anthropology.[2]

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[1] J. B. Součck. "Man in the Light of the Humanity of Jesus," *Scottish Journal of Theology*. Vol. II, 1, 1949. p. 81.

Barth's conclusions are throughout consistent with his Christological analysis. As Barth makes clear in the introduction to the volume of the *Dogmatics* that is the locus of his anthropology, this is the basis of his doctrine, not the scripture or some confessional position: "The reader will soon realize that at this point the exposition deviates even more widely from dogmatic tradition than in the doctrine of predestination. . . . Irrespective of details, the attitude to this book will necessarily be determined by whether the reader finally agrees with me that the way of a theological doctrine of man proposed here is not only possible, but the only one possible."[3]

[2] H. Vogel, "Ecce Homo. Die Anthropologie Karl Barths" *Verkündigung und Forschung*, 1949/50, pp. 119ff.

[3] C.D. III/2, p. ix.

GOD'S GRACE AND NEW BEGINNINGS

BY THE REV. C. SHELBY ROOKS

In the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit. Amen.

The text for this Communion Meditation is the concluding two verses of our New Testament Lesson:

> And the Lord turned and looked at Peter. And Peter remembered the word of the Lord, how he said to him, "Before the cock crows today, you will deny me three times." And he went out and wept bitterly. (Luke 22:61-62)

What a tremendously sobering scene this is—yet what a hopeful one also! Most of us who read this passage are ashamed for Peter as much as he was ashamed for himself. Yet most of us are hopeful also because we know what Peter became and we have hope that, in the midst of our own failures, there is the possibility of new beginnings which will permit the best in us to shine through. These verses of Luke's Gospel confront us then, with three essential elements of Christian life: Remembrance, Opportunity, and Presence. They are the same elements that confront us each time we partake of the sacrament of Holy Communion, for they are what the Gospel is really all about.

First, *remembrance.* "And Peter remembered the word of the Lord." Now the act of remembering can be a most pleasant experience. Is there anyone among us, for instance, so unfeeling and so unsentimental as not to know instantly what Charles Jefferys means when he says:

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We have lived and loved together
Through many changing years;
We have shared each other's gladness
And wept each other's tears;
I have known ne'er a sorrow
That was long unsoothed by thee;
For thy smiles can make a summer
Where darkness else would be.

Yes, one of the joys of this existence, particularly as one grows older, is to re-live in memory the quiet events and assurances that have made life good. The fact that the years blunt the harshness of the unpleasant as it existed side by side with the joyous really makes no difference. Remembering is its own particular kind of joy.

But remembering can be a shattering experience also. Last April, at the request of the Teachers Association, the children in the Princeton school system were sent home at mid-day and all of the personnel—administrators, teachers, clerks, cafeteria workers, bus drivers, and janitors—gathered for a workshop in human relations. I was asked to deliver what it was hoped would be a provocative address upon which the discussions later in the day could be based. What I did that day was an act of public remembering. I was recalling for those present not just my personal experiences, but the collective humiliation and systematic dehumanization of the black man in which this nation has engaged for so long. I don't pretend to be a wild-eyed militant—I'm too old and too fat for that!—and I don't use excessive language. Yet this was a traumatic experience for many of those present. Unfortunately, most white Americans still have little sense of responsibility for what this nation has made black people become. Thus, forcible confrontation with the rampant racism of America was an extremely painful experience for them. It was no less painful for me. The fact is that, however much any black man is immersed in the struggle to find meaning for the life of the black community, there is absolutely nothing pleasant about remembering the daily doses of misery that have been, and still are, a part of his life.

This facet of unpleasantness in remembrance can be multiplied in the experiences of thousands—for the ordinary man as well as the great. There is evidence in Christian tradition, as you know, that Peter himself told this story over and over in an effort to evoke loyalty to Christ. I am sure each time he did so it was with a feeling of shame he could not conceal. In our own time, Pope Paul VI, Lyndon Johnson, Abe Fortas, and many other well-known figures know public and private anguish as they are forced by the events of the present to recall those moments of the past they would rather forget or erase. So do you and I, but the familiar words are true:

> The Moving Finger writes; and having writ,
> Moves on: nor all your Piety nor Wit
> Shall lure it back to cancel half a Line,
> Nor all your tears wash out a Word of it.

The important thing is, that remembrance is the first faltering step in redeeming what we have been and in embarking upon a new life. It was only when Peter "remembered the word of the Lord" that he knew how far short of loyalty he had fallen. Then, and only then, could he begin his life anew. He probably repeated that story again and again as much out of his own sense of need as for the edification of his listeners. For us, the Sacrament of Holy Communion provides an occasion for the essential first step. It is the means by which, symbolically, Christ turns and looks at us. In the old Order of Worship that Congregational Christians had in their "Book of Worship," the Invitation to Holy Communion captured that sense of confrontation:

> Ye who do truly and earnestly repent you of your sins, and are in love and charity with your neighbors, and intend to lead a new life, following the commandments of God, and walking from henceforth in his holy ways; draw near with faith, and take this holy Sacrament to your comfort.

In our present day drive for inter-Communion, some of the stringencies of confrontation inherent in this Sacred Meal may be lost. But I believe this act of remembrance is a supremely necessary one. The possibilities for new beginnings in life will not be realized unless we are forced by the word of the Lord to remember who and what we are, and few occasions provide greater openings to God's word and will for our lives than the act of breaking the bread and drinking the cup. I'm sure the old hell-fire and damnation sermons are passé in a sophisticated group such as this. Probably not many of the students or faculty have ever heard one. But the old preachers did have a point: that man over and over needs to confront and be confronted by the rigorous demands of the Gospel. Without that, new life cannot begin to come nor can it be maintained. Thank God, then, for this

Sacrament and for the faculty of remembrance that God has given us.

Second, *opportunity*. "And Peter went out and wept bitterly." One of the inestimable mercies of God is that He provides continuing opportunities for new beginnings—fresh occasions for living life in a new way, and for the re-ordering of our priorities, for the correction of our errors, for imaginative and creative deeds, for the courageous use of our inmost being. These opportunities flow in upon us day by day, hour after hour, for each moment is unique. It holds within it the possibility that it can be completely different from any that has gone before in all of human experience. So an old poem from the Sanskrit says:

> Look to this day, for it is life, the very life of life.
> In its brief course lie all the verities and realities of
> your existence:
> The bliss of growth! The glory of action! The splendor
> of beauty!
> For yesterday is but a dream, and tomorrow is only a vision,
> But today, well-lived, makes every yesterday a dream of
> happiness, and every tomorrow a vision of hope.
> Look well, therefore, to this day!

Now I believe that's a pretty important word about life. So, I think, did Peter. This particular passage says only that he went out and wept bitterly. But it was the real beginning to what Peter became, for, from that moment, his life turned completely around. Given yet another chance to display his loyalty to Christ, he seized each new day as an opportunity to proclaim the Gospel and lead other men to God. I would not idealize Peter. The story of his life is much too human for that, too filled with errors, too burdened with poor judgment—as is the life of every man. The important thing, however, is that over and over God gave him new days for his use, new occasions to search for and do God's will. That, for Peter, was the amazing mercy of God. So it is for us. Look well, therefore, to this day!

Of course, we must also be able to recognize the opportunities inherent in each day. That we do not always do. For instance, I am just about convinced that the predominantly white seminaries in this nation will never seriously attempt to relate themselves significantly to black Christians. I'm about ready to suggest that, for the health of black churches and the black community, all of the black students and professors should withdraw from white theological schools and seek together to find the answers to their questions. Nothing that has happened in American theological education up to this very moment helps me to believe that white seminaries will ever regard black Christianity as something central to their main interests. And that is a tragedy of lost opportunity!

Don't think I'm being too far-fetched. I think it's an open question whether black Christians are even going to remain in white denominations. If you don't believe that, you ought to read the statements that have come from Black Caucuses in every major denomination, including the Roman Catholic Church. It's a question that will be raised in earnest at the meeting of the National Committee of Negro Churchmen next month in St. Louis, and again at the meeting of Black Seminarians in Boston early in November. This month's Ebony magazine has an article called, "Black Revolt in White Churches." You ought to read it. What is significant is that the revolt is already five years old and growing. And it will not be met simply by sending black students out to recruit more black seminarians as Union Seminary is doing this fall. The essential question is not whether Union or Princeton has ten, thirty or forty black faces in the student handbook. It is what these seminaries do with them: how determined they are to prepare black men and women adequately for a ministry radically different from that facing white men and women; whether any white school is willing to deal responsibly with the issues that concern black Christians. Up to this point Princeton and Union and Yale and Harvard and all the rest have persisted in the notion that there is nothing essentially different about Black American Christianity. It looks so much like other forms of American Protestantism, particularly frontier religion, that not much attention has been given to it. This kind of paternalism has resulted in very little significant intellectual inquiry. But Black Christians are taking a hard look at their past and present and future. I want you to know that a new day is dawning. I hope you will regard this as an opportunity for fulfilling your own Christian life as well as for relating to the life of your black brothers. If you don't, the opportunity may slip by. The truth of the matter is that, by 1980, white Christianity may be confined to suburban ghettoes, unrelated to and out of communication with urban Christianity, for the cities are going to be black—New York, Philadelphia, Washington, Cleveland and all the rest.

God gives us opportunities in abundance, then. The question is whether we accept them and make use of them.

Now third, *presence*. "And the Lord turned and looked at Peter." In a way, as much as I love him, I'm glad Paul Scherer is not present this morning. He was my major professor back in the days when it was still respectable to major in something as esoteric as homiletics. One of the things he always cautioned against was numbering subtopics. But I really must do that in this sermon because I'm talking about two different kinds of presence—the presence of the community of the faithful and the presence of the Lord. These are the great enablers that free a Christian to live creatively in the world!

First, *community presence*. It's easier to talk about that today because it is so demonstrable, so much a part of contemporary experience. Bill Webber at MUST is reported to have said that about the only meaningful worship experiences at Union Seminary now are Communion Services at 5:00 a.m. on mornings when a group of students is about to demonstrate on Wall Street or at the Induction Center or in the Ocean Hill-Brownsville school district. My black brethren are talking about the same thing when they use the word "soul." What these experiences point to is the feeling of responsibility human beings bear for each other's life, the strength that comes both from the knowledge that your companions are willing to suffer for and with you—even to die for you—and from your same willingness to perform these ultimate acts of human existence for them.

It is this supportive presence that, in part, enables us to deal with the pain in remembrance or the fear of unhappy consequence once we have acted together. Peter knew about that, as did all the Apostles. I am sure that, as much as anything else, it was the common sharing of both problems and danger that sustained them and enabled them to overcome their doubts and their fears. Not only so, it gave them hearability for each other, as in the case of the controversy over Paul's ministry to the Gentiles.

In our time, the Sacrament of Holy Communion may be becoming again one of the means by which we know community presence. The style of life which apparently is emerging in the twentieth century seems to indicate that presence can best be known as we are engaged in overcoming the world's ills. But it is also beginning to be recognized that this Sacrament can have a catalyzing influence as, in the sharing of this Holy Meal, we are again made aware of our responsibilities to each other even as we attempt to meet the issues that both confront and confound us. It is important to know that the strength to live these days comes both as we more willingly open ourselves to the potential of community presence, and as we willingly submit our hopes and aspirations and desires to it. Maybe that's what this Sacrament is all about!

Second, *the presence of the Lord.* It's almost impossible to demonstrate that presence for you in an era of theological confusion and overpowering scientism. I'm not going to debate the existence of God with you this morning. I simply want to say that the other great enabler of life—that which frees us to be—is the knowledge that God does share our days and participates in our lives. It is our willingness to open ourselves to that presence which gives our days meaning and permits us with confidence to grasp the opportunities that come.

Edwin McNeill Poteat has a poem called, "Prayer at Dawn," which describes most of what I would say here, and I close with that.

Now we begin another day together
The night has clutched the darkness to her breast
And vanished slowly westward. Gaily dressed
In brightly burnished brass and polished leather,
The East's great army comes. No matter whether
It brings us sun, and songs of love to sing.
Or cloud and terror; we shall slip its tether
And walk today for joy of journeying.
If I must weep, thy rain my tears delight.
If I must laugh, thy wind my laughter's flight;
Thy wealth to compensate the day's default
Thy power to fend the ultimate assault.
Let life be grave as pain or light as feather,
Now we begin another day together.

The new school year begins, a new day has dawned. Come, my friends, let us gather around this table—here, where together we are confronted by the demand of the Gospel for loyalty and obedience to Christ, where we are reminded once more of the unique opportunities for living that this day and all our days hold, where we are sustained and strengthened by the gift of each other's presence and by the presence of the Lord of Life Himself. And arising, let us go forth determined to do his will!

BLACK SEMINARIANS AND THE CRISIS IN THEOLOGICAL EDUCATION

BY GEDDES HANSON

Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary defines "crisis" as "decisive moment: turning point." To the degree that the word speaks of decision it is accurate in describing the situation so many of us see in theological education: There is obviously need for carefully wrought decision in the field. To the degree that the word speaks of change and "turning" we use it optimistically. The fear we entertain is that there will be no turning.

It would be reassuring to be able to feel that there will inevitably be some turning from the present course of preparing young men for the ministry of the church. By now, however, we have had enough experience with institutions to recognize that they sustain themselves as much by their own momentum as by any positive relation they may have to the world around them. I contend that the present course of seminary education is increasingly less responsive to the world in which it exists. The alternatives which present themselves have to do with denying the flux in the world outside the institutional gate, or recognizing it as a reality with severe implications for the way a seminary does business. C. Shelby Rooks states the dimension of the problem obliquely in a sermon at Princeton Theological Seminary. He asks whether, given the changes in our society, it is still possible for white seminaries to equip black students for places of leadership within the black community—a community, the radical recreation of which is protetypical of the contemporary social dynamics. His correlative question is whether black students should leave white seminaries and re-matriculate in black institutions.

While I sympathize wholeheartedly with the spirit of his first question, I would answer the second question in the negative. The very progression of questions assumes that seminaries—black or white

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—can train anyone—black *or* white—to assume places of leadership within the emerging communities to which they will be called. After interviews with seminarians of both colors, I have little confidence in that assumption.

What can be said, however, is that the situation of the black student vis-à-vis his seminary education gives us a model for examining the problem in its more pervasive dimensions. We can ask ourselves why the theological education of blacks at white seminaries prompts Rooks' question. We can ask ourselves whether the dynamic we expose with that question is not operative (1) in black seminaries as well, (2) in the education of white students in white seminaries, and (3) what decisions and changes are suggested by these dynamics.

What follows proceeds from the conviction that theological education has no intrinsic value. Theological education, as it is discussed here, is a means of assisting men to carry on the mission of the Church in today's world. This suggests that an awareness of the dynamics of the world is not an adjunct to the disciplines of theology and biblical studies and church history but is part of the whole package. One could go so far as to say that an atmosphere which allows a potential clergyman to work out his professional identity isolated from the dynamics which operate on "common" folk is doing neither him nor them any good. It is at this point, as much as at any other, that I react negatively to the idea of black students proceeding to exodus to black seminaries. The ministry in a black congregation is directed toward a people whose identity is found within a powerful, aggressively hostile majority. A clergyman who has developed a sense of who he is within the cloister of a black institution is limited in his ability to minister to the developing self-identity of his people in the midst of Whitey's world. It has been interesting to me to see that those seminarians who have been most vocal and most articulate in their understanding of the peculiarities of the black ministry have been those in white seminaries. Witness, for example, the consultations on the Black Church sponsored by the caucuses of black students at Princeton Theological Seminary and at the Boston Theological Institute. It is out of an involvement in the dynamics which operate upon one's people that one is best able to minister. I am convinced that the environment in which a man who serves the spiritual needs of people profoundly influences that ministry. His education, therefore, must mirror the dynamics of the environment in which the people to whom he will minister find "who" they are. The immersion of the sensitive black seminarian in the process of defining himself in a white oriented community is to my mind an asset to his ministry to black people. I wonder, however, if the white student fares as well in his exposure to maturing dynamics.

It used to be that the clergyman was reckoned to be doing the Lord's work. Only he, it was felt, was equipped to adjudicate what this meant. More than any other professional, the clergyman in our society has had the freedom to set his own priorities, make his own schedule, and go his own way. This absence of accountability has always been a threat to the creation of a responsible ministry. However, as the significance of the Church as an inviolate power has receded, this lack of accountability is less prevalent.

Laymen are developing quite specific expectations of what clergymen will and will not do. Admittedly, many of these expectations are neurotic. The point is that the modern seminary which trains men in an environment which fosters a lack of responsiveness to expectations, a lack of accountability to authority, and all in the name of Koinonia or Grace, does little to prepare a seminarian to function as a leader of laymen whose lives are boxed in by responsibility, accountability, and the Law. This is not to say that there is no room for dissent on the seminary campus or within the congregation. Rather, it is to say that the institutions—including the church—within which white parishioners are enslaved are no more likely to relinquish their authoritarianism than the institution within which black parishioners are enslaved are open to radical re-structuring. The man who would be a pastor to people who must wring a humanity out of this kind of world must be aware of, sensitive to, and able to work within the dynamics of responsibility, accountability, and structure—however zealously he may simultaneously be working for the Kingdom of Grace and Righteousness.

What is suggested is that the preparation for fruitful ministry is more than merely academic. It is emotional and psychological as well. Because theology deals with the God-man negotiation, a theological education involves not only a training in the man-sciences, but opportunities within the seminary community to explore and participate in those dynamics which operate on the men to whom the Church ministers. Black seminarians, and white, need to develop their professional identities in climates as much like the arena of ministry as possible.

Faculty and curriculum are two other areas of concern in the crisis in theological education which are illuminated by the situation of the black seminarian. These categories cannot profitably be discussed separately. Whether the egg or the chicken comes first, one thing remains obvious. The standard curriculum of any institution very quickly becomes a reflection of the pet concerns of the tenured faculty. Moreover, within time the faculty itself begins to mirror the pet prejudices of department heads with regard to methodology and academic credentials. This is natural; who else should answer the questions of academic accomplishment and attainment for an institution? It must, however, be recognized by all involved that this procedure produces a conservatism and a certain sameness within disciplines which may avoid conflict; it certainly also inhibits the scholastic and emotional growth of both faculty and students. The open and candid debate between professors on the method of approaching issues, and even the relative importance of issues, results not only in the refining of positions but presents to an attentive student body a demonstration of the fruitful conduct of conflict between peers. Nowhere is this demonstration so necessary than to our individualistically oriented seminarians.

The problems in the present procedure are crystallized in the experience of the black seminarian committed to an inner-city ministry who registers in the course in his seminary which deals with urban sociology. He finds that the course is taught by someone with a theoretical bias toward a sociology based on rural data, which ignores the dynamics of the situation into which he will go; he finds that there is nowhere in the department to go to relate to a bias more congenial to his needs; and he finds that the requirement of an advanced degree for faculty status precludes the appointment of more knowledgeable men in this area. The best men who were interested in urban sociology went out and *did* rather than stayed in school and studied. The necessity to break through the conservative orientation of faculty with regard to the multiplicity of acceptable credentials is precisely stated by Henry Mitchell:

> . . . Care must be taken to add to faculties men who are expert in Black religious culture, to the extent that they have succeeded in pastorates with the Black masses. To be sure, they will be hard to get, simply because they will have much greater freedom of motion and higher income in the Black ghetto church. If their success in

> the two cultures is evidenced by both a good performance in a large ghetto church and on accredited B.D. program, their 'unwritten Ph.D.' degrees should be recognized directly, and given appropriate faculty status and salary. To do less will guarantee that nobody fitting this demanding description will be recruited for either White or Black seminary faculties.[1]

Moreover, the facts of life would suggest that it is the highly prestigious white seminary which can afford to absorb such a person into its faculty with less risk to its accreditation than the black seminary.

These considerations, however immediate to the black seminarian, are not exhausted by his peculiar situation. Our society is one of tremendous upheaval in values and attitudes and perceptions—to say nothing of techniques and meta-images. When this, as well as the need of the ministry to be responsive to this flux, is taken seriously, it is doubtful whether any man who has not had a continuous, significant, and intimate experience as a minister to a congregation can be asked to prepare any man for the task. The previous illustration of the situation of the black student merely suggests that, in those areas of the seminary curriculum which are oriented toward the operation of the ecclesiastical institution, the ability to reflect critically on data—the "doctoral" ability—is not sufficient. One must be "where the action is" in the collection of one's own data. I personally am inclined to believe that a cycle of a certain number of years of teaching; followed, perhaps, by a year of formulating theory from data accumulated in the field will produce freshness of attitudes and an active theologizing, rather than a recitation of theology which becomes more and more stale with each year away from an operational involvement. While the application of this sort of cyclic approach to the educational responsibilities of faculty in the "logic-centered" disciplines of systematic theology and Bible study is more problematic, I would point out that an increased use of inter-disciplinary courses, especially those using the case or case-book method, could provide some carry-over or integration of the field experience of both operational faculty and students with the "scholastic" disciplines. The radically shifting relations within our society, epitomized by the flux in the communities in which black seminarians will serve, raise significant questions for the structuring or restructuring of institutions within which *any* student is to be trained.

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[1] Henry H. Mitchell, "Black Power and the Christian Church," *Foundations*. April-June, 1968, pp. 99-109.

However polemic these few pages may have seemed, they represent for me at least a great concern for the theological education to relate the academic and emotional preparation for ministry. Hopefully, theological education will turn to a more sensitive acceptance of and theologizing upon the arena of ministry in the present and future.

THE IDEOLOGY OF BLACK POWER

BY HAROLD A. THOMAS

SINCE the summer of 1960 when the slogan "Black Power" was first articulated and raised for national and international consideration by Stokely Carmichael of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee,[1] the direction and focus of the civil rights movement in the United States have changed considerably. Such changes did not come about without considerable confusion among both blacks and whites concerning the meaning of the term. Liberal, concerned whites, black moderates, and many civil rights leaders with a non-violent orientation shared the general confusion. On the one hand, when Dr. Martin Luther King spoke about the slogan in the historic James Meredith march for voter registration in Mississippi, he voiced the genuine sentiment of many blacks:

> Immediately, I had reservations about its use. I had the deep feeling that it was an unfortunate choice of words for a slogan. Moreover, I saw it bringing about divisions within the ranks of the marchers. For a day or two there was fierce competition between those who were wedded to the Black Power slogan and those wedded to Freedom Now. Speakers on each side sought desperately to get the crowds to chant their slogan the loudest.[2]

On the other hand, Charles E. Fager expressed precisely the confused state of many whites when he wrote in his article "White Reflections on Black Power,"

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[1] While the concept of Black Power was not new in America, Carmichael's use of the slogan "Black Power" for the first time in the emotionally charged atmosphere of a civil rights rally drew both positive and negative reactions from all parts of the United States.

[2] Martin Luther King, *Where Do We Go From Here?*, Boston, 1968, pp. 29-31.

> It is difficult, first of all to find out just what the phrases ["consciousness" and "Black Power"] mean . . . and SNCC staffers do not seem to feel it necessary to explain them to the white community. Moreover the slogans have set off a bitter controversy among civil rights groups which can hardly help but further perplex the white outsider. And whites like the author who go knocking on doors seeking to understand the new development run smack into a major effect of "black consciousness" the old welcome mat of "Black and White together" has been replaced by a curt poster reading "Whitey, go home." It is this rejection which most seems to leave us at a loss for a rejoinder.[3]

Much has been written and spoken in the last two years to make it absolutely clear that the concept of Black Power is a necessary consequence of the Negro's struggle through the years to achieve his freedom and his humanity in the United States. Black spokesmen such as the intellectual W. E. B. DuBois, the abolitionist Frederick Douglass, the militant Marcus Garvey and Malcolm X all pointed to the great need of Negroes to find definition and liberation. This would not come at the hands of the white man but as a result of their own efforts to free themselves and understand themselves as a people with a history and a destiny that is unique and for which they can be justly proud. Unfortunately, these men were never really heard by the vast majority of Negroes who were committed to integration at all levels of the civil rights struggle. History has indicated that the civil rights movement with its emphasis on "Black and White together" is a painful, sobering, and shocking example of how poor disillusioned, struggling blacks and sympathetic, well-meaning whites failed to make a significant dent in the structures of American society. To the extent that such integrated efforts failed to affect the system (i.e., the entire American complex of basic institutions, values, beliefs, etc.), to that same extent has the civil rights movement failed to bring about substantial improvement in the lot of the black American. This failure has led inevitably to a recognition of the fact that some new approach to the problem of freedom for black people was necessary.

The clarion call for Black Power is the cry of those who believe that the time is ripe now for a new framework of meaning to be developed by which blacks can achieve their own mature manhood.

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[3] Charles E. Fager, "White Reflections on Black Power," *The Christian Century*. LXIII (1966), 980.

It is the anguished cry of those who believe that no proclamation or civil rights bill, however unequivocal and profound, is an effective weapon against the bastions of racism and slavery so firmly entrenched in American society. It is the cry of those who believe that "the Negro will only be truly free when he reaches down to the inner depths of his own being and signs with the pen and ink of assertive selfhood his own emancipation proclamation."[4] This radical stance has far-reaching implications for both blacks and whites. As such, it requires the most careful evaluation accorded any system of beliefs which seeks to bring about so profound a change in the destiny of more than twenty million Americans.

The task of this paper is to deal specifically with the ideology of Black Power and to evaluate the emphasis on black consciousness and the black man's quest for power. Some attention will be given to a discussion of the use of Black Power both as a means and an end of social change in the United States. The paper will conclude with a critical discussion of the relationship of the ideology of Black Power to the Christian faith.

THE NATURE OF IDEOLOGY

Talcott Parsons in his discussion of the institutionalization of ideologies defines an ideology as "a system of beliefs held in common by the members of a collectivity; that is, a society, or a sub-collectivity of one—including a movement deviant from the main culture of the society." Parsons further describes an ideology as "a system of ideas which is oriented to the evaluative integration of the collectivity, by interpretation of the empirical nature of the collectivity and of the situation in which it is placed, the process by which it has developed to its given state, the goals to which its members are collectively oriented and their relation to the future course of events."[5] Given the above definition, one can readily recognize that there are as many ideologies as there are political systems. Perhaps the most outstanding example of a contemporary ideology is the Marxist economic-political system which essentially understands the history of all existing societies in terms of class struggles. Furthermore, any social order based on the division of classes is pregnant with the seeds of its own destruction; through the dialectical materialistic method, it finally destroys itself and becomes a classless society. For the Marxist, the contemporary struggle is the struggle between the bourgeosie (i.e., the capitalist class) and the proletariat (i.e., the non-propertied class). The testimony of history itself has called into question the basic assumptions of such a dynamic theory of social change. Just as dialectical materialism is an attempt to explain and change the inequities of an unjust economic-political system, so also Black Power is an attempt on the part of Black Americans to explain and hopefully change the inequities and injustices of a white, racist American culture. The black man has developed an ideology so that he may be free to determine his own destiny by his own power and not be the helpless victim of a sinister, vicious system which apparently has no intention of changing.

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[4] King, *Where Do We Go From Here?*, p. 43.

[5] Talcott Parsons, *The Social System*. Glencoe, 1959, p. 349.

THE EMPHASIS ON BLACKNESS

Alvin F. Poussaint, a young black psychiatrist, points out that as a result of the suffering, the humiliation, and the indignity inflicted on the American Negro throughout history, he suffers from a chronic identity crisis with a distorted self-image which critically affects his entire psychological being. This distorted self-image not only produces self destructive attitudes but also makes it extremely difficult for the black man to achieve equality in American life.[6] Shipped from Africa to the United States against his will, he was literally ripped from the cultural, pre-literary setting in which he found meaning for his life. Such erosion left the black man naked and unprotected, completely at the mercy of a white hostile America. Under conditions of slavery, the Negro family life was virtually destroyed with the systematic exploitation of the Negro female, the inhumanity inflicted on the children, and the emasculation of the male. This crippling legacy on the Negro family life is very much a part of the current explanation for the present crisis in Negro family life in America. Speaking of the unfortunate but necessarily dominant role of the mother in the Negro home, Lee Rainwater makes the following observation: "The mother-centered family with its emphasis on the primacy of the mother-child relation and only tenuous ties to a man . . . is the legacy of adaptations worked out by Negroes during slavery."[7] The slave system with its subservience stamped indelibly on the psyche of the Negro made him dependent on the white man and rendered him incapable of developing any confidence in himself.

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[6] Alvin F. Poussaint, "The Negro American: His Self-Image and Integration," *The Black Power Revolt.* Floyd Barbour, ed. Boston, 1968, p. 94.

[7] Lee Rainwater, "Crucible of Identity: The Negro Lower Class Family," *The Negro American.* Talcott Parsons and Kenneth Clark, eds. Boston, 1968, p. 167.

It is indeed strange that people who never allowed the Negro the luxury of ever forgetting that he was black should now be terribly disturbed because of the emphasis on black consciousness. The segregated system with its emphasis on black (colored) and white has forced the Negro to the conclusion that in spite of some token integration, his chances of being totally accepted by the white society are not real, and that if he is to be accepted at all, it will most likely be an acceptance of himself by himself in his own black community.

The flight of many lower class Negroes from the rural South to the urban North has occurred simultaneously with the exodus of panic-stricken whites from urban areas to the suburbs. Most of the nation's largest urban areas have in turn become black infernoes where dehumanized mortals boil in their own frustrations, hatred, hopelessness, and rage. In these ever-present hells from which the Negro finds no escape, he has been left alone to confront his own blackness. Hence, the very blackness which has been the source of his weakness he is now forced to regard as the basis for any hope or power. If his blackness, and not the consideration of his own self-worth as a person, is responsible for the Negro being where he is, then why doesn't he hate himself because of his blackness? Why shouldn't he believe that black is evil and white is right? If physical beauty in America's culture is judged according to white European standards, then why shouldn't the Negro despise his kinky hair and feel ashamed of his broad nose and his thick lips? The tragedy is that the Negro quite expectedly has formed his own self-image and self-concept on the basis of values prescribed by white racists. In the words of Poussaint, "Black men and women learn quickly to hate themselves and each other because they are Negroes."[8]

Not even the middle-class Negro who enjoys some of the "blessings" of white America has escaped the clutches of self-hatred. Although he may be middle class, he cannot hide his blackness which binds him absolutely to the fate of his black brothers in the ghetto. According to E. Franklin Frazier,

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[8] Poussaint, "The Negro American," p. 96.

> The repressed hostilities of middle-class Negroes to whites are not only directed toward other minority groups but inward toward themselves. This results in self-hatred, which may appear from their behavior to be directed toward the Negro masses but which in reality is directed against themselves. While pretending to be proud of being a Negro, they ridicule Negroid physical characteristics and seek to modify or efface them as much as possible. Within their own groups they constantly proclaim that "nigger" makes them sick. The very use of the term "nigger," which they claim they resent, indicates that they want to disassociate themselves from the Negro masses.[9]

The new mood expressed by the slogan "Black Power" seeks to capture that fundamental sense of dignity, integrity, and worth which is inherent in the human personality, specifically the black human personality. It is an attempt by the Negro to hurdle the crippling years of segregation and discrimination and accept the challenge to grow up into responsible selfhood. To do this he has had to reach into his dark past and look honestly at his heritage with a view toward developing a healthy appreciation for who he is. Hence the slogan, "Black is Beautiful." After being told for centuries that black is evil, wrong, and therefore ugly, why should there not be an emphasis on the beauty of blackness now? This emphasis is no mere visceral response to the self-rejection experienced over a period of many years. It is an authentic and logical expression of a people who are determined to know the truth about themselves, convinced that only the truth will make them free.

It is no doubt true that one of the reasons for the dismal failure of integration in the United States has been the understandably pathetic lack of organization, purpose, and strength within the Negro community itself. Disruption of the Negro family and community, referred to above, clearly illustrates the powerlessness and inability of the Negro to challenge the slave system. It is equally true that a continuing pattern of fragmentation and disorganization among blacks is not likely to contribute to their integration into the mainstream of American life. The Black Power advocates believe that if integration is ever realized, it will come when the black community is conscious of its own identity, solid enough and strong enough to contribute something to the union. Margaret Halsey is right when she says, "What the more 'militant' Negro leaders have learned is that

[9] E. Franklin Frazier, *Black Bourgeosie.* Glencoe, 1961, p. 226.

integration failed because the Negroes were not integrating from strength. Negroes will have to integrate themselves before there can be any genuine melting away of barriers between the white and non-white communities." Stokely Carmichael and Charles Hamilton make the very same point: "Only when black people fully develop this sense of community of themselves can they begin to deal effectively with the problems of racism in this country. This is what we mean by a new consciousness; this is the vital first step."[10]

Perhaps the strongest integrative factor in the Negro community at this point in history is the given blackness which is inescapable. Conscious of this gift, the Negro community has at first hand a most powerful defense against those forces within it which would mitigate against its attempts to work together. To advocate Black Power is to be aware and proud of one's blackness, ignoring those negative stereotypes inflicted on the Negro by his hostile white culture, and lifting black heritage and black tradition to new levels of appreciation. One black spokesman has put it humorously, "So bubble eyes and buck teeth are out; natural hair is in. Skin lighteners are out. 'Soul food' is in." Another black spokesman makes the same point in these words: "When black consciousness takes over, you eat your chittlin's with an air of ceremony. . . . When you sit down to take tea, you are losing your identity. Tea is not your bag, man. Indeed, blackness is cause for ceremony."[11]

THE BLACK QUEST FOR POWER

Certainly no other word can be more closely identified with white America than the word "power." America has been regarded by other nations around the world as one of the most powerful nations on earth. From time to time, the use of the United States power has been called into question by those who suspect that it has not always been used in the interest of peace. Sen. J. William Fulbright's recent book, *The Arrogance of Power* is only one illustration of the serious questions which are being raised concerning the use of American power. When this country flexes its economic, political, and military muscles, the effect is felt not only abroad but right here within the United States itself. The minority group suffering most severely from the abuse of this power has been the American Negro who has been virtually excluded from the councils of power. For years he has known the painful reality of police brutality and police power. As a race, the Negro has been unable to improve his economic situation at a pace which is commensurate with the economic development of the country in which he is struggling to survive. At times the black man in America seems so hopeless that one wonders whether his economic situation has remained constant during the past one hundred years, or, if it has moved at all, one wonders whether it has deteriorated even further. Politically, the Negro has had no power to effect any positive changes within the life of his community. The result of this woeful state of affairs has been that the black man has been the butt of every calculated or inadvertent abuse of power. Even when the power structures have made some attempts to ameliorate the conditions of the American Negro, such efforts have been frustrated by the racist responses of the white majority. This truth is clearly illustrated by the fact that the last two Democratic administrations, sympathetic to the civil rights movement, passed more civil rights legislation than any other administration in the history of the United States; yet, such legislation failed to make a significant difference in the condition of the American Negro.

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[10] Stokely Carmichael and Charles V. Hamilton, eds., *Black Power*. New York, 1967, p. 39.

[11] "What Must Be Done?" *Newsweek* (November, 1967), p. 10.

What is unmistakably clear is that the power of the white man has been corrupted. It has been corrupted "because it meets little meaningful resistance from Negroes to temper it and keep white men from aping God."[12] Whether this explanation of corruption is true, it is at the heart of the black man's quest for power. The power of the white man's system in America is expressed both overtly and covertly, and the Negro has been the victim of both forms. The institutionalized power structures have legitimatized their use of power at the expense of the Negro and have attempted to escape blame because this coercive power was not overt. John Bennett observes that

> the established forms of power are no less coercive because they get their way without very obvious use of power. Such power is exercised by the almost automatic enforcing of the accepted rules in society. Those in power discharge employees; they evict tenants; they refrain from taking any positive remedial steps by dragging their feet.

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[12] "Black Power: A Statement by the National Committee of Negro Churchmen, July 1966," *The Black Revolt*. Floyd Barbour, ed., p. 225.

> They might take drastic action to change many things, but they prefer to do nothing or to take delaying or token action. It is in their power to do so, and it avoids the appearance of naked power. Protection of interest by foot-dragging is often the most pervasive form of power in our cities.[13]

This statement clearly illustrates the way in which the black American has been cheated by those powerful social structures and institutions which have the responsibility of working in the interest of all of the people. The response of Black Power is an unequivocal "no" to such coercive use of power, overt or covert. It affirms that powerlessness breeds a race of beggars. The power desired by blacks is essentially organizational power, not for the purpose of perpetuating abuse or enslaving men against their will; rather, blacks want power to be strong enough to liberate themselves and hopefully their captors as well. This means sufficient power to provide a structure of authority for positive confrontation with perverted power. If Paul Tillich is correct in defining power as "being actualizing itself over against the threat of non-being," then Black Power is the struggle of the black man to discover what it means to be black in a white culture which, because of its bigotry and racism, steadfastly refuses to let him be. Specifically, this power is social power to determine the kind of society in which he will live. It is economic power to take advantage of all of the fruits of a superior technological society. It is political power to govern himself effectively by informing, criticizing and making decisions which affects his destiny. Black Power is both the realization of the unlimited, untapped resources lying dormant in the black community and the courage to call such resources into service. In the words of John Bennett, "It is a great advance when people who have been powerless and plagued by apathy or fatalism organize to improve their lot, and this means creating instruments of political and economic power that enable their interest to be felt by the community at large."[14]

BLACK POWER: MEANS OR AN END?

In spite of the fact that the civil rights movement failed in terms of its long-range objectives to bring about freedom and justice for the Negro in an integrated society, the movement was successful in awakening the moral sensitivities of many throughout the nation and throughout the world. On the one hand, those committed to racism were at least forced to hear the cry of the Negro for freedom and equality. On the other hand, those committed to brotherhood could not help but wonder how long they would have to remain firm in their hearts before they overcome. Nevertheless, in the historic march on Washington in 1963, the hopes of many were raised to the point at which they were beginning to believe that the "dream" of Dr. Martin Luther King might come true. Black Power was announced as the realistic but sobering response to that deferred dream. Is Black Power then a means to the end that all of the social order will be integrated with all men of good will, or is it simply an end in itself? The answer to this question is by no means clear. The issue remains cloudy because it is rarely if ever discussed by many of the Black Power spokesmen. This writer heard one articulate black militant spokesman express the view that he was so busy loving black that he didn't have time to be concerned with white. As far as the white man's problems were concerned he was uninterested. This suggests a lack of concern for any creative relationship with white society. Perhaps such an attitude really reflects the mood of the militant Black Power advocates. Edler G. Hawkins, a concerned, dedicated, creative black leader, suggests another point of view when he describes Black Power as "an interim ethic, a thing of absolute necessity, as we move from where we are to where we want to be in race relations."[15]

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[13] John Bennett, "The Church and Power Conflicts," *Witness to a Generation.* Wayne Cowan, ed. New York, 1966, p. 167.

[14] *Ibid.*, p. 168.

For years the powerless Negro begged white America to admit him into the mainstream of American life. It is no exaggeration to point out that he has never been completely accepted. Those few Negroes who are accepted have been so totally removed from the life of the ghetto that their "success" has had no meaning for the man in the street. In this connection one of the most helpful by-products of the Black Power movement has been the plethora of Black Collegians organizations springing up in white colleges and universities all over the country. These students are dedicated to the concept that their lives, however privileged, are inextricably bound to the lives of their black brothers in the streets. In the words of Vernon J. Dixon, "The call is out to enroll the skills and analytical tools of the black student in furthering and shaping the black revolution."[16] The actions of these students, now typical among many middle class Negroes, suggest that they are no longer prepared to beg for an entrance into the white mainstream; instead, they find themselves at the side of their less fortunate brothers, struggling together to work their way up and out. The Negro's rejection of the white value system and his consequent search for identity, selfhood, and fulfillment in the black community has left the burden for integrating society squarely on the shoulders of white American society. Up to now, whites have deceived no one concerning their intention to remain segregated. The question of whether American society shall be integrated is a question which white America must answer. The whole world still waits to know what that answer is. This answer also determines the status of Black Power. If white America decides to accept black people for who they are with freedom for self-fulfillment and self-determination, then Black Power must be only a means to hasten the day when all men will sit down at "the table of brotherhood." If, however, white America continues to perpetuate the present injustices which are now a part of the Negro's common life, then I believe that Black Power in one form or another will be an end.

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[15] Edler Hawkins, "What's Ahead in 1968?" *Religion and Race Memo,* No. 52. December, 1967, p. 5.

It must be said that the ideology of Black Power does not mutually exclude the concept of integration. The integration desired by too many whites is an integration into their value system. Those who integrate are forced to forget who they are in order to survive. In Carmichael's words, "To be an American, the black man must strive to become 'white.' To the extent that he does, he is considered 'well adjusted'—one who has risen above the race question."[17] The integration which is compatible with Black Power is the union which has integrity for both sides. It is a union based on complete liberation and freedom for either side for inter-group and interpersonal living, together with the mutual sharing of power. In his book *Let's Work Together*, Dr. Nathan Wright, Jr. observes: "Black consciousness does not exclude integration. It simply does not require integration as an absolute end. Integration . . . is only a means to achieve freedom and fulfillment for all."[18]

[16] Vernon J. Dixon, "The Black Students and the Brother in the Streets," *Negro Digest*. XVIII (1968), 29.

[17] Carmichael and Hamilton, *Black Power*, p. 31.

[18] Nathan Wright, *Let's Work Together*. New York, 1968, p. 127.

Some of the most articulate spokesmen for Black Power have been some of the most severe critics of American Christian religion. Ron Karega, Stokely Carmichael, Malcolm X and Vincent Harding have all called into question the conduct of those who profess to adhere to the teachings of the Christian faith. The Black Muslim Malcolm X undoubtedly shocked a number of black Christians when he told them they were worshiping a Jesus who could not identify with them.

> Brothers and Sisters, the white man has brainwashed us black people to fasten our gaze upon a blond-haired, blue-eyed Jesus! We're worshiping a Jesus that doesn't even look like us! The white man has taught us to shout and sing and pray until we die, to wait until death for some dream heaven in the hereafter, when we're dead, while the white man has his milk and honey in streets paved with golden dollars right here on this earth.[19]

In incisive words, the Christian Vincent Harding describes the Black Power advocates' reaction to white American Christians and their Christ, "Go to hell you white sepulcher hypocrites. All you want is to cripple our will and prolong our agony and to use your white Christ to do it."[20] The tension expressed in these two statements reveals the basic incompatibility of some advocates of Black Power and some disciples of Jesus Christ. Those spokesmen for Black Power make at least this one point abundantly clear: The Christian witness in the United States is so questionable that the image of Jesus Christ, the Son of God, has become confused with the image of Christ who blesses the American way of life. This Christ allows some men (white men) to keep other men (black men) in bondage. There can be no confusion, however, between the American Christ and the God of the Christian faith, the God of Israel, the God who revealed himself uniquely in Jesus Christ.

The God of the Christian faith is the God who created all men in his own image, free to realize their human potential. The dramatic story of the exodus is no doubt the clearest Old Testament illustration of God's concern to set his people free. Furthermore, the entire record of the life of Christ is the story of God's liberating men from fear, disease, sin, and death. If indeed the advocates of Black Power

[19] Malcolm X, *The Autobiography of Malcolm X*. New York, 1965, p. 222.

[20] Vincent Harding, "Black Power and the American Christ," *Christian Century*. LXXXIV (1967), 12.

seek, above all, to liberate men who are in bondage, then they stand solidly in the tradition of the Christian faith.

The God worshiped in the Hebraic-Christian tradition is not only the God of all men, he is also the God of Israel, a people with whom God had a special relationship. A scattered, disorganized band of nomads, Israel was called together by God. He made them a people, a nation with identity and a destiny. He was their God, and they were his people. The promise given to Abraham, "By you all the families of the earth will bless themselves" (Genesis 12:3), is a promise given to the father of Israel for all Israel. According to G. Ernest Wright, ". . . the phrase in chapter 12:3 means . . . that God has chosen Israel in order that through this one people all men may be brought to a saving knowledge of himself."[21] Could it be that through the ideology of Black Power with its emphasis on black identity, God is bringing a scattered, despised people together not only to save themselves, but also to be the instruments through which God will work to save the nations of this world? The message of Black Power comes as a word of judgment not only to America but also to those nations of the world who find their security in their own strength and use their power to keep others in slavery.

Although the ideology of Black Power is one of the most significant systems of belief developed by a people who seek their freedom, it is not without its dangers. The quest for self-identity and power is no doubt a positive task for a people who have been suppressed and powerless. But self-identity and race pride can never be an excuse for the mere glorification of race. In spite of his history, the black man has to see himself not only as a man who is unique in color, heritage, and tradition, but also as a vital member in the family of man. His freedom to realize black consciousness must be a freedom not only to stand *against* those who would suppress him, but also a freedom to stand *with* all men who seek the liberation of their brothers. Even the black man, in spite of his condemnation of white power, is not beyond the reach of those perversions which have made the white man guilty of the abusive use of power. The present power struggle within some Black Power organizations for leadership is indicative of the temptations of men, black and white, to use power for their own ends.

The Christian who recognizes that all power belongs ultimately to

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[21] G. Ernest Wright, *The Book of the Acts of God*. New York, 1960, p. 12.

God is not overly impressed with that power which men seek. He is aware of man's pride and his sinful search for strength and power to erect towers of Babel for his own glory. The power of the Christian faith is a power most effective in weakness and humiliation. It is the power of the cross. Such a demonstration of power through weakness must always remain a live option for the Christian. "Is it not possible," asks Vincent Harding, "that the God who dies for his enemies, who rejects their terms and their weapons—and their kind of power—is also worthy of consideration as a model for the employment of the black community?"[22]

Finally, for the Christian, all ideologies are at best man's imperfect attempts to provide a system of beliefs which are operative for his own salvation. The ideology of Black Power is no exception. The man who takes the Christian faith seriously finds his salvation in Christ and not in any ideology. It is the power of God alone, working through whatever human channels, that will redeem the hearts of sinful men. The Christian, however, remains sensitive and open to the many ways in which God is constantly breaking through to his people, speaking to them, judging them, and saving them. Could it be that at this point in history, God is breaking through again? Perhaps this time he is using black men to utter the word of judgment and hope not only for America but for the world.

[22] Vincent Harding, "The Religion of Black Power," *The Religious Situation—1968*. Donald Cutler, ed. Boston, 1968, p. 26.

MADNESS AND THE HOLY SPIRIT

BY RUSSELL BECKER

> A madman's ravings . . . are absurd in relation to the situation in which he finds himself, but not in relation to his delirium.
>
> SARTRE

Prolegomenon

Music wasn't music anymore; it was something new and wonderful; it didn't play—it lived and breathed, caressing the room, gyrating my world. The notes played games with me; they danced around the room eluding my grasp, sneaking up behind me and then scurrying away to die under my pillow or in a corner—only to be resurrected again.

My friend, my friend whom I had known forever, who had oozed with me in some primeval slime, in some prehistoric pool, asked me the time. Oh yes, the time. The clock was there—or was it? The second hand was reaching escape velocity, and I felt it would fly into stellar space. I wanted to say, "Take me with you"—the time, the time. I cocked my head and squinted my eyes—yes, I have it, it's. . . . I forgot, I forgot the time—time? I forgot the question. I must try again. Now I know it, but I can't tell anybody; it's too absurd. The time; it's so funny it hurts. I laughed and laughed and laughed. Why would anyone want to know the time? My body is laughing with a gigantic guffaw; everything is laughing—my friend is laughing. Oh sweet pain, my gut hurts. Too much effort, it isn't worth it—the time just isn't worth the effort for me to say it . . . whatever it was that I was going to say.

My head turned away from the clock. Every nerve in my body sensed that I had moved my head. I was aware of every message, every ganglion had its piece to say and I listened intently. My head stopped.

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Stop! Stop! Stop! Stop! My gaze latched onto a crack in the plaster. The crack turned into a crevasse in a glacial ice flow. The fissure drew me toward it as if I were an iron filing and it were a gargantuan electro-magnet. It wasn't as if I had never seen a crack before, it's just that I never really cared about cracks. God, but cracks are so important.[1]

II

"It is the reflection of my face. Often in these lost days I study it. I can understand nothing of this face. The faces of others have some sense, some direction. Not mine. I cannot even decide whether it is handsome or ugly. I think it is ugly because I have been told so. But it doesn't strike me. At heart, I am even shocked that anyone can attribute qualities of this kind to it, as if you called a clod of earth or a block of stone beautiful or ugly. . . . My glance slowly and wearily travels over my forehead, my cheeks: it finds nothing firm, it is stranded. Obviously there are a nose, two eyes and a mouth, but none of it makes sense, there is not even a human expression. . . . What I see is well below the monkey, on the fringe of the vegetable world, at the level of jelly fish. It is alive, I can't say it isn't; . . . I see a slight tremor, I see the insipid flesh blossoming and palpitating with abandon. The eyes especially are horrible seen so close. They are glassy, soft, blind, red-rimmed, they look like fish scales.

". . . Do other men have as much difficulty in appraising their face? It seems that I see my own as I feel my body, through a dumb, organic sense.

". . . People who live in society have learned how to see themselves in mirrors as they appear to their friends. I have no friends. Is that why my flesh is so naked? You might say—yes you might say, nature without humanity."[2]

III

1) "You know, sometimes I feel like empty words walking around in a box."
2) "My body is nothing; I am my mind, and it could take any form."
3) "Life is just a preparation for death, anyway."
4) "When I cut myself [the subject had attempted suicide], I finally felt I was somebody. I felt real, I didn't doubt that I existed."

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[1] An experience of the writer.

[2] Jean-Paul Sartre, *Nausea* (New York, 1964), pp. 27-29.

5) "I want to get married, but I feel like I shouldn't want to. I pretended I didn't like school when I did. I want to be with people, but I run away."
6) "Everybody meets the solutions and not the problems. Everybody was concerned when I attempted suicide, but nobody cares about the cause. Nobody is willing to accept my solution to the problem; I have a right to take my life."
7) "When I was a kid, I had everything I wanted. My step-father has told me that I can have all of his money—if I'm worthy of it."
8) "I'm scared to death about looking inside myself."
9) "I could be happy being in prison, if it were really me."
10) "I feel like my real self is somewhere else."
11) "I feel better if I just stay in my cell and don't go out."
12) "Everytime I succeed, I feel it's not me, and then I have to * * * * up."[3]

IV

"Whilst in this state of philosophic pessimism and general depression of spirits about my prospects, I went one evening into a dressing room in the twilight to procure some article that was there; when suddenly there fell upon me without any warning, just as if it came out of the darkness, a horrible fear of my own existence. Simultaneously there arose in my mind the image of an epileptic patient whom I had seen in the asylum, a black-haired youth with greenish skin, entirely idiotic, who used to sit all day on one of the benches, or rather shelves against the wall, with his knees drawn up against his chin, and the coarse gray undershirt, which was his only garment, drawn over him enclosing his entire figure. He sat there like a sort of sculptured Egyptian cat or Peruvian mummy, moving nothing but his black eyes and looking absolutely non-human. This image and my fear entered into a species of combination with each other. That shape am I, I felt, potentially. Nothing that I possess can defend me against that fate, if the hour for it should strike for me as it struck for him. There was such a horror of him, and such a perception of my own merely momentary discrepancy from him, that it was as if something hitherto solid within my breast gave way entirely, and I became a mass of quivering fear. After this the universe was changed for me altogether. I awoke morning after morning with a horrible dread at the pit of my stomach, and with a sense of the insecurity of life that I never knew before, and that I have never felt since. It was like a revelation; and although the immediate feelings passed away, the experience has made me sympathetic with the morbid feelings of others ever since. It gradually faded but for months I was unable to go out into the dark alone."[4]

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[3] From an interview of the writer with an inmate in a New Jersey state reformatory.

V

"The nurse told me that sometimes I kept them awake at night by talking. And they—they put me into a padded cell and I said, 'Well, don't put me in here,' I said, you know, I said, 'I can't bear it.' But they said, 'But you—we've got to try to do it because you make such a noise you know—talking.' So they put me into this place and I said, 'Well, leave the door open,' so they left the door open, and I remember going through that night struggling with—with something that wanted to—some sort of—curiosity or willingness to open myself to—um—experiencing—this, and the panic and the insufficiency of spirit that would enable me to experience it. And during that time I went through—I went through the Stations of the Cross, although I'd never been what you might call a really religious person—I'm not now—and I went through all that sort of—those sort of feelings. Well the—all this experience became—went on for quite a time and I began to—they kept on giving me sedatives to make me sleep, and I—one morning I decided that I was not going to take any more sedatives, and that I had got to stop this business going on because I couldn't cope with it any more. . . .

"I sat on the bed, and I thought, well, somewhere or other I've got to sort of join up with my present—er—self, very strongly. So I sat on the bed, I clenched my hands together tightly. And the nurse had just been along and said to me, 'Well, I want you to take this,' and I said, 'I'm not taking any more because I should—the more I take of that the less capable I am of doing anything now—I mean—as I said, I shall go under.' And so I sat on the bed and I held my hands together, and as—I suppose in a clumsy way of linking myself up with my present self, I kept on saying my own name over and over again and all of a sudden, just like that—I suddenly realized that it was all over. . . ."[5]

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[4] William James, *The Varieties of Religious Experience* (New York, 1958), pp. 135-136.

Introduction

Timothy Leary, the charismatic leader of the cult of LSD, has stated that the drug, LSD, offers "the hope of an unparalleled expansion of man's untapped mental capacities."[6] Leary believes these capacities are unexploited because man is conditioned by an "imprinted" view of reality, "a sudden irreversible type of learning which seems independent of the laws of motivation, reward and conditioning."[7] Although the biological analogy of imprinting may better be left to geese,[8] the point still seems valid, that man is caught up in what R. D. Laing terms a social fantasy system,[9] which dictates in varying degrees the nature of our experience. If this is indeed the case, William James' remark is apropos: "No account of the universe in its totality can be final which leaves these other forms of consciousness quite disregarded."[10]

In a modern world where alienation is intrinsic to the social fabric, where reality is a hole in a computer punch card, is it any wonder that induced forms of consciousness are becoming a live option? In return, this social fabric reels like a rabid dog bitten in the flank and slaps the dubious epithet of "madness" on the curious offspring it has spawned. R. D. Laing, one of Britain's leading psychoanalysts, has called into question some of our basic assumptions regarding "madness" and the function it plays in the development of the self. Laing suggests that madness, far from being a debilitating demonic force, is rather a salutary process employed in the service of the self.

This paper proposes to explore the relationship of the Holy Spirit described by Christian theology, in particular that of John Macquarrie, to the psychic phenomenon which has been labeled "madness." For the treatment of madness the paper will rely almost exclusively on the works of R. D. Laing.

[5] R. D. Laing, *The Politics of Experience* (New York, 1967), pp. 111-112.

[6] Timothy Leary, "Introduction," from *LSD: The Consciousness Expanding Drug*, ed. David Solomon (New York, 1964), p. 2.

[7] *Ibid.*, p. 19.

[8] Konrad Lorenz, *On Aggression* (New York, 1966).

[9] R. D. Laing, *The Self and Others* (London, 1961), pp. 21-22.

[10] James, *Varieties of Religious Experience*, p. 388.

MACQUARRIE'S DOCTRINE OF THE HOLY SPIRIT

Method:

Theologians are not often as amenable as John Macquarrie to exposing their theological method to full scrutiny. Some of Macquarrie's method is not explicit in the introduction to his book, *Principles of Christian Theology* and must be gleaned from the text of the entire book. Macquarrie's method can be called phenomenological in that it seeks to do justice to all data.[11] No one can divest himself entirely of presuppositions, but we can take seriously phenomena confronted in all contexts. This methodology is not arbitrary but follows coherently from Macquarrie's theology with its universalistic implications: ". . . The position of these theologians becomes distorted when they try to narrow the knowledge of God to a single self-revealing act on his [God's] part, and as against them at this point, the traditional natural theology was correct and justified in claiming a wider and indeed universal possibility for knowing God."[12] Consequently for Macquarrie, phenomena are data which bear an inherent possibility of revelation. A phenomenological method is thus the only method which sufficiently allows the data to speak for itself. Revelation, however, is not merely a distillation of what is "good" in all experience, but is rather a revelation which meets man within the context of historical contingency, within his tradition.[13] If Holy Being is active within the creative process on a universal scale,[14] it follows that the parochialism of a "special" revelation stifles the efficacy of the creative process itself as well as stifling what Macquarrie calls the "universal possibility of revelation."[15]

Consistent with Macquarrie's phenomenological method is his willingness to deal with theology on interdisciplinary terms.[16] His remarks on psychology are of special concern here. Psychology is cast in an informing role; i.e., the empirical findings of psychology can inform the theological task.[17] Unfortunately, however, in Macquarrie's endeavor to maintain the integrity of the ministerial role, he demeans "psychological comfort" and appears to suggest that psychology does not participate in the divine creative process,[18] thus running some risk of undermining the cogency of his natural theology. But Macquarrie's openness to other disciplines does show, in principle at least, that he takes all phenomena seriously irrespective of its guise.

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[11] John Macquarrie, *Principles of Christian Theology* (New York, 1966), pp. 31-32.

[12] *Ibid.*, p. 47.

[13] *Ibid.*, pp. 156-157.

[14] *Ibid.*, pp. 202-203.

[15] *Ibid.*, p. 80.

[16] Macquarrie, pp. 18ff.

[17] *Ibid.*, p. 25.

[18] *Ibid.*, pp. 427-49.

Even though the phenomenological method enables us to understand external and internal data with some degree of objectivity, we also discover that by employing the method on inner phenomena (existential-analytic) a non-objective aspect of man is revealed, namely, his "prior understanding." Man, *ipso facto*, has "prior understanding," and the realization of this fact automatically sets limits on the theological enterprise. Theology is an interpretive process which moves from the known to the unknown, from existence to that which impinges upon existence.[19] The focal point of the interpretive process is of course existent man and his experience. Although he cautions against the perversions of subjectivism, Macquarrie is nonetheless concerned to establish the nature of the community experience.[20]

Man's mode of being, termed existence, is unique because it has its own being disclosed to it.[21] Man as "disclosed being" is the starting point of all theology and as such is involved in what Macquarrie refers to as "reciprocal illumination:" "If it is the understanding of ourselves already given with existence that makes possible a philosophical theology and, indeed, makes possible our response to any revelation or our recognition of any revelation, the revelation will in turn shed new light on that 'natural' understanding of ourselves from which we set out."[22]

Macquarrie seems to suggest that man has a built-in "capacity for revelation."[23] This "capacity" theology has called *analogia entis*, analogy of being. Macquarrie adopts this term to express the immanence of Being in beings, i.e., God's participation in his creation.[24] Macquarrie postulates a hierarchy of beings which all participate in Being; the highest of which we have any significant knowledge is man. "In man, a material body and an animal organism are united with his distinctively personal being. This is the widest range of being that we know, and therefore symbols and images drawn from personal life have the highest degree of adequacy accessible to us."[25] Thus,

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[19] *Ibid.*, p. 33.
[20] *Ibid.*, pp. 5-6.
[21] *Ibid.*, p. 55.
[22] *Ibid.*, p. 210.
[23] *Ibid.*, p. 85.
[24] *Ibid.*, pp. 189-190, 320. Also see Arnold Come, *Human Spirit and Holy Spirit*. Philadelphia, 1959, pp. 86, 114-115, 164.
[25] Macquarrie, p. 131.

analogia entis becomes the ground for any feasible symbolizing of Being, that is, for our very understanding of God. Consequently, an understanding of human existence is, for Macquarrie, the *sine qua non* of theology.

Natural Theology:

Macquarrie is in fundamental agreement with the intentions of the "old style natural theology," but he wishes to make a few basic alterations. Old style natural theology was primarily concerned with rationalistic proofs in order to approach a God that had been encapsulated in a strait-jacket of special revelation. Macquarrie endeavors to span this "ugly ditch" between the universal and the particular by a philosophical theology or a new style natural theology. This theology seeks to accomplish its task by an existential-ontology, an understanding of Being via existential analysis: "Or are we to push back the inquiry into the fundamental ways in which we come to know anything, and try to elucidate the basic structures and patterns of experience that might seem to offer valid credentials for a religious conviction."[26] The sources of religious conviction are as universal as disclosed being itself. Resident within man is a capacity of primordial thinking or a thinking which can respond to the solicitations of being;[27] this capacity can attune itself to the address of being in every context. This is the "natural" aspect of Macquarrie's theology—that expressive Being seeks to realize itself in the context of creation or natural order.[28]

Holy Spirit:

Macquarrie does not speak of the elements of the trinity as "persons," which to the modern mind connotes separateness or autonomy; rather he prefers the denotation "modes of being." His idea of being is the result of a method similar to Bultmann's; i.e., being is that which stands over-against the nothingness in our own existence.[29] Being, for Macquarrie (or Heidegger), does not fit traditional philosophical meanings. Being is an incomprehensible transcendent-immanence which, although elusive and distant, is present in the being of all beings. The nature of being is "letting be," by which Macquarrie means "something . . . positive and active, as enabling to be, empowering to be, or bringing into being," as opposed to leaving alone.[30]

[26] *Ibid.*, p. 49.

[27] *Ibid.*, p. 85.

[28] *Ibid.*, p. 206.

[29] *Ibid.*, p. 97.

[30] *Ibid.*, p. 103.

However, God and being are not synonymous. What makes being God for the religious man is the gift-like character that the letting-be assumes for him. When one speaks of this grace, he is no longer speaking of being but of Being—a valuational element has entered the picture. Thus, the crucial question for Macquarrie is not, "Is being God?" but, "Is being gracious?"[31]

"Primordial" Being is that aspect of the trinity, symbolized by Father, which is seen as the transcendent source of the "energy of letting-be"; he is the ultimate source or possibility of all beings. Left to himself as "primordial" Being, God would be unknowable. But God is also immanent, mediating himself through all beings. This immanent aspect, the second person of the trinity, Macquarrie calls "expressive being." Being has taken on the character of time to identify with creation—the Logos concept in Christian theology.[32] The third person of the trinity is the dynamic nature of Being; it is that operation of Being which seeks to relate in a unifying way beings to Being without destroying the freedom of the beings in question. The Holy Spirit or "unitive Being"[33] is both dynamic and teleological. More will be said about these ideas later.

To comprehend Macquarrie's view of the work of the Holy Spirit, we must understand his use of the word "creation." Creation is "the dependence of the beings at all times on Being that lets them be."[34] Therefore, creation is not a point in time but a continuing process, a process of God's love (letting-be) working itself out in the world of beings. In this scheme, expressive Being or the Son is an agent of creation and not creation itself.[35] Creation, reconciliation, and consummation are not separate acts but are on a continuum consonant with the creative process as a whole. "Rather, it is the case that at a given time there was a new and decisive [Christ] revelation of an activity that had always been going on, an activity that is equiprimordial with creation itself."[36]

The work of the Spirit is also a part of the creative continuum: "The Holy Spirit then is God's coming to man in an inward way to enlighten and strengthen him; it is the awakening in man of the

[31] John Macquarrie, "How is Theology Possible?," *New Theology No. 1.* New York, 1964, pp. 28ff.

[32] Macquarrie, *Principles*, p. 183.

[33] Dale Moody, *Spirit of the Living God*, Philadelphia, 1968, p. 183.

[34] Macquarrie, *Principles*, p. 219.

[35] *Ibid.*, p. 203.

[36] *Ibid.*, p. 247.

realization of his kinship with Being, an awakening brought about by Being itself that is already immanent in man."[37] Part of the Spirit's work, which traditionally has been called sanctification, is a process of growth culminating in the highest quality of human existence, love. Love can be understood as analogous to Being's "letting-be" but with the limitation of particularity. Most typically, " 'letting-be' means helping a person into the full realization of his potentialities for being; and the greatest love will be costly, since it will be accomplished by spending of one's own being."[38] Since Being is immanent in beings, God's love is mediated reciprocally through these beings; i.e., we love God by loving beings and we are loved by God through beings.[39]

Included in the creative process is the concept of consummation or destiny. Unitive Being is seeking a new and richer unity:

> The end would be all things gathered up in God, all things brought to fulfillment of their potentialities for being, at one among themselves and at one with Being from which they have come and for which they are destined. But this end too could not be thought of as a point that will eventually be reached, for at every point new vistas will open up. Being must remain at once stable and dynamic. A static perfection, achieved once for all will be frozen.[40]

Therefore, it remains clear that the Holy Spirit is active in all aspects of creation-reconciliation-consummation and is not confined to any single area such as salvation or sanctification.

Of special interest to this paper is Macquarrie's treatment of the concept of selfhood and its relationship to Unitive Being. Macquarrie's view of the self is usually expounded in the existential categories of temporality. Authentic selfhood occurs when "the polarities of existence are held in balance and its potentialities are brought to fulfillment."[41] This fulfillment can only be realized when the temporal dimensions of human existence are held in unity. Through the work of the Holy Spirit, Unitive Being strives to attain unity in man in the form of authentic selfhood.

Man is caught in a tension between his "facticity" and his "potentiality"—selfhood stands in the process of human existence as an authentic potentiality.[42] The pathology of human existence lies in the fact that there is such a disparity between "facticity" and "potentiality." In the face of alienation from his own selfhood man commits sin by seeking assistance from beings; that is, he forgets Beings.[43] This does not mean, it seems to the writer, that man cannot find Being by looking to beings—for, indeed, Being is mediated. Rather, it means that the nature of the search is such that it excludes love and, thus, excludes God.

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[37] *Ibid.*, p. 295.
[38] *Ibid.*, pp. 310-311.
[39] *Ibid.*, p. 312.
[40] *Ibid.*, p. 320.
[41] *Ibid.*, p. 64.
[42] *Ibid.*, p. 60.

Jesus Christ is the symbol of the fulfillment of selfhood which is potentially given with existence. His self-giving was continuous with the self-giving of God in the risk of creation. As such, Christ is a catalyst in realizing this potential in man,[44] that is, in realizing man's destiny which is ". . . to participate freely, responsibly, gladly, with love, to become a co-worker with God in creation, a guardian of Being to whom it has been entrusted the capacity to let-be."[45]

R. D. LAING ON MADNESS

Method:

R. D. Laing, like traditional psychoanalysts, employs the tools of clinical data and case history to gather information for his interpretations. His book, *Sanity, Madness, and the Family*, is a classic example of his case-study work. His case studies, however, differ markedly from usual psychoanalytic method. Laing is far less concerned with the unconscious mechanisms[46] (although they have a place in fantasy) of the self (ego) which take the usual forms of introjection, projection, and repression.[47] He deals primarily with the interrelationship of the ego with the significant others in the ego's perceptual field or "field of experience."[48] Laing refers to his method as "interpersonal perception,"[49] that is, the whole process whereby the self views itself in relation to others. Laing maintains that

> My field of experience is, however, filled not only by my direct view of myself (ego) and of the other (alter) but of what we shall call metaperspectives—my view of the others (your, his, her, their) view of me. I may not actually be able to see myself as others see me, but I am constantly supposing them to be seeing me in particular

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[43] *Ibid.*, p. 238.

[44] *Ibid.*, pp. 250, 289.

[45] *Ibid.*, p. 214.

[46] R. D. Laing, H. Phillipson, and A. R. Lee, *Interpersonal Perception*. New York, 1966, p. 7. Also see Laing, *Self and Others*, pp. 4-5.

[47] *Ibid.*, p. 12. Also see Laing, *Politics*, p. 29.

[48] *Interpersonal Perception*, p. 4.

[49] *Ibid.*, pp. 37ff.

> ways, and I am constantly acting in the light of the actual or supposed attitudes, opinions, needs, and so on the other has in respect of me.[50]

Self-identity, which is a crucial concept for Laing, thus becomes a juxtaposition or synthesis of one's view of himself and one's metaperspective or view of how others view him. Man's metaperspective affords him a meta-identity or a being-for-the-other. Psychoanalytic theory is deficient in this regard for it fails to adequately comprehend man's being-for-others, the person's function in social context. Therefore, Laing is concerned with developing a theory of social interrelations, an analysis of the "social nexus."[51]

The influences of existential and phenomenological psychology on Laing's work are apparent and substantial, especially in his concept of metapsychology. Psychological analysis of behavior under experimental conditions is essential in understanding "psychic dysfunction," but therapy must employ metapsychology. A dichotomy exists between the experience of the self and the experience of the "other," which can only be traversed by a phenomenological inference. "Now, in doing this," states Laing, "the psychoanalyst is taking the basic phenomenological step, which is both necessary and hazardous. He has to step beyond his own experience of the patient, into the patient's experience of him."[52] To make such an inference one must first understand something of human interrelations, and this was Laing's intention in writing *The Self and Others.*

The experience of the other is treated phenomenologically; i.e., it is allowed to speak for itself with as little impingement of the analyst's experience as possible. This has far-reaching implications for clinical method and for a conception of "reality." Laing is not deluded into thinking that a patient's account always corresponds to "factual" data, but he is willing to concede that the patient's perception is, nonetheless, real to the patient. In other words, fantasies of a patient, although not corresponding to the therapist's experience, do have their own integrity as existential truth.[53]

Therefore, by letting a person speak for his own experience, Laing hopes to construct a theory of interpersonal relationships:

[50] *Ibid.*, p. 4.
[51] *Self and Others*, p. 17.
[52] *Ibid.*, pp. 12-13.
[53] R. D. Laing, *The Divided Self*. New York, 1965, p. 87.

> . . . We need concepts which both indicate the interaction and interexperience of two persons, and help us to understand the relation between each person's own experience and his own behavior, within the context of the relationship between them. And we must in turn be able to conceive of this relationship within the relevant contextual social systems. Most fundamentally, a critical theory must be able to place all theories and practices within the scope of a total vision of the ontological structure of being human.[54]

The only feasible method of understanding the being-in-the-world of the other is by an existential phenomenology, an attempt to get inside the skin of the other rather than seeing the other merely as an object in our perceptual field.[55] The behavior of the other is not taken to be symptomatic of malady but as a way of understanding his experience.[56] What is existentially true is lived out as really true in the form of behavior.

Aetiology of "Madness":

Laing recognizes the prevalence of what Menninger has called the "urge to classify."[57] Classification of behavior may assist us in constructing statistical probabilities, but it is of little help in the investigation of a single case.[58] "Simple," "paranoid," "catatonic," "hebephrenic," "childhood"—when a niche has been found for the "other," chronic and acute undifferentiation sets in. An individual defies strict classification.

The test of the psychosis of the other, states Laing, is the degree to which there is an incongruity between him and me: "I suggest, therefore, that sanity or psychosis is tested by the degree of conjunction or disjunction between two persons where the one is sane by common consent."[59] Communal truth agrees that a man is dead when his biological organism ceases to function. The schizophrenic is utterly convinced of the existential truth of his own death. If he tells anybody, he has "transvaluated the communal truth" and must suffer the consequences of being called "mad" by the public. It is often safer to play at sanity than to acknowledge the psychic fact of one's demise. Laing writes,

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[54] *Politics*, p. 74.

[55] *Divided Self*, pp. 25-26.

[56] *Politics*, p. 74.

[57] Karl Menninger, *The Vital Balance*, New York, 1963, pp. 9ff.

[58] *Politics*, p. 77.

[59] *Divided Self*, p. 36.

> The kernel of the schizophrenic's experience of himself must remain incomprehensible to us as long as we are sane and he is insane. But comprehension as an effort to reach and grasp him, while remaining within our world and judging him by our own categories whereby he inevitably falls short, is not what the schizophrenic either wants or requires. We have to recognize all the time his distinctiveness and differentness, his separateness and loneliness and despair.[60]

It is therefore a dubious endeavor to assume an aetiology of madness,[61] to utilize a paradigm of clinical medicine and posit a pathology, malfunction or efficient cause, all under the rubric of "mental illness." To say that there are those who behave differently under conditions of stress or who have various abilities to cope with frustration is not to concede that an aetiology exists.

The question still is left unanswered. Where does the social fact of schizophrenia come from, if it is not an identifiable condition which exists in any single individual? Why does society insist on isolating those who transvalue its sacred canopies? The social fact of schizophrenia arises out of the "mystification" process engendered by the "group."[62] A type of social fantasy system is erected which endeavors to stifle any experience which does not conform to the Procrustean bed of group expectations. The family often becomes a "protection racket," selling security for conformity. "Adaptation to what?" Laing asks. "To society? To a world gone mad? The family's function is to repress Eros; to induce a false consciousness of security; to deny death by avoiding life; to cut off transcendence; to believe in God, not to experience the Void; to create, in short, one-dimensional man; to promote respect, conformity, obedience; to con children out of play; to induce fear of failure; to promote a respect for work; to promote a respect for 'respectability.' "[63]

The communal meaning of human existence consequently becomes the norm of individual existence, precipitating an alienation of the deviant's experience. In order to perpetuate and preserve itself the communal myth must polarize persons into in-group and out-group categories—"us" and "them."[64] The result is a type of phylogenetic ritual that protects the group member from the aggression of others in the group in return for his psychic fidelity—in exchange for his birthright. Those outside the group ("them") are subject to psychic ostracism and are treated as objects. Furthermore, those whose being-in-the-world is radically different from the "us" can be put without qualms into a padded cell or any of those various mechanisms of objectification constructed to deal with "it."

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[60] *Ibid.*, p. 38.

[61] *Politics*, pp. 70-71. Also see Laing, and A. Esterson, *Sanity, Madness, and the Family*. New York, 1964, pp. 4-5.

[62] *Politics*, pp. 35ff. Also see *Self and Others*, pp. 20ff.

[63] *Politics*, p. 41.

[64] *Ibid.*, pp. 50ff.

The Source and Nature of Madness:

The ego is by its very nature an instrument of adaptation, and schizophrenia is a label used to express the fact that an ego has not adapted in a way that the "group" regards as normal. Given the disjunction between the experience of the "I" and the experience of the "other," the "I" must rely entirely on the behavior of the "other" to assess the fact that the experience of the other is maladaptive.[65] This is a dubious procedure since, in fact, unless one could "be" in the world of the other, he could not determine for certain that his ego had failed to adapt to his world. The possibility always exists that the "I" is operating in a context of a pseudo-social reality.

From his studies of families of schizophrenics Laing concludes that the "mad" person comes from a social situation in which there is a network of disturbed and disturbing patterns of communication: ". . . It seems to us that without exception the experience and behavior that gets labeled schizophrenic is a special strategy that a person invents in order to live in an unlivable situation."[66] In other words, the individual is placed by himself and others, knowingly or unknowingly, into an "untenable position" or a "position of checkmate." Laing's book *The Self and Others* outlines in some detail the devices operant in the social nexus which precipitate such an untenable position:

> The ultimate of this is . . . when no matter how he feels or how he acts, no matter what meaning he gives his situation, his feelings are denuded of validity, his acts are stripped of their motives, intentions, and consequences, the situation is robbed of its meaning for him, so that he is totally mystified and alienated. . . . The person caught within such a muddle does not know whether he is coming or going: in these circumstances what we call psychosis is often a desperate effort to hold on to something, and it is not surprising in the circumstances that something may be what we call "delusions."[67]

[65] *Ibid.*, pp. 3ff.

[66] *Ibid.*, pp. 78-79.

[67] *Self and Others*, pp. 135-136.

In III of the Prolegomenon of this paper an interview was recorded in which there were obvious signs of the "splitting" process, apparently in its early stages. In the book *The Divided Self*, Laing describes the way in which a person, confronted by a type of "ontological insecurity," seeks to deal with his anxiety and despair. A rift or split may divide the person's being into a "disembodied mind and a de-animate body." In the split, the "inner" self becomes the true self and the "outer" self becomes the false self. This split which is intended to support sane experience can degenerate into a situation where all concept of self is dissipated leaving nothing but a "chaotic non-entity."[68]

Unfortunately, what began as a desperate alternative in the face of a true existential threat can perpetuate the very thing from which the ego is defending itself:

> . . . The "true self," being no longer anchored to the mortal body, becomes "phantasticized," volatized into a changeable phantom of the individual's own imagining. By the same token, isolated as is the self as a defense against the dangers from without which are felt as a threat to its identity, it loses what precarious identity it already has. Moreover, the withdrawal from reality results in the "self's" own impoverishment. Its omnipotence is based on impotence.[69]

The fact that the "psychotic" bites the hand which is extended in help does not mean that help is not wanted; it means rather that the "help" is seen as a greater threat to his world than the withdrawal and fantasy tactics he is employing in defense of his existence. It is clear, then, that "psychosis" is a defense mechanism of the first order,[70] functioning as a ploy of the ego to make existence endurable.

Madness as a Natural Process in the Service of the Ego:

Two basic options are open to the border-line psychotic: to be himself irrespective of the consequences, or commit psychic suicide.[71] If the first course is taken the "group" will tag him "mad" and his career as "mad" patient will commence. Laing describes this development as follows:

> The person labeled is inaugurated not only into a role, but into a career of patient, by the concerted action of a coalition (a "conspir-

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[68] *Divided Self*, p. 162.

[69] *Ibid.*, p. 141.

[70] *Ibid.*, pp. 43, 48, 90, 139, 150, 176, 202.

[71] *Ibid.*, pp. 147.

> acy") of family, G.P. mental health officer, psychiatrists, nurses, psychiatric social workers, and often fellow patients. The "committed" person labeled as patient, and specifically as "schizophrenic," is degraded from full existential and legal status as human agent and responsibile person to someone no longer in possession of his own definition of himself, unable to retain his own possessions, precluded from the exercise of his discretion as to whom he meets, what he does. His time is no longer his own and the space he occupies is no longer of his choosing. . . . More completely, more radi--cally than anywhere else in our society, he is invalidated as a human being. . . . Once a "schizophrenic," there is a tendency to be regarded as always a "schizophrenic."[72]

In the face of such engines of dehumanization, it is apparent that the latter choice makes the best existential sense. In a very real way, society has "institutionalized" forms of making the decision for the potential "psychotic." If we accept the "fact" that madness is a way of being-in-the-world which is the result of breakdown in the communicative process between persons and that it operates in defense of the ego, it follows that some self-valuation process is operative; that is, the self is still of value to the "mad" person.[73] Therefore, the particular way of being-in-the-world is based on a valuation of the self.

Laing suggests that the "schizophrenic" is more in contact with his "unconscious" than "normal" persons.[74] So-called "normal" persons have succeeded in shunning the knowledge of fantasy which is a "basic and primary way of experiencing self and others." Fantasy can become conscious and can facilitate the reorganization of the self. "Madness need not be all breakdown; it may also be breakthrough."[75] A journey into the geography of inner space can be and often is a terror-filled experience, but by venturing on the voyage there is the possibility of tapping untold resources of the self. As Laing states, "There is nothing intrinsically pathological in the experience of ego-loss, but it may be very difficult to find a living context for the journey one may be embarked upon."[76]

Laing asserts that the experience of ego-loss is not only a key to the reorganization of the self but is part of a natural process of "true insanity."[77] The travesty of madness is not madness itself but our refusal to let it take its course. Laing asks, "Can we not see that this voyage is not what we need to be cured of, but that it is itself a natural way of healing our own appalling state of alienation called normality?"[78] What is needed is not diagnosis and prognostication but a physician-priest or guide[79] who would conduct ". . . an initiation ceremony, through which the person will be guided with full social encouragement and sanction into inner space and time, by people who have been there and back again."[80]

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[72] *Politics*, p. 84.

[73] *Divided Self*, p. 205.

[74] *Self and Others*, p. 24.

[75] *Politics*, p. 93.

[76] *Ibid.*, p. 87.

[77] *Ibid.*, p. 101.

The Therapautic Process:

Laing writes, "Everyone should be able to look back in their memory and be sure he had a mother who loved him, all of him; even his shit and piss."[81] The crux of the therapeutic process is love, a quality of love that will not smother the other, for it is just this type of smothering of which the ontologically insecure person is most afraid. "Despite his longing to be loved for his 'real self' the schizophrenic is terrified of love. Any form of understanding threatens his whole defensive system."[82] Even love that does not engulf the other may in fact, be interpreted existentially as doing precisely that. The therapist must persevere, however, and seek to demonstrate a love which is prepared to "let him be."[83] Laing states, "The main agent in uniting the patient, in allowing the pieces to come together and cohere, is the physician's love, a love that recognizes the patients total being, and accepts it, with no strings attached."[84] Love for the "schizophrenic" is always a gamble, since to love a person is to be like him to some extent and, thus, to lose a sense of who one is, which in turn, constitutes a full-fledged threat to identity.[85] It is the hope of the therapeutic situation that love will prevail.

CONCLUSION

It is certainly consistent with Macquarrie's theology of nature[86] to postulate that truth sympathetically extrapolated from the natural order participates in the divine order of things in some way. So, psychological "truth" or truth which tells us something of the nature of man must, in fact, tell us something about the nature of God, since God is immanent in his creation. Therefore, if psychology can elucidate the "natural processes" of the created order, it is a revelation in its own right—in keeping with the "universal possibility of revelation."

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[78] *Ibid.*, p. 116.

[79] *Ibid.*, p. 113.

[80] *Ibid.*, p. 89.

[81] *Divided Self*, p. 172.

[82] *Ibid.*, p. 163.

[83] *Ibid.*, p. 45.

[84] *Ibid.*, p. 45.

[85] *Ibid.*, p. 198.

[86] Macquarrie, *Principles*, pp. 205ff.

If Laing's hypothesis about madness being a natural process of self-disclosure and reorganization is correct, Macquarrie's conception of the Holy Spirit as Unitive Being—that the very work of Spirit is to freely draw creation into a fuller participation in Being—has profound implications. "Psychosis" is a bondage *par excellence*, operating under the guise of freedom. (The "untenable position" prior to madness was no less confining.) If, in fact, a person can receive by an excursion into his unconscious fantasy life the psychic resources to enable him to extricate himself from the precarious perch of "check-mate," it seems reasonable to suggest that such a process is of the Spirit. Laing understands that this process of the reorganization of the ego enhances a man's freedom and his ability to love. If this is not a greater participation in Being whose very nature is love, then the writer is at a loss to say what else can be. (A speculative hypothesis is that the unconscious life, with which the schizophrenic is so much more in touch, could be a divine energy source—"sources" possibly in the Jungian or Jamesian sense—to which the self has constant access; but such an investigation is beyond the scope of this paper.)

It is possible that the ego's constant self-valuation or propensity to seek a tactic of survival in its defense is itself the work of Spirit. If we concede that even in annihilation, the self is seeking to preserve itself, it becomes clear that the self, although misguided and liable to assume self-defeating postures, is in reality searching for health. We can refer to this process as a self-preserving instinct alone, or, as the writer would term it, a work of the Spirit within the inherent created nature of man. Therefore, we may say tentatively that a defense mechanism can be the work of the Spirit. Given the world of the "other," a defense mechanism removes the self from true existential danger, and thus preserves the self for possible health.

Now if the self chose a tactic which was actually and always self-defeating, we would have to question whether the Holy Spirit were confused and had Himself adopted the "world" of the other. That is to say, if freedom were completely relative to the individual the concept of destiny or eschatology would be meaningless; we would be trapped into denying the difference between a "psychotic" and a "non-psychotic" ability to love. Taking Laing's assertions that madness is part of the natural process of actual health (in other words, the person does not remain in his "psychotic" state), we can say that not only is madness a defense of the self in the perspective of health, but that the process of madness is designed actually to lead to health. Health can be both relative to the world of the "psychotic" but can also stand as an ideal-type, goal or divine possibility toward which the self can strive. In Macquarrie's terms, there is a potential in man which is constantly seeking to actualize itself, to attain a fuller participation in Being.

In Laing's work we can see the ramifications of what it means to "let-be" (a term on which both Laing and Macquarrie rely): to allow the natural processes to take their course; to refrain from vitiating the process by our insistence on a cure; to cease putting the "other" in untenable positions which force "desperation moves" and which prohibit madness from leading to wholeness. Macquarrie would call it allowing or enabling the "other" to become what he was meant to be. This might mean trusting the creative processes which God himself has initiated. It does not mean leaving the "other" to himself to flounder without direction. Love, as both Laing and Macquarrie interpret it, is mediated. We love God by loving those beings in which He, himself, is immanent; likewise, we receive God's love via the channel of "beings-in-the-world." The way to facilitate the natural process of wholeness is not by casual indifference but by actively engaging in the natural process itself, by loving the other. Since it is impossible to opt out of the on-going process, we must decide whether we will contribute to it or inhibit it. Consequently, pastoral counseling does not happen by observing a natural process take place while we look on in isolation. We are always within the experiential field of the other, as kindling for his burning anxieties or as a significant person in a loving relationship: "If I could turn you on, if I could drive you out of your wretched mind, if I could tell you, I would let you know."[87]

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[87] *Politics,* p. 138.

THE ECSTATIC ELEMENT IN OLD TESTAMENT PROPHECY

BY PAUL MALASHEVITZ

THIS paper will examine the ecstatic state as it appears in the prophets of the Old Testament. There is a great deal of debate whether the Writing Prophets can be classified as ecstatic prophets, and in the course of this paper, we will study the various positions. At the outset, the discussion will center on the question of the definition of the word "ecstasy" in order to establish the most meaningful concept in terms of the Israelitic concept of man. Attention will also be given to such subjects as the purpose of ecstasy and enthusiasm, the power involved in ecstasy and the phenomenon of group ecstasy.

Since this paper is directed primarily toward a clearer understanding of prophecy in ancient Israel, little emphasis is placed upon ecstasy as it has been observed in modern times. Yet, it must be noted that such phenomena as the "Sleeping Preachers" may indeed give us an insight into the exact nature of the ecstasy of the Old Testament prophets. Indeed, many of the actions and reactions described about the two groups do appear to have much in common.

The question of the definition of ecstasy finds its supporters split into much the same groups that they split when attempting to determine the relationship between the earlier and the Classical Prophets. Heschel, who tries to draw a clear-cut distinction between these two groups of prophets, emphasizes the Greek concept of "ekstasis" wherein the primary character of ecstasy becomes the departure of the soul from the body in order to attain a relationship with the deity outside of the physical body.[1] However, the Hebraic concept of man which views man as a single totality of soul and body would not allow for such a separation. The soul is not capable of leaving the body since

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[1] Abraham Heschel, *The Prophets*. New York, 1962, p. 324.

the soul is the center of man's being, comprised of all of his activities—mental and physical. Furthermore, as Knight suggests, "the Hebrew soul is no fixed entity. . . . It is a plastic material which is being constantly fashioned by its creator. . . ."[2] In order for this refashioning to take place, Yahweh's relation must be with the totality of man's being, not with one aspect rising to form a unique relationship with Him. Thus, as far as the movement of the soul is concerned, I feel certain that the meaning of ecstasy should be centered on communication rather than on a sharing of being, and this communication involves the whole being of the prophet. In fact, in the case of the Classical Prophets, their individuality seems to be retained throughout their experiences and heightened afterward.

The other important aspect of ecstasy with which we must deal is that of physical activity prior to and during the ecstatic experience. Those scholars who make a sharp distinction between the nabiim and the Writing Prophets usually contend that since the latter did not partake in the wild contortions often accompanying the prophecies of the nabiim, they must be considered a group entirely distinct from the nabiim and their counterparts in other religions. This claim is made in order to justify the view that the Israelitic Writing Prophets are vastly different from any other prophets that have been known. The usual term to describe the physical antics of the prophets is "enthusiasm," which means to have God within. This basic understanding must be rejected in light of the Israelitic consciousness which, while recognizing the personal nature of the deity, also stresses the vast difference which exists between man and God. For Yahweh to use a man for his own ends is surely acceptable, but Yahweh does not identify himself with man.

The physical activities of the prophets were not of central significance in the prophetic experience. The revelation of Yahweh, the creativity of the prophetic word, and the powers bestowed by the encounter are far more important in understanding the role of the prophet. As Guillaume has stated, "It is a mistake to lay such emphasis on the physical phenomena of ecstasy—dancing, leaping, stabbing the body, swallowing hot coals and so on—as to imply that the physical experiences are primary and the spiritual experience secondary. In many cases physical excitement is prior in time, but it is not prior in importance."[3]

[2] Harold Knight, *The Hebrew Prophetic Consciousness*. London, 1947, p. 63.

[3] Aldred Guillaume, *Prophecy and Divination*. London, 1938, p. 291.

The ecstatic experience, therefore, must be conceived primarily as one marked clearly by an uplifted and inspired condition of the mind which does not imply total union with the deity as far as the Hebraic consciousness is concerned. Lindblom's definition is far more acceptable than any other, but I think that even he has failed to take a concrete look at the ancient Middle Eastern religious situation. To define ecstasy as "a mental state in which human consciousness is so concentrated on a particular idea that the normal current of thoughts and perceptions is broken off and the senses temporarily cease to function in a normal way"[4] is to overlook what is one of the more important aspects of such an experience. A central part of the ecstatic experience is that it is involuntary. The individual might prepare himself for ecstasy by physical activity, but as far as the Israelite is concerned, the final state is always the result of a violent seizure of the individual by the invasion of an external force. If the ecstatic state could be induced by man, that would be the equivalent of subjecting Yahweh to the will of man, and this is clearly a contradiction within the framework of the Israelite mind. This idea must be combined with those of Lindblom in order to give us a solid basis upon which we can build.

The prophet does not determine his entrance into an ecstatic state, and so we must look elsewhere to find a purpose for the various physical phenomena that are often performed by the nabi. There are many instances in Judaism and other religions where an individual has heightened his religious awareness artificially through the use of alcohol, drugs, music, dancing, or many forms of bodily constraint. These may or may not be specific attempts to attain an ecstatic state, although it seems quite certain in various instances in the Old Testament that they were. For example in II Kings 3:25, we hear Elisha calling for music in order that he might be able to prophesy. Yet, in another instance we find that the making of music and dancing is for a different reason completely. The fact is that music had an integral part in Israelite worship, and it was understood as a means of expressing a joyful, thankful attitude toward Yahweh. The agitation of the body was a full expression of one's dedication to Yahweh; greater agitation demonstrated a deeper love for him. Love at its greatest height is passion—the passion which is seen in wild uninhibited behavior. In one sense then, music, dancing, and other violent actions are a response to God in worship. When one is fully involved in that sort of dedication, one might naturally be expected to be gripped by the spirit of the deity.

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[4] J. Lindblom, *Prophecy in Ancient Israel.* Philadelphia, 1965, p. 106.

In other forms of ecstatic inducement, the prophet probably sought to prepare himself for the highest of all religious experiences by exposing his body to those procedures by which he might become less aware of his physical nature. However, the use of drugs and other similar stimulants and depressants for this purpose fell into disrepute because they were misused. Isaiah decries this situation saying, "Be drunk, but not with wine; stagger, but not with strong drink. For the Lord has poured out upon you a spirit of deep sleep, and has closed your eyes, the prophets, and covered your heads, the seers." (Isaiah 29:9-10) He is repulsed by their use of artificial means of ecstatic inducement because they have failed to speak the Word of Yahweh to the people. It is the falseness and the trickery of the men who claim to be prophets that he condemns, and he demands that they no longer be drunk with drink but with the spirit of Yahweh instead. Hence, the artificial means of inducement must be understood in light of Isaiah's position. The Classical Prophets did not accept the validity of such efforts because the nabi had used them for his own ends. This in itself is not sufficient to stand as a condemnation of the physical actions that might be involved in an ecstatic experience. Saul, for example, throws himself naked upon the ground, not in an attempt to induce an ecstatic state, but rather as a consequence of one. (I Samuel 19:22-24) In addition, even the Writing Prophets were struck dumb or made immobile by their experiences.

This brings us to one last aspect of the physical nature of the ecstatic experience, namely the trance state which is devoid of any external movements. Guillaume considers this to be the highest state of ecstasy since it focuses all of the psychic energy of the individual on the mind without any loss of energy in physical reactions. Hence, the individual is most receptive to the invasion of the spirit.[5]

The purpose of the physical action which is so often considered to be a part of ecstasy is to subject the body to extreme controls or complete inhibition in order to prepare for the coming of the divine spirit. The purpose was not to attain unity as the Greeks sought it in their enthusiastic orgies but to have communion with Yahweh. The prophet did not lose his identity in a merger with the divine; rather, he sought to know what the will of Yahweh was for his people. In addition, ecstasy often played an important part in group worship. The earliest prophets lived together in communities, and their worship included ecstasy as a means of expressing praise of their God. Their worship included much music and dancing which would be useful in moving toward an ecstatic encounter with the divine.[6] It has been suggested that Psalm 150 is indicative of this since "the verb to dance in verse four indicates a whirling and wildly spinning motion. Such a sacred dance played an indispensable part of cultic worship, providing an outlet for their enthusiasm for God as is to be seen in II Samuel 6:5."[7] At the base of all this, however, was the underlying motivation of being able to have communion with Yahweh who was beyond man in his normal condition.

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[5] Guillaume, *Prophecy and Divination,* p. 324.

When the soul is prepared, either by conscious or unconscious effort, the deity if he so desires takes the initiative in creating the ecstatic state. Ecstasy is induced solely by the power of Yahweh. It is his ruah which seizes the prophet at the very center of his being; the result is that the prophet is fully open to suggestion and the normal thought-processes cease to proceed from the self.[8] The effect upon the individual consciousness varies. In some instances the individual is fully aware of what is happening to him although he is unable to control it in any way. On other occasions, there is no awareness of what is happening until after the ecstasy has ended. From modern investigations we have learned that it is exceedingly difficult to obtain a description of what the trance state is like.[9] We do know that it is unlike simple creative inspiration, because the persons involved play a totally passive role. It is also unlike dreaming, for rarely is the person asleep although dreams are a real part of prophetic experience. Finally, from electronic tests it can be concluded that it is not a matter of hallucinations since there is no measurable organic reactions of the sense organs involved. Thus, little can be said about the exact nature of the ecstatic experience even in our day, and there is a question about the applicability of such information to our subject in any case.

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[6] Walther Eichrodt, *Theology of the Old Testament*. Philadelphia, 1967, II, 327-328.

[7] *Ibid.*, p. 300.

[8] Guillaume, *Prophecy and Divination*, p. 300.

[9] Although there may be a definite difference between trance states of the "Sleeping Preachers" and that of the prophets, there is enough similarity to warrant a tentative comparison. See Aarni Viopio, *Sleeping Preachers, A Study of Ecstatic Religiosity*. Helsinki, 1951.

For the Israelite, the ecstatic trance is feared because it represents a great concentration of power in a small area. The descent of the spirit embodying this power of Yahweh was referred to as the "Spirit of Yahweh" or the "Hand of Yahweh." The prophets were all aware of the irresistibility of this power which can be clearly seen in the calling of the Writing Prophets. Likewise, even earlier, in Saul's time "the Spirit of Yahweh was the manifestation of God in power, a divine energy acting upon men from without, and they were most fully conscious of [it] in ecstasy."[10] This rush of energy from Yahweh penetrated the center of their souls, not destroying them, but enriching them with the knowledge of the Word.

The result of this great influx of power was that the individual now had powers above and beyond the capacity of normal men, or at least that is what we are told in the writings of their descendants. Throughout the Old Testament we have reports of prophets healing those afflicted with leprosy and blindness, bringing the dead back to life, purifying water and food, and even an instance of making iron float. Even their clothes were sometimes laden with great powers as was the mantle of Elijah in II Kings 2. These elements of magic and wonderworking were often considered the basic test of a prophet's truthfulness, and without the ability to perform incredible deeds he was liable to be condemned as a false prophet.

One of ecstasy's other powers, and perhaps the most significant one, was being able to predict events in the future. Predictive ability, however, must not be thought an essential part of the ecstatic experience because in many instances the prophet was merely used as a mouthpiece by Yahweh.[11] Yet, as a result of the power with which he had come in contact, the prophet's words had a special creative efficacy. The spoken word of any individual possessed the same quality. It had an effect upon the subject to whom it was directed, and this helps to clarify the significance of curses which might be pronounced. For in the pronunciation of a word which rises from the soul of an individual, its strength is manifested in the word and must have a consequence. The effect of a word is based upon the strength of the soul from which it comes. In the case of the prophet, this power is extremely strong and his exclamations will most certainly be realized. As Knight has maintained, "The true ecstatic state yields power which enables true prophecy to spring from the grasp of the spiritual context to which the future integrally belongs."[12] From this brief discussion it is possible to understand why the inner actions of the ecstatic state are more significant than the outward physical actions which may or may not be an essential part of the event. The ecstatic state confers upon the prophet many powers that are taken as signs of his being a true prophet.

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[10] Guillaume, *Prophecy and Divination,* p. 300.

[11] Knight, *Hebrew Prophetic Consciousness,* p. 38.

It is at this point that I believe extra caution should be taken so that ecstasy does not disappear behind a mysterious puff of smoke as a result of its awesome possibilities. Although the prophet is serving as the mouthpiece of Yahweh while he is engaged in an ecstatic state, it must be remembered that he is a very real part of the culture to which he is speaking. He has grown up within it and has been informed by its expectations and its desires. When he begins to speak to the people, proclaiming that which was revealed to him in his visions or dreams, he cannot completely free himself from the culture and himself. Thus, although the messages of the Writing Prophets may have the same or similar meanings, nevertheless it will be presented in different styles and with different emphases by each separate individual. This point is important in understanding the prophets because they have basically given us their interpretations of the meanings derived from the Spirit of Yahweh. At all times the prophet remains a real man within a given historical situation, even though he is the messenger of Yahweh.

The ecstatic state is an essential element in prophecy of any type, but to leave it out of the Classical Prophets would be to destroy their meaning and importance for the history of Israel. They derive the vital power of their lives from it, as did the earlier prophets, and that is what distinguishes them within ancient Israel. Pedersen has argued that "both perceived the presence of God in their ecstasy, when the strength and impressions of ruah arise from the depth of their soul."[13] They are distinct as individuals, and their soul never identifies itself with Yahweh. Even though Yahweh is a very personal God and although his spirit is in them, it still remains outside of them and above them at the same time.

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[12] *Ibid.*, p. 55.

[13] Johannes Pedersen, *Israel*. London, 1959, III-IV, 493.

In this brief discussion we have maintained that ecstasy is an indispensable part of the concept of the prophet in the Old Testament. It is the very source of the power which makes the prophet a man of God. The effect of this power upon his personality is a drastic one, especially in the case of the Classical Prophets. For theirs is a purely charismatic office, and they part completely with their previous life patterns. Among the earlier prophets it is difficult to determine whether the same holds true, for their role is not a charismatic one. Furthermore, their behavior was greatly different from that exhibited by their successors to the title of "nabi." At this point the whole issue of the relationship between these two groups of Prophets appears. In order to preserve the distinctive nature of the Classical Prophets and because of the lack of agitated enthusiasm found among them, it was formerly assumed that they were an entirely different tradition than the earlier nabiim. The earlier prophets were called fools and madmen (Hosea 9:7; Jeremiah 29:26), and even the Writing Prophets criticized their methods as we have seen. Recently however, the thought on this matter has begun to lean in the direction of acknowledging that the Classical Prophets arose from the same basic tradition that the nabiim did. That is not to say that they were completely alike, but there is much more similarity between them than was previously accepted.

On the basis of my research on the topic of ecstasy alone, the latter, newer hypothesis seems better substantiated. Hence, it is my conviction that no clear-cut line can be drawn between the earlier prophets and the Classical Prophets. The fact that they both were given the same title (nabi) initially points in that direction. If the recorders of the Old Testament message had conceived of them as belonging to entirely different groups, they would have most certainly given the Classical Prophets a different title to distinguish them from their predecessors.

Second, although the earliest prophets were often looked upon with much contempt by their contemporaries and successors as a result of their ecstatic behavior, the only polemic to be found within the latter group of prophets was directed primarily against the failure of the nabiim to teach the true message of Yahweh. They were condemned for seeking their own purposes. A secondary trend of thought runs against their artificially induced ecstastic trances, but ". . . the prophets of the eighth and seventh centuries do not disown their ecstatic forebearers, though they insist that they are a new kind of prophet."[14] The new element in their prophecies is their warning of the desperate plight of the people of Israel.

Third, it seems likely to me that because of the early rabbis' stern opposition to the agitated ecstatics among the earlier prophets, similar traces of madness and ecstasy in the Classical Prophets may have been editorially removed. This is purely my own conjecture, but since ecstatics of the most extreme nature have often been looked down upon as "madmen," it does not seem too farfetched to think that some editing might have taken place in order to preserve the integrity of the Classical Prophets who are so important to the history of Israel. In the same way, the attempt is made to separate them from any connection with the nabiim in order to avoid guilt by association.

Fourth, there is a great similarity between the prophesying of both groups. The earlier prophets were admittedly more interested in divining the future, but the real disparity between the two groups comes primarily with the disintegration of the ideal within the prophetic communities existing before and during the age of the Writing Prophets.

Fifth, the existence of the prophets of Mari sheds a great deal of light upon the subject, for there is a great deal of similarity between them and both of the groupings of Israelite prophets with which we are dealing. They were an ecstatic group as the early nabiim were, but they also shared a similar style with the Classical Prophets. As one critic has stated, "The fact that the prophets in Mari made use of the same messenger formula used by the Writing Prophets in Israel suggests that this formula was no innovation in Israel."[15] The conclusion to be drawn from this is that the Writing Prophets were not a totally isolated phenomenon; rather, they must have had roots in other prophetic movements in the ancient Middle East.

Therefore, as far as the element of ecstasy is concerned, no fine line of distinction can be drawn separating the early prophets in Israel from the Classical Prophets of the seventh and eighth centuries, at least from the treatment of them in the Old Testament. The significance of ecstasy is in the mental state and the resulting revelations produced by the influx of ruah, and not in the phenomena of physical agitation which sometimes accompanied the ecstatic experience. Biblical evidence for separating the prophets is lacking, and the distinctive nature of the great prophets is not threatened by their connection with other strains of prophecy. It is precisely their ecstatic character which gives them meaning and power within Israelite culture and enables them to proclaim the will of Yahweh for the lives of men.

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[14] Bruce Vawter, *The Conscience of Israel*. New York, 1961, p. 24.

[15] W. C. Klein, *The Psychological Pattern of Old Testament Prophecy*. Evanston, 1956, p. 249.

COMMUNITY

BY RICHARD KILLMER

THIS paper is concerned about community as an instrument of social change. After describing some of the characteristics of our contemporary society, I will discuss the nature of community and offer six characteristics of a community concerned about social change. This paper not only reflects my recent reading but also my experiences during the past year. My participation in the resistance to the war in Vietnam has greatly affected my thinking. I have spoken to approximately 25 groups about the war, and the turning-in of my draft card has made me aware of the "rationality" of the system and its ability to destroy protest. The resistance has also influenced my thinking on the nature of community. Most of the large resistance groups (New York, Boston, and the Bay Area) are concerned about community and exploring the relationship between their act of resistance and the nature of community. My work with the Philadelphia Resistance was a great help. Those who have or are thinking about returning their cards have formed into a community. Although they are growing and just beginning to think about the purposes, dynamics, and characteristics of such a group, I am encouraged by the possibilities of their efforts.

In Philadelphia, I also became involved in a community of priests, students, and professors at LaSalle College. They met every week for mass, a meal of rice, and discussion of their concern for change. A free university was their chief goal. However, when four of the students decided to return their cards, an immediate support group was formed. It pledged its help in any way possible to increase their effectiveness and to aid them personally in the months ahead.

At Princeton Seminary, twenty students have been meeting in three groups during the semester to discuss the nature of community

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and the possibilities of such a group being formed here. Even though nothing concrete was accomplished, the ideas and images suggested in discussions have been very helpful in the development of this paper.

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Man refuses to affirm his dependence upon God, his creator. He is not willing to live in the freedom-responsibility tension he was placed in at creation. By denying his dependence on his creator, man finds himself in a state of alienation. He experiences separation from God, his fellow man, and himself. Every day newspapers give evidence of the separation between man and man, nation and nation. Human beings also experience a more subtle alienation from each other in that there seem to be walls in their lives protecting them and preventing their real feelings from being known. People wear masks to hide who they are and what they think and feel. Man experiences separation within his own life. He finds himself desiring to act in a certain way and then doing the exact opposite of what he desires to do. Paul's comment, "The good that I would do that I do not do, and the evil I would not do that I do," vividly articulates man's dilemma.

Man is a social being. He participates in communities, ethnic groups, and nations. Since these groups are made up of individuals who sin, it therefore follows that these associations themselves will be corrupted. Man also creates institutions, social orders and social powers. These, like nations and ethnic groups, are also alienated from themselves, each other, and God.

The institutions and social orders however, have a form and power which is greater than and of a different nature than the sum of individuals who create and participate in these institutions. Therefore, these powers and forces are able to separate themselves from the individuals who created them. The individuals are dehumanized; their choices are limited; and their state of individual and corporate alienation is reinforced.

Herbert Marcuse, in his book *One-Dimensional Man*, describes several characteristics of our society which exemplify these forces which dehumanize and limit individuals. Marcuse finds that human choices in our society are greatly limited. Many choices that affect human lives and even human destinies are not being made. Why is this the case? Laws are not preventing men from making decisions about those things important to them. Secret police forces are not intimidating persons who wish to make these choices. Rather, Marcuse finds that the rising standard of living and all its benefits tend to reduce the use and value of freedom. Because the kind of life produced by our technology and our bureaucracies is pleasant and comfortable, there is very little need to demand self-determination. Because life is satisfying, there is little need for independence of thought and conscience.[1]

In this situation, possession of material things and the necessities of life becomes the goal of many lives. Once these are obtained, the individual's only concern is the maintenance of possessions. Therefore, the fact that a war is being waged which has killed 20,000 Americans and untold thousands of Vietnamese and the fact that those killed have had little or no choice about the war does not upset a materially satisfied individual. Whether our country is committing genocide never appears as an issue which they must judge. As a further example, in the spring of 1968 a large group of Princeton students marched on Nassau Hall with a list of four demands, including the end of the Institute for Defense Analyses, the end of parietals, and the hiring of a professional draft counselor. Several students alongside the march carried a sign saying, "What do you have to complain about?" One student mocking the demonstrators, said, "They're complaining about the tears in their herring-bone jackets." These examples indicate that if technology and bureaucracies can provide satisfying goods, then the complaints about the lack of choice disappear. In fact, even the desire and need to choose disappear. Why choose when everything we could possibly want is given to us?

The second characteristic of technological society which Marcuse analyzes is the one-dimensional nature of thought and language. The satisfying goods which we receive also include thoughts, concepts and feelings; the need to think and feel for ourselves is thereby satisfied. Just as the value of making choices is limited if our needs are met, so the value of thinking our own thoughts is limited if we are given satisfying thoughts and feelings. The material and mental products offered may be rubbish, but our needs are satisfied so they are willingly taken. Another factor involved is that speech and writing is determined and the individual is expected to associate words with a static structure of institutions and attitudes. It is known what kinds of thought are satisfying, so advertisements and the news media arrange their offerings so that the needs are met. Because the individual has little desire to think on his own and because certain stimuli are offered which are expected to produce certain responses, language itself becomes a controlling force. It not only reflects the controlling forces but is one itself. As Marcuse writes, "[Language] is an instrument of control, even when it does not transmit orders but information; where it demands not obedience but choice, not submission but freedom."[2]

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[1] Herbert Marcuse, *One-Dimensional Man*. Boston, 1964, p. 1.

An example which clearly indicates this is one from my own experience in speaking to various groups on the war in Vietnam. The word "communist" is one which produces in some people's minds thoughts such as no freedom, concentration camps under Stalin, an international conspiracy planning to take over the world, the necessity of giving everything to the state, dictatorship, totalitarianism. Therefore, the realization that Hanoi and the leadership of the National Liberation Front are communists produces a predictable response. The conclusion is that the communists must be stopped. If "they" are not stopped, "they" will conquer the world.

The United States Information Agency and perhaps the news media also recognize the response which the word "communist" will produce. Thus, they use it often in explanations and defenses of the war. The news media including the New York *Times* insist on referring to the National Liberation Front and Hanoi as communists. There are probably twenty-five other words which would more adequately describe the revolutionary groups in South Vietnam, without resorting to the term "communist." However, the alternatives are not chosen. The refusal to think for oneself and the satisfaction with the thoughts and feelings delivered provide language with the ability to control thought and limit choices.

The third characteristic of our society is that of need-creation. Since the productive apparatus and the business and economic complexes surrounding it are so effective in satisfying needs, the system must create needs which it can satisfy. The world of advertising provides several examples of need-creation. New products are quickly sold, for they are advertised in such a way that possession seems absolutely necessary. Needs are therefore created and satisfied by the system.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 103.

In our society, we have become convinced that one-dimensional thought, need-creation, and the limitation of choice is rational. It is quite reasonable that satisfaction of needs becomes the *raison d'être* of man, for families do have to be supported. It is quite reasonable that the government's justification of the war is accepted, for they do have more information. It is reasonable that needs are created, for we do want new and better products. Thus, the irrational appears rational and the negative appears positive. Society is capable of making the controlling of choice and dehumanizing of man seem to be rational, positive, and necessary.[3] Marcuse has provided a beautiful example of the irrational made rational.

> I take a walk in the country. Everything is as it should be: Nature at its best. Birds, sun, soft grass, a view through the trees of the mountains, nobody around, no radio, no smell of gasoline. Then the path turns and ends on the highway. I am back among the billboards, service stations, motels, and roadhouses. I was in a National Park and I now know that this was not reality. It was a reservation, something that is being preserved like a species dying out. If it were not for the government, the billboards, hot dog stands and motels would long since have invaded that piece of Nature. I am grateful to the government; we have it much better than before. . . .[4]

The irrational made rational implies the fifth characteristic of a technological society: Protest is often made impotent. Since the rationality of the system is claimed and celebrated, anyone who claims that it is irrational must be irrational himself. Those who refuse to go along are diagnosed as neurotic and unimportant.[5] The classification of protesters as "peaceniks" or "hippies" enables society to ignore the substance of protest and thus to reduce it to nonsense. One of the high school students in my former field work church discussed the fact that I returned my card, saying, "Well, I can understand that you were sincere, but those others are a bunch of nuts." When I told him that I admired the sincerity of those I had met at Penn State, he responded, "Well, the ones at Rutgers—they sure are. . . ." Even though he continued to find exceptions to his category, he held on to its usefulness. It was useful precisely because it enabled him to write off the protest. Marcuse further points out that those works of art which are critical of society are made impotent by the fact that they are made into a commercial product. As they sell and become

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 15.

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 226.

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 9.

popular, they become mere entertainment and are less apt and able to gnaw at the society's conscience.

George Benello points out another characteristic of our society. He agrees with Marcuse that because of the effectiveness of society's need-satisfying apparatus, decisions and choices are not made by modern man. However, he asserts, men do want to make decisions; they do want to determine their future. Our "wasteland culture," however, puts a low value on this ability and the option is often not alive. Modern organizations are so arranged that decisions are only made in the upper hierarchies. Those who work at lower jobs perform those tasks which they are instructed to do. They do not make decisions which either affect their companies or themselves. For this reason there is a great race to get to the top of the ladder. There the individual finds what Benello calls the "psychic energy." At the top, decisions are made and real responsibility is taken. At the top, a man can feel important and make choices which affect his life, the company's life, and the lives of others. At the top a man can have real power.[6] In regard to Vietnam, those who have opposed the war have sensed that the decisions about running the war have been made by a very few people at the top. Congressmen and senators have had the same frustrations. Yet, the structure again destroys the choice of all but a very few.

The awareness of the destruction of individual choice produces a loss of community. Martin Buber in *Paths of Utopia* and Robert Nisbet in *Community and Power* point out this characteristic. Nisbet draws the picture of our modern world—a world characterized by anxiety and guilt. Individual insecurity and moral uncertainty are rampant. These feelings of insecurity often lead individuals to seek community. Formerly individual identity was determined by the communities to which one belonged. Church, family, neighborhood, clan gave their members status and security, protection, and freedom. Here the difference between good and evil, order and disorder, guilt and innocence were taught and embodied.[7] These primary associations were strong, however, because they could offer their members a real voice in the community. This was the case because these groups possessed a virtually indispensable relation to the economic and political order. Government was of and by the people. Problems were met and solved by the community acting as a whole. The economy of the groups was dependent upon each of the members' contribution of ability and energy.

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[6] George Benello, "Wasteland Culture" in *Our Generation*, p. 21.

[7] Robert Nisbet, *Community and Power*. New York, 1953, p. 50.

These primary associations have declined. They have declined precisely because they are no longer institutionally important in society. If people have little voice in our modern society, they no longer cling to these primary associations because their needs are satisfied through other associations. As Nisbet indicates, individuals have lost interest in these communities because they "have ceased to play a determining role in our institutional systems of mutual aid, welfare, education, recreation and economic production and distribution."[8] Yet the need for community continues. Men still retain the needs of cultural purpose, membership, status and continuity.[9] According to Nisbet, the explanation for the demise of primary associations and the rise of substitute associations is found in the theory and actions of the modern political State.[10] To understand the kind of thinking that helped bring about the rise of the State and helped bring about the decline of small communities, Nisbet emphasizes the philosophy of Rousseau. Rousseau was very much opposed to the power which the primary associations exerted. He found that the individuals within the community were much too dependent on one another and therefore were not free. Rousseau believed that the answer to this problem would be the establishment of the State. The new State's mission, according to Rousseau, was to free the individual from the primary associations by securing the individual's dependence and loyalty upon the State itself. If the individual renounced his dependence on the traditional associations of society and identified with the State, then at last he would be free. Freedom would be achieved by identification with the will of the majority, and this would be expressed single-mindedly by the government of the State.[11]

Therefore, the needs of security and status were no longer fulfilled within the small communities, but were fulfilled in the political State. The State also promised that the moral goals of man which had evaded man for thousands of years would finally be achieved through its power. Nisbet believes that the State has not failed in its promises. By taking away the functions and diminishing the value of the primary associations, it has not only failed to replace them but also destroyed something very important. Nisbet sees the State as a powerful force which has become endowed with more functions than at any other time in history because of the decline of primary associations. Yet in its bureaucratic arrangement it denies these functions to individuals. Functions are performed and decisions are made by a very few; as Nisbet states, "No relationship must exist that is not contemplated by a central command and assimilated into a formal hierarchy of external administration."[12]

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[8] *Ibid.*, p. 54.

[9] *Ibid.*, p. 73.

[10] *Ibid.*, p. 143.

[11] *Ibid.*, p. 168.

Nisbet argues that not only has the State not enhanced the freedom of individuals, but it has destroyed freedom and functions and choices which have existed. He asserts that the primary associations can grant persons the security and freedom necessary to be creative and live fully. However, the problem is not how to bring back the good old days but how to establish communities which will grant the security and the participation that the primary associations formerly granted. As Nisbet writes, "The real problem is not, then, the loss of old contexts, but rather the failure of our present democratic and industrial scene to create new contexts of association and moral cohesion within which the small allegiance of men will assume both functional and psychological significance."[13] In sum, Nisbet identifies two characteristics of our modern society—the absence of community and the power of centralized authority. Nisbet finds a positive correlation between the two and believes that the absence of community leads to a strong centralized State. Proudhon, a nineteenth century socialist, would echo Nisbet's analysis and criticism of centralism in these words, "The centralist system is all very well as regards size, simplicity and construction; it lacks but one thing—the individual no longer belongs to himself in such a system; he cannot feel his worth, his life, and no account is taken of him at all."[14]

The above analysis has sought to articulate basic characteristics of modern, technological society. All the characteristics are interrelated and contribute to the dehumanization of man. They all prevent men from reaching their potential. They all channel persons; i.e., they force them into living lives of pre-determined roles and predetermined choices. The question is raised, however, whether they are all aspects of one system. Is the nature of these alienating forces a monolith? Marcuse answers this affirmatively. He uses the word "society" to mean a monolith produced by the power of technology, centralism, and bureaucracy, and capable of producing the style of life characterized above. As he writes, "The hypostatized whole resists analytic dissolution, not because it is a mythical entity behind the particular entities and performances, but because it is the concrete, objective ground of their funding in the given soil and historical context. As such, it is a real force, felt and exercised by the individuals in their actions, circumstances, and relationships."[15]

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[12] *Ibid.*, p. xlv.

[13] *Ibid.*, p. 73.

[14] Martin Buber, *Paths in Utopia*, Boston, 1949, p. 33.

A brief discussion of three problems facing us today will demonstrate the validity of Marcuse's analysis of contemporary society. First, Black Americans have been channeled out of the system. Their needs have not been satisfied. Even though new needs are created, they are not and cannot be fulfilled. However, with an injunction of the ideal of progress, even their condition of poverty and the fact of overt segregation are proclaimed rational: "Things sure are better than they were before." However, because blacks have been channeled out of the system, a critical awareness has developed within the black community, and it is now possible for them to say no to the system which has created their disenfranchised position. One hears in the Black Power movement the demand for participation within the system, but at the same time the cry for the end of channeling forces is also heard. Many blacks are very much aware that choices are limited and needs created and thoughts are controlled. Denied access to society and relegated to its periphery, they are now demanding participation in a society free of these forces and free of the monolith which enslaves them.

Second, students are becoming aware of the channeling forces at work in the university. They recognize that society makes demands on the university for the production of functionaries and research. Universities thus become union card factories producing practitioners for various roles in society. On the campus, students' lives are channeled through rules which govern their social and political activities. They are now demanding a greater say in the life of their university and thereby are demanding an end to the choking influence of society. That is what Columbia was finally all about.

Third, the draft probably represents the clearest example of the channeling forces of society. It clearly points to society as the ground of the various dehumanizing forces at work. In 1965, the Selective

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[15] Marcuse, *One-Dimensional Man*, p. 207.

Service System issued a document with the suggestive title of "Channeling." "Channeling" gives the rationale and *raison d'être* of the draft. The document has since been withdrawn and issued in a shorter, less obtainable and less objectionable form. Several passages indicate the Selective Service's purpose.

> Many young men would not have pursued a higher education if there had not been a program of student deferment. Many young scientists, engineers, tool and die makers, and other possessors of scarce skills would not remain in their jobs in the defense effort if it were not for a program of occupational deferments. Even though the salary of a teacher has historically been meager, many young men remain in that job, seeking the reward of a deferment. . . . The club of induction has been used to drive out of areas considered to be less important to the areas of greater importance in which deferments were given, the individuals who did not or could not participate in activities which were considered essential to the defense of the Nation. . . . The psychology of granting wide choice under pressure to take action is the American or indirect way of achieving what is done by direction in foreign countries where choice is not permitted.

Black Power and protest, the university, and the draft demonstrates how the monolithic forces of society control the choices, occupations and style of life of individuals. Marcuse's monolith of society is a reality. It should be considered as such when change is contemplated. Since the romantic idea of revolution is not an option in our society, separate issues must be chosen and attacked. However, what Marcuse's analysis says to us is that our way of thinking about these issues and our attempt to change these problems must take into account the monolithic nature of society as the ground of these channeling forces.

Harvey Cox has provided theological insight into the possibility of changing these channeling and dehumanizing forces. The Biblical doctrine of creation de-mythologizes and de-divinizes the world of nature. God is not just the God of nature, Cox writes, but is the God of history and hence of political and economic life. "He is now de-mythologizing the structures of corporate human existence and bringing them under human control just as he once conquered the natural forces."[16] God is at work breaking through those structures which control man and bringing about the possibility of their being controlled by man. Richard Shaull expands this theme in his essay, "Revolution: Heritage and Contemporary Option." All nature, history and human life is subordinated to God and therefore nothing can be sacralized. All authority structures are undermined. Current principalities and powers are judged. Their change can be understood through a theology of messianism, i.e., the belief that the struggle in history for human liberation is moving toward a goal.[17] Jesus, besides demonstrating the process of liberation, was and is the new man—the liberated one. The goal of the struggle for liberation is human fulfillment. In Jesus we have the greatest example of what it means to be human.[18] The Kingdom of God points to the future reordering of human relationships and social structures. The Kingdom involves not just abstract principles, but concrete technological and political goals which are worked out "in the midst of the dialogue between the vision of man and what he can become and the situation in which we find ourselves."[19]

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[16] Harvey Cox, "The Responsibility of the Christian in a World of Technology," in Denys Munby, ed., *Economic Growth in World Perspective*. New York, 1966, p. 192.

Shaull maintains that man's attempt to point toward the Kingdom of God and his attempt to bring about liberation is best done in community:

> The possibility of combining participation in efforts to transform society with an attitude of relative freedom and critical judgment comes from being part of a community which is a point of reference beyond the immediate social struggle; in Biblical terms, a "chosen people," fully involved "in" but not entirely "of" the world: constantly open to the Kingdom of God which is now "coming" in our midst.[20]

Shaull therefore suggests that the possibility of liberation from the channeling of society could come through the establishment of communities which support their members as they struggle for liberation. However, why should individuals form communities? Why is the formation of communities perhaps the answer to the problem of dehumanization in our society? Two reasons suggest themselves.

First, the strength and force of our society is monstrous. Technology increases its power and its bureaucracy acts as a protective shield destroying most dissent. Its ability to make the irrational rational tends to perpetuate the status quo and renders protest meaningless. In short, the system has machinery which maintains itself and protects it from change. We are therefore confronted with a powerful apparatus, resistant to change and yet in need of it. Change will not come about through the efforts of one man nor from a group of men who are not extremely well organized. Change will not come about if the task is seen as an avocation one pursues on weekends. Change will only come about if men and women join together in a group pledged to work toward the vision of liberation.

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[17] Carl Oglesby and Richard Shaull, *Containment and Change*. New York, 1967, p. 192.

[18] Shaull, *Containment and Change*, p. 228.

[19] *Ibid.*, p. 233.

[20] *Ibid.*, p. 246.

Communities are necessary to resist the pressure to conform and the machinery which subsumes dissent. They must provide the power base for individual stands or individual acts which are taken. Furthermore, communities are needed to develop and maintain parallel structures to the ones existing in society. If ghetto schools provide inadequate education, perhaps the only way to provide creative education is to establish separate schools. Communities of people who have pledged their finances, resources and time would be required to carry out a project of such a magnitude. Thus, the first purpose for communities is to establish themselves as an effective instrument of social change.

The second reason for community is the establishment of a structurally rich society. Nisbet has described how the rise of the State has destroyed the importance of the primary associations. In Java, when a man lacks a family, working partners and intimate friends, he is considered poor. Today, people in our society are similarly poor. They lack what Benello calls "affectivity"—the energy needed to carry on the purposes of an individual in society.[21] The primary associations are the growth centers where people can become socialized (in the positive sense), gain affectivity, and learn the possibility of group purpose. However, since the primary associations no longer have a function in society, since they no longer have influence in the realm of politics and economics, the possibility of affectivity and meaningful relationships in a group is denied. People remain self-centered and cynical, incapable of belief either in each other or in common goals.[22]

Buber has given us a vision of what a new society would be like in these words: "There was an organic, functionally organized society, a great society built up on various societies, the great society in which men lived and worked, competed with one another and helped one another, and in each of the communities the individual human being, despite all the difficulties and conflicts felt himself at home in the clan, felt himself approved and affirmed in his functional independence and responsibility."[23] The problem is to create such a society, made up of new communities, which supply affectivity, help people find a meaningful role in their group and in society as a whole, and create true democracies where individuals through community can make decisions which affect their lives and destinies. By establishing communities to work for change, the first step is taken toward a society consisting of associations which grant individuals security and function. These communities could fulfill the role that primary associations once filled.

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[21] Benello, *Our Generation*, p. 20.

[22] *Ibid.*, p. 21.

What will these communities do? What will they look like? We can suggest six characteristics of these communities.

First, the goal of these communities is of course to effect a radical change in existing structures which will grant men the freedom and choices which are not real for them at this point in history. However, care must be taken that concern for social structures and their change not negate a concern for persons as individuals. Individuals are our chief concern; that must be kept in mind at all times. Therefore, within the group there must be a personal concern for each other, and there must be a concern for the growth and health of individuals. As Buber writes, "It is inevitable that man must transform himself to the same degree that he changes his institutions lest the new house man hopes to erect becomes his burial chamber!"[24] The community is thus a therapeutic community, as Benello has maintained. It must be the locus for the honesty and sharing which will lead to personal change. However, it cannot be a place where values and changes are merely discussed. The members should be expected to live them. Benello believes that individual growth will be possible precisely because the person will find that he counts and that he has the support of the group. Because choices and freedom will be possible, the individual will become stronger. In the atmosphere of real participation, the individual will feel and become more human.

Furthermore, Jesus is the new man, the new Adam. Through his example, we know what it means to be human. He was a man perfectly responsive to the needs of men. His ministry was carried out in two ways. He ministered to men individually. He healed the sick, talked with the lonely, comforted the anxious. Jesus also was aware of the dehumanizing forces in society. In his day, official Judaism had developed a caste system which dehumanized many. In Jesus' confrontation with this power structure, he was killed. The example of the life of Jesus can be held up by the community as the goal of each individual within it.

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[23] Buber, *Paths in Utopia*, p. 131.

[24] *Ibid.*, p. xv.

The second characteristic of community is the creation now of what it hopes will be accomplished in the future. The community serves as a model for the society of the future. However, this means that two things must happen now. First, the values which the community hopes will be accomplished in the future must be embodied in their relationships both within and outside of the community. The community will not, of course, usher in the end of sin. Separation and alienation will still be realities. In the past, communal experiments failed because of the naivete of the members regarding sin. However, values which are not upheld in the present by a small community will not be lived in the future by all of society. Second, the community may devise parallel structures, parallel organs in the present. It may wish to experiment with new forms of education, communication, or health services. The new forms may then bring about changes in the structures of society through the force of its example or by attracting to it people who currently participate in the existing structures. An underground newspaper may be the most vivid example of a parallel structure. Through experimenting with new forms, the community enacts now what it hopes will exist in the future.

Jesus is not only the model of humaneness but also the instrument of human emancipation. As Jesus changed men's lives and brought liberation in his own day, so this grace is available today. Through Christ the values hoped for can be those which are lived. It must be remembered that as values are lived, old structures are broken down and new liberating ones are erected through the work of Christ in men. The community can be God's instrument of bringing change.

The third characteristic of community is its concern for education. The kind of education which is their first concern is the development of a critical awareness, based on the community's values. Such a critical awareness will in turn lead to action to develop new forms to replace the old, and as the community is concerned about developing this critical awareness in themselves, so they are also concerned to develop it in others. The concern for education should further be undergirded by a philosophy of education. Goals should be worked out and methods should be chosen which will be effective. Groups concerned about change often fail to provide this theoretical foundation.

The fourth characteristic of community is its ability to maintain the tension between working on specific goals while attempting to change the monolithic system. We have discussed Marcuse's description of society as the foundation of the structures which channel and dehumanize individuals. The goal of community is to destroy this unified system and allow a more structurally rich society to come into existence. Therefore the labors of the group will have to center on the monolith. At the same time the size, complexity, and strength of the system renders all single approaches to the problem useless. Specific issues and specific tasks must therefore be chosen and developed. The war, the draft, the race problem are examples of the issues that could be chosen. However, the danger which arises is that the community may get so bogged down in the one issue that it will lose sight of the fact that this is just one symptom of the disease produced by the monolithic society. For example, it has been said that many people are becoming doves for the wrong reasons. A dove's concern for the number of Americans killed in Vietnam is admirable; however, when that is emphasized to the exclusion of the fact that America is destroying the hopes and desires of the Vietnamese or the fact that Vietnam is just a symptom of our arrogant and paternalistic foreign policy, then a mistake is being made. It is therefore essential that the community be capable of maintaining the tension between the ideal and the particular. Work and emphasis on specific issues should be carried out. At the same time, the relationship of the issue to the whole of society must be stressed and the ultimate goal of the change of the monolith must be emphasized.

The fifth characteristic of community is the ability to be in the world, but not of it. The nineteenth century socialists were anxious to get out into the wilderness and set up their communities. Today there is no longer a wilderness and the effectiveness of withdrawal from society is questionable. The members of the community will have to be in the world either establishing parallel structures or subverting present ones. It must, through whatever method it chooses, be in the society it wishes to change.

Yet the dangers to the community are very real. We have seen the capabilities of the monolith to destroy effective protest. We have seen the channeling forces at work in our culture. We have seen how strong the pressures are to conform to the mass standard. The dangers of being bogged down, of being channeled, of being made ineffective are very real. Paul's warning, "Be not conformed to this world," is well taken today. The community, therefore, must support each individual as he attempts to bring about change while being in society. It must supply the corrective or the analysis or the encouragement to maintain the tension. The community must provide help to each person as he attempts to be free of, and yet be in the society it wants to change.

The sixth characteristic of community is the individual member's break with those forces which channel his own life. Groups of people concerned about social change have decided that to destroy the channeling forces in society means first a repudiation of them in their own lives. This requires an analysis of one's relationship to these forces and then a decision to be free of their influence. Repudiation of these forces first of all implies a freedom and a perspective in that freedom that influences the rest of one's work. Knowing that an important decision has been made, a kind of psychic energy is gained which propels one's work and provides the strength to accomplish it. The realization that one has done what is right and not what has been predetermined by society grants him the ability to continue the task. Second, the repudiation of these forces involves an increase, not a decrease, in effectiveness. Just as the mere force of non-violent action does change opinions and attitudes, so does this personal act confront others with the issues and values involved in such a way that they must be faced.

Returning one's draft card—draft resistance—is probably the paradigm example of such an act. The man repudiates the channeling forces of the Selective Service and does instead what he believes is right. The experience of those resisters who have spoken to groups has been that the act indeed confronts the issues so vividly that people must respond to the issues raised. Resistance to the draft is a paradigm act, but it is not the only or ultimate act. Draft resistance only exemplifies what has been discussed. But new acts are needed at this point in history. It is especially important that such a repudiation of channeling and dehumanization be accomplished by white Americans in connection with the race issue. What this act could be still needs to be explored.

These are six characteristics which should be taken seriously by a community concerned about social change. Through community, resistance to and change of society may be possible.

EUGENE McCARTHY AND HIS THEOLOGY OF CIVIL RELIGION

BY JOHN M. MULDER

THE RELATIONSHIP of religion and politics has rarely been explicit, but it has been noted that in the United States, the political life of the nation is characterized by a type of "civil religion." As Robert Bellah has pointed out, this religion is not to be identified with any of the three main institutional religions—Judaism, Protestantism, or Catholicism. Rather, forged out of nationalism and religious beliefs, civil religion "has its own seriousness and integrity and requires the same care in understanding that any religion does."[1]

Bellah's analysis maintains that the frequent invocation of God in political affairs, the political rhetoric which is used to inspire awareness of national ideals and purposes, and the particular style of some political movements constitute the essential character of America's "civil religion." This religion has no Bible or Torah, save perhaps the Constitution and the Declaration of Independence. Its clergy are essentially religious men who are thrust into political life by their election by the people and by their own choice. It is not surprising that this civil religion is most easily identifiable in those men who are themselves committed Christians or Jews. Out of a common dedication to both the God and the nation which they seek to serve, they have spelled out the ideals of an American Way of Life designed to realize something of an American Dream.

Bellah's essay maintains that there have been two crucial periods in the development of America's civil religion. The first was the crisis of nationhood, in which Puritan theology, deism, and Enlightenment rationalism were synthesized for the realization of the new nation's independence. The second was the crisis of the Civil War, in which

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[1] Robert N. Bellah, "Civil Religion in America," *Daedalus*. Winter, 1967, p. 1.

the civil religion was reinterpreted to include a broader conception of humanity. At this time, the themes of redemption and reconciliation became integral parts of a civil religion seeking to bridge the gap of a divided country.

Bellah also maintains that today the civil religion of the United States is in the midst of a third crisis, originating in the unresolved conflict between white and black and complicated by foreign entanglements which sap the nation's resources and energies. Out of the present crisis, Bellah expects a new interpretation of civil religion, one which will embody a more acute awareness of America's international responsibility in a revolutionary world. There seems to be little doubt that we are in the midst of a social crisis which undoubtedly has international implications, but it is not at all clear whether Bellah's outline of America's new civil religion will prevail.

It is relatively safe to say that this new religion will not involve a decisive break with the past, a thorough renunciation of the paths which we have pursued as a nation and the ideals to which we have committed ourselves. Rather, we are likely to become more keenly aware of the demands which the ideals of justice and freedom place upon us. Whether those demands are met or rejected is largely the issue today. This means that the new interpretation of civil religion will probably be developed in more specifically ethical terms. The theological ideas of civil religion, which Bellah describes as "Exodus, Chosen People, Promised Land, New Jerusalem, Sacrificial Death and Rebirth,"[2] will remain the foundation of the faith, but the disparity between the actual and the ideal will be accentuated.

This paper is based upon Bellah's contention that a civil religion exists in America. Our thesis is that Sen. Eugene McCarthy's recent campaign and the particular content of his appeal to the people of the United States represents his new interpretation of the theology of civil religion. We shall also try to show that McCarthy's emphasis during the campaign suggests the development of a theology of civil religion along new ethical lines.

I

Eugene McCarthy is an enigma as a man and as a politician. Prior to his decision in November, 1967, to enter several Presidential primaries his reputation in Washington was based on his celebrated wit. He had delivered a stirring valedictory for Adlai Stevenson at the 1960 Democratic convention which nominated John F. Kennedy, and he had been considered as a possible running mate by Lyndon Johnson in 1964. However, since his arrival in Washington in 1948 as a congressman, his record as a legislator has hardly been brilliant. In fact, many of his colleagues in the Senate have described him as basically bored with the drudgery of legislating for the nation.

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[2] *Ibid.*, p. 18.

While interested in politics, his interest is perhaps more as a theoretician than as a practitioner of the art. E. W. Kenworthy, the New York *Times* correspondent who covered McCarthy in the Senate and for the duration of his campaign, explains his instinct for the theoretical in that "essentially Sen. McCarthy is a theologian. At least," Kenworthy says, "that is where his first interest seems to lie."[3] McCarthy's bookshelves are filled not with studies of American life by economists and political scientists but with St. Thomas Aquinas' *Summa Theologiae*, St. Augustine's *City of God* and *Confessions*, and Sir Thomas More's *Utopia*. In his own political credo, *Frontiers in American Democracy*, published in 1960, he acknowledges his debt to Jacques Maritain, Reinhold Niebuhr, John Courtney Murray, and Christopher Dawson, whom he describes as "political philosophers." He also says he owes "a little" to Machiavelli.[4]

The other books on his desk or on his book shelves are mostly volumes of poetry. Some of his favorites include *Poems* by the Greek poet, George Seferis, *Near the Ocean* by Robert Lowell, T. S. Eliot's *The Waste Land*, and Robert Bly's *The Light Around the Body*. He is fond of quoting Walt Whitman and Dylan Thomas, but he admits that such a practice is "a pretty bizarre thing for a politician to do."[5] Kenworthy says that this interest in theology and poetry stems from McCarthy's fundamental conviction that "religion and to a lesser degree poetry are the final repositories of truth, and that a government of men, properly conducted, is simply a secularization of these truths."[6]

McCarthy's interest in theology prompted him to consider the priesthood, but he finally settled on teaching sociology. At the time of his election to Congress in 1948, he was chairman of the sociology department of the Roman Catholic College of St. Thomas in St. Paul, Minn., and was teaching a rather off-beat sociology course which included Sir Thomas More's *Utopia* in the required reading. McCarthy's debt to More and the similarities between them are striking, and a comparison of the two men aids in understanding this twentieth-century poet-theologian-politician.

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[3] New York *Times*, Aug. 30, 1968.

[4] Eugene J. McCarthy, *Frontiers in American Democracy*. New York, 1960, p. 9.

[5] New York *Times*, Aug. 30, 1968.

[6] *Ibid.*

Both More and McCarthy went into politics after briefly flirting with the priesthood and teaching in a university. Furthermore, both were uncertain about the wisdom of their choice, and their misgivings found expression in "an unsparing mocking wit, and an underlying suspicion that perhaps the the only really moral posture in a wicked world is that of the martyr. Any commitment short of that and possibly even the extremity of martyrdom was fair game for slighting—never to be taken seriously." McCarthy's fabled wit has been further compared to More's, for More "had a wealth of native humor and fantasy which made it difficult for even his closest friends to single out the serious from the jocular." As one of McCarthy's friends has said of him, "Gene would kid his way through the judgment gates." Other colleagues, less friendly to him, have described him as "a bitter man" and called his irreverence "cynical."[7] Michael Janeway has observed that "something in [McCarthy] wants to laugh in the face of history, or at least in the face of journalists who presume to pronounce on what is and isn't historically fated."[8] However, this tendency to take neither himself or those around him with any kind of ultimate seriousness may be due to what Michael Sidlmayr, a medieval historian whom McCarthy enjoys quoting, calls, "the sobriety of historical awareness."[9] Even more, his wit, his sense of a cosmic comedy, may be due to his conviction that God alone controls the affairs of men and that temporal, human endeavors should be recognized merely for what they are.

Of course, one can also draw parallels between More's refusal to recognize Henry VIII as head of the Church of England and McCarthy's challenge of Johnson when no one else would consider such an impolitic act. Such adherence to principle and the claim that McCarthy received his inspiration from More may have substantial basis in fact. Besides keeping More's *Utopia* on display in his office, he also has a bas-relief of More in white plaster hanging on his wall and refers to him as "our blessed Thomas More." He told one reporter, "I don't like to play this too heavily but I've always looked on

[7] New York *Times Magazine*, December 10, 1967.
[8] *Atlantic Monthly*, January, 1968, p. 4.
[9] New York *Times Magazine*, December 10, 1967.

More as the first modern man, the first political man. He was forced to make a kind of individual and personal choice at a time when there was great upheaval and significant economic and political changes, not really very different than those we face today. Today also, there is a need for personal responsibility, for separate judgments. . . ."[10]

McCarthy's dependence on More and his own realization that in a time of upheaval a man was responsible for the morality of his own conduct is indicated in practically everything which he has written. Throughout his three major books, *Frontiers in American Democracy* (1960), *A Liberal Answer to a Conservative Challenge* (1964), and *The Limits of Power* (1967), he exhibits an acute sensitivity for the ethical dilemmas in politics. He frequently testifies to his own position that religious faith is the motivation for ethical action. In *Frontiers of American Democracy*, he devotes an entire chapter to "Religion and Politics," and in it he writes,

> The majority of Americans, and the majority of men holding public office in the United States, are sustained and fortified in their political judgments by the precepts of the natural law strengthened by religious faith. Most decisions made by majority vote of the Congress, by judges in the courts, or by the President in the loneliness of his office have moral and religious overtones.[11]

He concludes the chapter by stating a series of ideals for the Christian who enters politics and says,

> Altogether these seem to be difficult standards and demands. Their fulfilment requires heroic virtue. There is however, no other measure which is valid for Christians in politics or in any other way of life. As the great politician and saint, Thomas More, observed, "It is not possible for all things to be well, unless all men are good—which I think will not be this good many years."[12]

Thus, it is fairly evident that McCarthy can be seen as a profoundly religious man who found himself challenged by the demands of the Bible and "implicated," as he put it, in a war and a foreign policy with which he could not agree. Furthermore, he has acknowledged that religious faith implies a primacy of loyalty to God, rather than to the state. This is a potential source of conflict, he realizes, for the "conflict between conscience and the unjust and all embracing state is age-old and indeed perennial in the history of Western civilization."

[10] *Ibid.*

[11] McCarthy, *Frontiers*, p. 58.

[12] *Ibid.*, p. 62.

Nevertheless, man's duty is clear, McCarthy says: "Not only do we honor those who stand on conscience, we consider a stand against injustice the obligation of the responsible citizen."[13]

Furthermore, in a democracy the state and the citizens must maintain the proper limits of the state's authority. There are, however, two cases in which a citizen can oppose his government's laws. First, McCarthy writes, when the state legislates in an area reserved for individual choice and concern, the individual must "withhold his obedience." Second, the citizen may oppose his government when it, "acting in its proper sphere, orders actions which are wrong and contrary to right reason, an extreme example of which would be either an unjust war or an unnecessary one."[14] Thus, it appears that as McCarthy became convinced that the war in Vietnam was both unjust and unnecessary, he felt it necessary to "stand against injustice" and that the times called for "heroic virtue." As he put it, "There comes a time when an honorable man simply has to raise the flag."[15]

Such a theory of political action is based upon McCarthy's interesting synthesis of Thomistic theology, contemporary political theories, and what may be called somewhat imprecisely, the American political tradition. For McCarthy, the underlying assumption of democracy is that "man is rational and morally responsible. It accepts that political life as well as private life is subject to reasoned judgment and to the will of men."[16] As Thomas formulated it, reason was man's tool in perceiving the natural law on which all human law was based. McCarthy also speaks in terms of the natural law, and for him the state's only responsibility is to legislate according to the dictates of the natural law. Any incursion of the state into areas governed by what Thomas called divine and eternal law is a violation of the authority of the state and its proper separation. McCarthy writes, "When we come to consider religious and moral teachings beyond what is dictated by natural law, or attainable by natural reason—when we come, for instance, to consider questions of revealed truth, of faith, and of supernatural perfection—the right of the state to determine and to decide and to suppress error no longer prevails."[17]

McCarthy has thus departed from his theological teacher in his recognition of the necessity of dividing church and state, a division which he sees as necessary because of the different spheres of authority within the natural world. In separating church and state, McCarthy has obviously been influenced by the American political tradition, and he maintains that the authority of the state is curbed by the judgment of individuals who evaluate the morality of the state's laws and policies. Judgment is guided by reason, and obedience based on reason's perception of the natural law checks a government which overextends its authority.

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[13] *Ibid.*, p. 59.

[14] *Ibid.*, pp. 30-31.

[15] New York *Times Magazine*, August 10, 1968.

[16] McCarthy, *Frontiers*, p. 23.

[17] *Ibid.*, p. 33.

However, McCarthy is also aware of the ambivalence of man's reason and the ambiguity of the truth which it provides to man. For him as for Cardinal Newman, truth is not single and personal but "the limit of converging probabilities."[18] This sense of the relativity, probability, and ambiguity of truth precludes the mentality of the martyr who goes forth to his death convinced of his virtue. Rather, in Eugene McCarthy it produces a curious politician who lectures more than orates, who uses conditional rather than absolute terms, and who questions the seriousness of all things temporal in a sharp, incisive wit.

There is no pure quality, no unmixed strain in his personality. His decision to oppose Johnson was produced by complementary impulses of arrogance and humility. He often said he thought he "might" make a good president. He explains his feigned humility with a reference to a poem by the Greek poet, George Seferis. A mule carrying a queen slips and the queen falls and breaks her neck. The spirit of the queen returns to the man attending the mule and says: "Do not punish the mule. I was full of the will of God and that was too much for any beast to bear." And McCarthy, with something of the self-consciousness of the martyr, comments, "So that if you don't understand my candidacy, I really don't want you to believe that I'm carrying the whole burden of the country. I'm kind of an accidental instrument really, through which I hope that the judgment and will of this nation can be expressed on these matters which I think are of great import. . . ." However, in a different mood and a little less introspective, McCarthy explains the purpose of his campaign in terms of "making reason and the will of God prevail."[19] Here is the fusion of humility and arrogance, produced by an awareness of a final mystery in life. This is a necessary stance for the Christian, says McCarthy, for it is the result of "his awareness of the great mystery of redemption and the shared mystery and dignity of all men."[20]

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[18] New York *Times*, August 30, 1968.

[19] *Ibid.*

[20] McCarthy, *Frontiers*, p. 62.

In sum, Eugene McCarthy is essentially a Christian, a man convinced of the mystery of redemption, and consequently aware of the ultimately tentative nature of man's life. Because eternity is certain, life is only probable. Because God is, everything else may be. And yet, within him is the realization that he is responsible for more than himself and must act even within the ambiguities which surround him and in spite of the consequences. The Christian in politics, he says, "should trust that by his action and by his influence, and even in some cases by his political death, he may advance the cause of justice."[21] Such an awareness of his responsibilities meant that McCarthy acted, but to all who observed him, the decisiveness of his decision was unclear. As one observer commented, "It is unclear whether McCarthy is running *for* the Presidency or *against* the war."[22] Even the man himself indicated the tentative nature of his decision: It was "nothing like St. Paul being knocked off his horse," he told reporters.[23]

Throughout the campaign this same bantering wit was used to keep people from believing that he bore "the burden of the country," that he was a kind of "accidental instrument," and to remind himself and others that perhaps the campaign would not solve anything anyway. Parodying Eisenhower, he pledged at the beginning of his fight, "I will go to the Pentagon."[24] When Nixon picked Agnew as his running mate, he announced, "I didn't think he'd choose Steve Derounian."[25] His decision to oppose Johnson wasn't political suicide; "it's more like execution."[26] When asked whether he would step aside for Bobby Kennedy if he entered the race, he replied, "It probably won't be that voluntary."[27] And when Kennedy did enter the race and offered to help him campaign in Wisconsin, he offered the observation that "it appears as if he's fattening me up for the kill."[28] When Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., defected to the Kennedy ranks, he said that wasn't much of a loss; besides, "he sometimes writes history before the event. That can ruin the discipline."[29] He refused to campaign in drug stores, he said, because it was improper to barge up to someone and say, "Hello,

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[21] *Ibid.*, p. 43.

[22] *Atlantic Monthly*, January, 1968, p. 6.

[23] New York *Times*, December 1, 1967.

[24] New York *Times Magazine*, December 10, 1967.

[25] New York *Times*, August 9, 1968.

[26] New York *Times*, December 1, 1967.

[27] *Ibid.*

[28] New York *Times*, March 19, 1968.

[29] New York *Times*, August 30, 1968.

I'm Sen. McCarthy. How are your corns?"[30] And for the political education of the masses, he explained that morticians opposed Medicare "because it would upset the traditional doctor-patient relationship."[31]

Such irreverence gave comic relief to a campaign which was deadly serious and which embodied the hope of changing the direction of American foreign policy. McCarthy's wit seemed at times to be whistling in the dark, a laughter voiced against the black apocalyptic mood of the time. As James Reston described this atmosphere at the time of Bobby Kennedy's assassination, "There is something in the air of the modern world: a defiance of authority, a contagious irresponsibility, a kind of moral delinquency, no longer restrained by religious or ethical faith. And these attitudes are now threatening not only personal security but also public order in many parts of the world."[32] McCarthy too sensed this in the air. It was, in fact, one of the results of a nation waging a war which it could not fight, as his "blessed Thomas More" had instructed him in *Utopia*. And thus he emerged as a candidate, willing to subject the issue of the war to the "reason and will" of the people, willing to be a political martyr, realizing at the convention that he may be like the Biblical toilers who worked all day and who received the same as those who came in at the eleventh hour: "They also received a penny. Maybe that's what I'll get."[33]

We have suggested that Eugene McCarthy must be seen as a religious man who is especially sensitive to the ethical dilemmas of political life, but it remains to be shown how his theology manifested itself in the campaign, a campaign which was securely within the tradition of civil religion in the United States but which also represented a new emphasis on the theological ethics of civil religion. The primary themes of the campaign were those of Judgment, Confession, Reconciliation, and Renewal. The new aspect was basically McCarthy's insistence that the people judge the wisdom and morality of the war and that the government confess that it was wrong in its foreign policy. The country should dedicate itself to reconciliation of its races and its age groups and to a renewal of its system of government. The goal of such striving was a world in which reason and justice prevailed.

[30] New York *Times*, April 20, 1968.
[31] New York *Times*, March 31, 1968.
[32] New York *Times*, June 6, 1968.
[33] New York *Times*, August 30, 1968

II

Eugene McCarthy announced his decision to enter several Presidential primaries on November 30, 1967. It was the product of a long period of dissatisfaction with the Johnson administration's handling of the war in Vietnam. Although he voted for the Gulf of Tonkin resolution in 1964, he changed his mind and on March 1, 1966 voted for its repeal, arguing that it had been re-interpreted and given a meaning unintended by Congress. The crucial development was Under Secretary of State Nicholas Katzenbach's testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in August, 1967. Katzenbach maintained that the declaration of war by Congress was no longer necessary or desirable in a nuclear age. McCarthy was furious as he left the meeting, telling a reporter, "This is the wildest testimony I ever heard. There is no limit to what he says the President can do. There is only one thing to do—take it to the country."[34] He first thought of himself as the one to bring the issue before the country in October when Secretary of State Dean Rusk warned of the "yellow peril" in Southeast Asia. McCarthy's response to that was to call for Rusk's resignation.

He decided to enter the primaries and told Kennedy of his plans. He later said that Kennedy acknowledged his decision but promised no support. Somewhat interestingly, in his press conference on November 30, McCarthy never once said that he was a candidate for the Presidency but merely indicated that he was entering several Presidential primaries. That may be a moot point, but it does indicate the primacy of his motive of placing the issue of the war before the people. Within his announcement are hints of the very themes which were to characterize his campaign. First came the identification of the evil: Government has escaped from the control of the people and was obdurately waging an unjust war. "I am concerned," he stated, "that the Administration seems to have set no limit to the price which it seems willing to pay for a military victory." The war in turn had produced a crisis in American government; it no longer responded to the will of the people. "There is growing evidence of a deepening moral crisis in America—discontent and frustration and a disposition to take extra-legal if not illegal actions to manifest protest." Out of identification of the crisis came McCarthy's decision, one which his mentor Sir Thomas More had suggested. The decision

[34] New York *Times Magazine*, December 10, 1967.

also implied a hope, which McCarthy voiced in this way: "I am hopeful that this challenge which I am making . . . may alleviate at least in some degree this sense of political helplessness and restore to many people a belief in the processes of American politics and of American government."[35]

Such faith in the system was also a legacy of Sir Thomas More, for in *Utopia*, he writes,

> So it is in a commonwealth and in the councils of princes. If evil opinions cannot be quite rooted out, and if you cannot correct habitual attitudes as you wish, you must not therefore abandon the commonwealth. Don't give up the ship in a storm, because you cannot control the winds. And do not force unheard-of advice upon people, when you know that their minds are different from yours. You must strive to guide policy indirectly, so that you make the best of things, and what you cannot turn to good, you can at least make less bad.[36]

And so there were the makings of the crusade—the Judgment, the call for Confession, the agent of Reconciliation, but also the hope of Renewal. The Renewal was not being sought to shore up an otherwise corrupt and decaying system; rather, its purpose was to "permit us to give the necessary attention to other commitments, both at home and abroad, military and non-military, and leave us with enough resources and moral energy to deal effectively with the pressing domestic problems of the United States itself."[37]

Of course, the decision was not unanimously understood as the product of a sensitive religious conscience. Richard Rovere called McCarthy's action "odd" and "quaint," but admitted that he was the "first really interesting" national figure "to emerge since the Kennedy era."[38] Carl Rowan wrote that one should "put resentment and revenge high on the list"[39] in determining McCarthy's motives; he was presumably resentful that Johnson had chosen Humphrey over him in 1964 as his Vice Presidential candidate. Others claimed he was bored with the Senate, pointing out that he was once caught reading a book during a committee hearing. Some members of the Johnson administration said he did it to boost the sales of his book, *The Limits*

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[35] New York *Times*, December 1, 1968.

[36] Thomas More, *Utopia*. New York, 1949, p. 23.

[37] New York *Times*, December 1, 1967.

[38] *New Yorker*, December 9, 1967.

[39] Carl Rowan in the New York *Times Magazine*, December 10, 1967.

of Power, and to increase his lecture fees. McCarthy himself confessed that he entered the primaries "because I couldn't face my kids otherwise."[40] Virtue does not come unstained in any man, but these frequently heard accusations at the time scarcely do justice to the deeper impulses which prompted McCarthy to step forward. As Tom Wicker wrote in retrospect, nothing in his campaign "became him like the beginning of it."[41]

Furthermore, the impolitics of his decision and his campaign can scarcely be ignored. He was a relatively unknown senator challenging the incumbent President of his own party. His campaign was characterized by his refusal to advance appeals to special interest groups, the poor, or Negroes. He suggested that an American institution, J. Edgar Hoover, be fired. He criticized the foundation of America's post-World War II activist foreign policy of anti-communism and military strength. He questioned the Rooseveltian conception of a strong Presidency and suggested that the President use the White House only as an office and simply commute. And in Oregon, he went so far as to state openly that the well-educated were voting for him and the poorly educated were voting for Kennedy. That was no doubt true, but it was hardly the rhetoric which would win votes.

Such disdain for political considerations contributed to the crusading character of the campaign by appealing to the youths who filled out his staff. In a period of radical protest against the war, McCarthy represented an uncompromising challenge to the Establishment and thereby lured disaffected college students back into the system. Marshall McLuhan likened him to Pierre Elliott Trudeau, Prime Minister of Canada, in their common "indifference" to political power. Such detachment goes over well on television, McLuhan maintained, and McCarthy's appearance as "a small town philosopher" gave him "a nice, modest rapport with the young."[42] One reporter concluded that "whatever the complexities of his inner self, McCarthy's public self has perfectly embodied the aspirations of the peace movement. He has refused to shout or wave his arms; he has insisted on talking sense to the American people."[43]

McCarthy himself recognized the possibility of demagoguery and his responsibility as the leader of the Children's Crusade, as his legions of college students began to be called. "The Christian in politics," he wrote, "should shun the devices of the demagogue at all times, but especially in a time when anxiety is great, when tension is high, when uncertainty prevails, and emotion tends to be in the ascendency."[44] Nevertheless, despite McCarthy's aloofness, his refusal to exhort or harangue, the campaign was a crusade, manifesting a civil religion in a slightly new dress. It was the righteous man, the impolitic man, the man unstained by dirty compromise, leading the committed—his "constituency of conscience"—by his restrained charisma made effective by the powerful medium of television. The ranks of his army were united by a cause which McCarthy called "the best of all possible causes—the cause of peace."[45]

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[40] New York *Times Magazine*, December 10, 1967.

[41] New York *Times Magazine*, August 25, 1968.

[42] *Ibid.*

[43] New York *Times Magazine*, March 31, 1968.

The war, McCarthy constantly emphasized, was distracting America's attention from its proper concerns. "Increasingly," he said in Wisconsin, "we have been turned inwards on ourselves. This Administration has hugely expanded a war with none of our allies supporting us. And—despite our enormous military and economic power—we find ourself more and more impotent in world affairs."[46] Thus, McCarthy called for a time of reasoned judgment, a kind of temporal *dies irae*, which would test the character of the American people: "For the first time in our history we call upon the nation to pass judgment on a war policy—not when the war is over as we did on the Spanish-American war—but in mid-course. This is a real challenge to our moral maturity."[47]

The Judgment which McCarthy called for was the voice of the will of the people, guided by reason. The fabric of American society was being destroyed by a foreign war which was brutalizing the spirit of the American people. McCarthy saw himself as a leader for those who wished to judge the quality of American life and who wished to reassert their control over their lives. "If there is one central theme to my campaign," he stated, "it is the President's duty to liberate individuals so that they may determine their own lives, to restore that mastery and power over individual life and social enterprise which has been so seriously eroded by the growing impersonality of our society and by the misuse of centralized power." The President must be "a kind of channel for those desires and those aspirations, perhaps give some direction to the movement of the country, largely by setting people free."[48] Repeatedly, McCarthy emphasized that the campaign was a test, a judgment, a chance for people to free themselves, and an opportunity to return to creating a society in congruence with American democratic ideals. Shortly before the convention, he raised the questions which the Vietnam war asked of American citizens:

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[44] McCarthy, *Frontiers*, p. 61.

[45] New York *Times Magazine*, March 31, 1968.

[46] New York *Times*, March 28, 1968.

[47] New York *Times Magazine*, March 31, 1968.

> Vietnam asks us, as it has for many years, who we are as a nation. It asks whether we are prepared to exercise our great power with responsibility and restraint. It asks whether we are prepared to accept diversity in the world, patiently and with tolerance. It asks whether we can control the influence of the military in our society. It asks whether a war of such dimensions can be made responsive to popular judgment, whether a great country can conduct a democratic foreign policy. Finally it asks whether this nation can invest its resources and energies to build a just and democratic society at home.[49]

H. Richard Niebuhr has pointed out that the unifying theme of American Christianity has been the conception of the Kingdom of God,[50] and certainly within McCarthy's campaign this concept has been adopted in a secularized form. He does not call forth divine judgment and destruction and the creation of a New Jerusalem. Rather, he calls forth the reason and judgment of the American people. This reason is not the measure of all things, for reflected in McCarthy's rhetoric there is the American Dream of civil religion which he describes as the dream of "a just and democratic society at home." The fact that God is not invoked to sanctify the dream is not an indication of McCarthy's civil irreligiosity, but an indication of his civil religious maturity. He has written that the Christian politician is "not necessarily the one who makes of every cause a 'crusade,' presenting himself like Carlyle's crusader as 'the minister of God's justice, doing God's judgment of the enemies of God.' He should himself avoid unwarranted appeals to religion. He has a very special responsibility to keep the things of God separate from those of Caesar."[51] It is unlikely that McCarthy's own temperament, his awareness of the tentative nature of man's perception of truth, and his sense of "the mystery of redemption" could prompt him to lead as a crusader. And yet, he was a crusader, a kind of sacrificial crusader who suffered defeat in order that the judgment of the American people could be executed and that the processes of government might be renewed.

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[48] New York *Times Magazine*, August 25, 1968.

[49] New York *Times*, August 16, 1968.

[50] H. Richard Niebuhr, *The Kingdom of God in America*. New York, Harper Torchbooks, 1959, pp. 1-16 and preface.

[51] McCarthy, *Frontiers*, pp. 60-61.

Studies of the New Hampshire primary indicate that he did serve as a voice of the voters' reason and judgment; more than half of those who voted for him didn't know his position on the war, and the more they knew the less likely they were to vote for him. In short, the study concluded that the vote was one of dissatisfaction with the course of the war and the policy of the Administration, but not necessarily a dovish vote.[52]

McCarthy sensed that the campaign had succeeded in freeing the American people's voice and making the system sensitive once again to their will. In words that were prophetic, he wrote in a column in the New York *Times*, which appeared the day before Johnson's bombing halt speech and withdrawal from the race, that "perhaps the most important result of my campaign so far has been to provide a reminder that, in a democracy, any political structure can be made to yield to the popular will."[53]

Throughout the campaign, McCarthy also made his appeal to what he called "the constituency of conscience, of hope and trust in the future."[54] This also must be seen in terms of civil religion's parallel with the sect typology of other religions. In the sect, the crucial characteristic is the idea of voluntary association; i.e., through commitment to a common cause, an individual joins the group, united by their adherence to a primary ideal.[55] McCarthy's civil religion formed its sect in the same fashion; however, in it the commitment to the realization of Niebuhr's Kingdom of God ideal, secularized as "the just and democratic society" in the McCarthy campaign, implied the theme of judgment. The "just and democratic society" inevitably brought the unjust and undemocratic society of contemporary America into judgment, called it back to its foundations, and stirred its renewal. McCarthy said he was not asking for national repentance, but it is obvious that he was asking for confession. As he told the delegates from North Carolina at the convention, the United States must admit we have been wrong because "we have a special responsibility for the war in Vietnam, since we said in 1964 that what has happened wouldn't happen."[56]

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[52] New York *Times*, March 15, 1968.

[53] New York *Times*, March 30, 1968.

[54] *Ibid.*

[55] See H. Richard Niebuhr, *The Social Sources of Denominationalism*. New York, 1957, and William Lee Miller, "American Religion and American Political Attitudes," *Religious Perspectives in American Culture*, James Ward Smith and A. Leland Jamison, eds. Princeton, 1961, pp. 81-118.

Thus, the campaign of Eugene McCarthy was not necessarily *for* the Presidency but for the renewal of the processes of American government and society. It took on the form of a civil religious crusade, aimed at an unjust and unethical war which had paralyzed the control of the American people over themselves and their government. The war had distracted people from the realization of the ideal to which they had dedicated themselves, and it had sapped the resources for achieving it. McCarthy stood up as a quixotic leader, running not for the office but against it, running to free the people, to open the processes of government. His call was for renewal, not a revolution. In all, his Thomistic theology gave him a confidence in the reason and will of the American people which needed only to be awakened. Such a Great Awakening would not usher in an eschatological realization of the American Dream, but it would make society less corrupt, less unjust.

III

The success of Eugene McCarthy's campaign for the Presidential nomination of the Democratic party is not difficult to assess. We have maintained that he did not actually expect to secure the nomination but to bring the judgment and will of the people to bear on the Vietnam policy of the Johnson administration. He sought to renew the processes of American political life and in so doing to set the people free to realize a "just and democratic society," torn by division and in need of reconciliation. As he put it, "The time has come for us to break out of the patterns of the past, to set our people free. . . . [The campaign] is not the politics of joy, or the politics of punishment, but a politics of reconcilation."[57] At the end of the campaign, the unlikely crusader reflected, "It is a long way from New Hampshire in the cold and snow . . . , raising issues all the way, sometimes alone, but for a good part with the support of Robert Kennedy, just two of us, willing to risk something of what was called the future."[58] The loss of the platform fight was not in vain, he reasoned, for "that was not the measure of the judgment which was passed in this country."[59]

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[56] New York *Times*, August 30, 1968.

[57] New York *Times*, April 20, 1968.

The Judgment prevailed, and moreover, the system had been opened and the dissaffected brought into it. Their exposure taught them that one could trust in the American ideal of a democratic society, even though its democracy was not available to all and injustice persisted. Through his campaign, the confidence in the system, the faith in the civil religion, had been reawakened. "I think that the outlook," said McCarthy after the convention vote had been tallied,

> is one that must be reassuring: one of confidence and one of optimism—not really of our own making but by virtue of our having discovered it to exist in the minds and heart of the people of this country. I think we can say that we were willing to open the box and see what America was. We had that kind of trust and that kind of confidence. And when we opened it, we found that the people of this nation were not found wanting.[60]

The accent of Grace is touched upon finally—"not really of our own making"—and the campaign ends on the transformation with which Grace abounds. Seeming defeat had been turned into victory, for the character of the American people had been vindicated: They "were not found wanting."

The campaign was a victory in defeat. There is little doubt that McCarthy and his Children's Crusade did open the processes of American political life. Reform continues in the Democratic party in perhaps a stumbling fashion, although McCarthy's opposition to Teddy Kennedy as Senate Whip is inexplicable as well as his forfeiture of his Senate Foreign Relations Committee seat to the hawkish Sen. Gale McGee of Wyoming. His campaign lured Bobby Kennedy into the race and together with the Tet offensive, they at least nudged Johnson closer to his decision to halt the bombing and to remove himself as a divisive figure in American politics. Furthermore, it made the public opinion speak clearly to Richard Nixon, who otherwise might have made his campaign from a more hawkish stance.

In sum, Eugene McCarthy did serve as an "accidental instrument" of the judgment and reason of the American people. While he effected little reconciliation of the races or the generations, he did reconcile a great many people to the essential viability of the American system of government. He gave others new hope both in the ideal of an American democratic society, based on justice, and in the possibility of realizing that ideal. In short, he served as an evangelist of American civil religion in reawakening the faith in the American Dream which was being eroded by fear and despair. From these he sought to liberate the people, free them to control their lives again. This new aspect in America's civil religion—the freedom of a citizen's reason to judge the policies of his government and his duty to do so—is a singular contribution to the humanization of a society which McCarthy saw becoming more impersonal and more dominated by external rather than individual authority. Its emphasis upon measuring policies against the ideal of a just and democratic society, upon determining the ethical validity of governmental endeavors, and upon individual responsibility for such judgments, suggests the beginning of a new, more mature phase in the development of America's civil religion.

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[58] New York *Times*, August 28, 1968.

[59] New York *Times*, August 30, 1968.

[60] *Ibid.*

ABOUT THE COVER

The Byzantine-inspired double eagle which has become DIMENSION's cover symbol has a long and mysterious history. A single eagle is a more familiar Christian symbol, representing not only St. John the Evangelist, but in some circles baptism, the Ascension of Christ, and the Last Judgment. The double eagle (actually a double-headed eagle) appears most commonly in the Byzantine Empire as an emperor's symbol, suggesting the combination of cross and crown in the single figure of the divinely favored ruler. It was used on coins and tapestries, and as architectural ornamentation. Double eagles can still today be found adorning Greek Orthodox churches, especially in the monasteries of Mt. Athos.

The history of the double eagle before Byzantine times is nearly lost. Specimens have been found in architectural remains of the Hittite kingdoms, leading to speculation that it was introduced into Byzantium and Europe by crusaders returning from Turkey and the Holy Land. Another intriguing theory associates the Roman Janus, two-headed god of beginnings, with the Christian single eagle, which also has to do with the new beginnings of baptism, ascension, and judgment.

DIMENSION's double eagle symbolizes above all the theologian working in two "dimensions," the church and the secular world. It represents academic theology and practical ministry, not as separate, but as two aspects of the same ministry, two perspectives on the saving work of Jesus Christ, two dimensions of the minister's life as a man called by God to be his servant.

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